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Abstract 
 
This research defends a particular version of cosmopolitanism: statist cosmopolitanism. 
Its point of departure is the current debate in international political theory on the moral 
standing of boundaries and the scope of distributive equality. Against existing 
cosmopolitan approaches, it is argued that states have an intrinsic normative standing and 
constitute the most relevant agents of global justice. Against non-cosmopolitan 
approaches, it is argued that the defence of compatriot favouritism in the distribution of 
egalitarian obligations rests on a confusion between motivation and principles in ethical 
reasoning. More positively, this research claims that the state is not only compatible with 
the cosmopolitan defence of distributive equality but also necessary for its realization. 
The work is divided in three parts. The first part introduces some preliminary 
observations and illustrates the historical roots of the controversy between statism and 
cosmopolitanism with particular reference to the Enlightenment. The second part 
criticizes cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan approaches to global justice and defends 
both cosmopolitanism and the state. It illustrates how the limits of cosmopolitan and non-
cosmopolitan arguments are due to more fundamental methodological flaws, regarding 
the place of ideal and non-ideal considerations in normative theories of global justice. 
The third part reconciles the defence of cosmopolitanism with the defence of the state 
both at the level of principle and at the level of agency. At the level of principle, it shows 
how cosmopolitan egalitarian obligations to relieve relative deprivation may be grounded 
on sufficientarian responsibilities to relieve absolute deprivation. At the level of agency, 
it argues that those obligations ought to be understood politically – not just morally – and 
that states constitute the most relevant agents for their realization. Finally, the research 
clarifies how the transition from principles to agency could be made by local 
cosmopolitan “avant-gardes”, responsible for acting within the state and thinking beyond 
it. 
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Introduction 
 
Cosmopolitans think that states (and the political community underpinning them) hardly 
matter normatively. Non-cosmopolitans think that states matter so much that they 
override global distributive equality. Statist cosmopolitanism – the account this research 
tries to develop – argues that both the state and global distributive equality matter. States 
matter so much that without them global distributive equality would not be feasible. 
Global distributive equality matters so much that without it the partitioning of people 
into states would be morally indefensible. 
Normative theory on global justice may be effective if it is able to reconcile 
moral desirability and political feasibility. This research takes as a point of departure the 
limits of both cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans to theorize effectively about global 
justice. To understand these limits we need to distinguish between claims of principle 
and claims of agency. Claims of principle tell us what we should do. Claims of agency 
tell us how we do what we do. Most cosmopolitan accounts focus on principles and 
neglect agency. Most non-cosmopolitan accounts focus on agency and derive principles 
from it. Statist cosmopolitanism attempts to say something about both principles and 
agency. With regard to principles, it tries to justify global distributive equality. With 
regard to agency, it tries to illustrate the normative relevance of the state. 
An important tradition in political theory starts by taking people as they are and 
the laws as they can be. Contrary to that tradition, most cosmopolitans start with an ideal 
of how laws can be and overlook the way people are. Most non-cosmopolitans start with 
the reality of how people are and overlook how laws can be. Following that tradition, 
statist cosmopolitanism pays attention to people as they are and to the laws as they can 
be. It tries to defend a version of cosmopolitanism able to account both for the normative 
desirability of the cosmopolitan ideal and for its political feasibility and motivational 
sustainability. 
What does “taking people as they are” mean? People vary from each other; they 
also vary from place to place and from time to time. Some worry only about themselves; 
some others about their family and friends; some consider only their fellow-nationals; 
some keep changing their mind. Yet others care about the world at large. I call the latter 
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the cosmopolitan “avant-garde”. The cosmopolitan avant-garde is both rooted and 
outward looking. It acts within the state, yet thinks beyond it. It talks to people as they 
are about how the laws can be. 
How should laws be? Laws should protect individuals’ life and guarantee the 
satisfaction of their basic needs. They should make sure that no one falls below a 
subsistence threshold and that every individual in the world has enough as is necessary 
for him to lead a minimally decent life. Both cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan 
accounts on global justice agree upon as much. Statist cosmopolitanism argues that if as 
much is agreed upon then (at the level of principle) much more than non-cosmopolitans 
are usually keen to grant follows. A concern for the relief of absolute deprivation at the 
individual level gives rise to a concern for the relief of relative deprivation at the level of 
states. On matters of principle, even if we start statists we might end up cosmopolitans. 
If we take seriously global equality at the level of principle then (at the level of 
agency) much more than cosmopolitans have been prepared to discuss follows. We need 
to think about what sorts of obligations to place for relieving relative deprivation and 
about how such obligations could be feasibly and stably allocated. Statist 
cosmopolitanism argues that egalitarian obligations should be understood politically and 
not just morally. It further suggests that for political obligations to be effectively 
allocated we must acknowledge the primary role of states. On matters of agency, even if 
we start cosmopolitans we might end up statists. 
 
The defence of statist cosmopolitanism is organized as follows: 
 
Part One introduces some preliminary observations. More specifically: 
 
Chapter I aims to reconstruct the historical roots of the controversy between those in 
favour of cosmopolitanism and those against it. It focuses in particular on the 
Enlightenment and illustrates how the tension between cosmopolitanism and statism 
during much of the 18th century is due to the fact that the term “cosmopolitanism” 
initially only referred to an individualist moral attitude, that of the citizen of the world. A 
similar moral attitude was criticized for failing to combine the principle of equal 
treatment with an adequate conception of agency thereby cultivating citizens’ 
indifference to the common good and leading to political passivity. A discussion of this 
issue is provided by analysing the writings of Voltaire and Rousseau and their reception 
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in the thought of Immanuel Kant. It is only in the writings of Kant, I argue, that the 
defence of states at the level of agency supplements the defence of cosmopolitanism at 
the level of principle. 
 
Part Two defends the state and cosmopolitanism. More specifically:  
 
Chapter II takes a critical distance from existing cosmopolitan accounts which, contrary 
to Kant, try to ground the defence of global distributive equality on a critique of political 
membership. The chapter’s task is brought into sharper focus by assessing the way in 
which global distributive obligations are usually justified in global contractarian theories. 
By focusing on the circumstances of global justice, the nature of the parties,  the veil of 
ignorance and the sense of justice, the chapter shows how the cosmopolitan critique of 
political membership modifies the contractarian premises in a way that is both 
unwarranted and unnecessary. While failing to establish principles of global distributive 
justice, existing cosmopolitan adaptations ignoring the relevance of political membership 
simply weaken the method’s justificatory potential. 
 
Chapter III adds to the critique of existing cosmopolitan accounts, a critique of non-
cosmopolitan accounts. It argues that the limits of both approaches are due to more 
fundamental methodological flaws, namely, the misplacement of ideal and non-ideal 
considerations in their analysis of global justice. Non-cosmopolitans approach the nature 
of states by trying to show how special associative relations ground particular 
distributive obligations: they take people as they are but not laws as they can be. On the 
other hand cosmopolitans start with a justification of cosmopolitan principles but 
overlook the issue of agency: they take laws as they can be, but not people as they are. 
The chapter suggests that any adequate theory of justice should place ideal and non-ideal 
constraints at the appropriate level of analysis. It should start with ideal principles 
grounded on relevant circumstances of justice and from there move to the necessity of 
non-ideal agents sensitive to the political conditions of their realization. 
 
Part Three reconciles the defence of the state and the defence of cosmopolitanism 
within an alternative approach to global justice: statist cosmopolitanism. More 
specifically:  
 
 14 
Chapter IV takes up the issue of principles. It defends an ideal of global distributive 
equality without endorsing usual cosmopolitan premises on the arbitrariness of political 
membership. It starts by clarifying the notions of absolute and relative deprivation as 
well as the conceptions of justice corresponding to each: sufficientarian justice and 
egalitarian justice. The chapter criticizes the sharp distinction usually drawn between 
such conceptions and argues that in specific circumstances of global justice both are 
conducive to principles for an equal distribution of relative shares. It further argues that 
the satisfaction of sufficientarian principles at the level of individuals gives rise to an 
egalitarian concern for the distribution of power at the level of states. The rest of the 
chapter articulates such statist egalitarian account of justice and defends the idea of 
equality of power against a number of objections. 
  
Chapter V takes up the issue of agency. It argues that cosmopolitan obligations should 
be understood politically and not just morally and emphasizes the importance of non-
ideal associative relations for their allocation. The chapter stresses that cosmopolitan 
political obligations may be discharged when the institutional transformations they 
demand are both feasible and stable. Cosmopolitanism becomes a feasible option by 
taking advantage of political mechanisms that allow citizens to transform collective 
institutions by putting constraints on each other’s actions. It may hope to be stably 
maintained by appealing to familiar associations, deeper social ties, cultural resources 
and mutual understandings that further motivate imperfect moral agents. The concepts of 
popular sovereignty and civic education are introduced to further clarify issues of 
feasibility and stability in the allocation of political obligations. 
  
Chapter VI considers the link between principles and agency. It analyses more fully the 
issue of how states could be transformed in a way that promotes imperatives of 
cosmopolitan justice. It argues that there is no need to make heroic assumptions about 
what ordinary citizens may or may not be motivated to do when it comes to specific 
initiatives promoting cosmopolitan justice. It is enough to rely on those civic and 
political movements that are already morally or politically sensitive to issues of global 
poverty and power inequalities and argue that they may take the lead in promoting 
cosmopolitan imperatives. The chapter attempts to clarify this issue by introducing the 
notion of a “cosmopolitan avant-garde”. It goes on to explore how one should understand 
the concept of an avant-garde movement, who constitutes it and how the civic initiatives 
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of a cosmopolitan avant-garde might affect the rest of the citizen body thus gaining 
support for cosmopolitan transformations. 
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Chapter I 
Statism and Cosmopolitanism:  
A Historical Survey 
 
 
1. The idea of cosmopolitanism during the Enlightenment 
 
“Un cosmopolite n’est pas un bon citoyen” – a cosmopolitan is not a good citizen. This is 
how in 1762, the fourth edition of the Dictionnaire of the French Academy commented 
on the concept of cosmopolitanism. In a more moderate, yet hardly unambiguous voice 
the Encyclopédie of Diderot and D’Alembert also remarked: “on se sert quelquefois de 
ce nom, en plaisantant, pour signifier un homme qui n’a pas de demeure fixe, ou bien un 
homme qui n’est étranger nulle part“.1  Both definitions provide a clear example of how, 
contrary to what is frequently assumed, the Enlightenment was as much the age of 
cosmopolitanism as of the adversity to it.2 
This chapter explores the historical roots of the controversy between statism and 
cosmopolitanism during the Enlightenment.3 After shortly clarifying the political and 
                                                
1
 “We sometimes use this term, in joking, in order to refer to a man who has no fixed residence, that is to 
say  a man who is nowhere are stranger”. Both definitions are cited in Georges Pieri, “Raison Et 
Cosmopolitisme Au XVIIIe Siècle,” in L'idea Di Cosmopolitismo. Circolazione E Metamorfosi, ed. 
Lorenzo Bianchi (Naples: Liguori, 2002), 358. 
2
 The assumption is frequently made in normative studies emphasizing the roots of the cosmopolitan 
project in the philosophy of the Enlightenment, particularly the thought of Kant. See, for example, Martha 
Nussbaum, ed., For Love of One Country? (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002) 7-11, Onora O'Neill, Bounds of 
Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 136-37, Kok-Chor Tan, Justice without Borders : 
Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 33-35, 
Jeremy Waldron, “What Is Cosmopolitan?,” Journal of Political Philosophy 8, no. 2 (2000): 236 ff. .  
3
 For good historical overviews on the Enlightenment idea of cosmopolitanism and its tensions with 
patriotism, see Lorenzo Bianchi, ed., L'idea Di Cosmopolitismo. Circolazione E Metamorfosi (Naples: 
Liguori, 2002), Lorenzo Bianchi and Alberto Postigliola, eds., Un "Progetto Filosofico Della Modernità" 
(Naples: Liguori, 2000), Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and Ralph Schumacher, eds., Kant Und 
Die Berliner Aufklaerung. Akten Des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
2001), Pauline Kleingeld, “Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 60, no. 3 (1999), Nicolao Merker, L'illuminismo in Germania. L'età Di 
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intellectual context in which the terms “cosmopolite” and “citoyen du monde” started to 
re-circulate, the tensions between cosmopolitanism and patriotism are assessed.4 
Focusing on the reflections of some key intellectual figures of the Enlightenment, the 
chapter argues that their disagreement on the normative justification of cosmopolitanism 
is due to an under-theorized link between cosmopolitan principles and cosmopolitan 
agency for most of the 18th century. 
In the first part of the chapter, I introduce two different ways of understanding 
the term “cosmopolitan” which circulated during the Enlightenment. The first is a 
negative one, associated to the attitude of private individuals who refuse allegiance to 
any kind of political community. The second is a positive one, associated to the attitude 
of the “sage” who makes his loyalty to a particular political community conditional upon 
its realization of a universal ideal of moral equality. The prevalence of either 
conceptualization produces an oscillation from a sceptic or even hostile evaluation of 
cosmopolitanism on the side of authors such as Voltaire or Rousseau to the enthusiastic 
endorsement of it by authors such as Leibniz and Diderot. 
The second part of the chapter illustrates why in both the negative and positive 
understanding of cosmopolitanism the link between principles and agency remains 
under-theorized. By analysing the development of Rousseau’s assessment of 
cosmopolitanism from the Discourses to The Social Contract, I try to show how 
cosmopolitanism fails to inspire a proper political project because it is considered either 
motivationally weak or politically dangerous. Cosmopolitanism represents either the 
attitude of the moral hero or that of the indifferent citizen; in any case, it is limited to a 
more or less commendable individual point of view, which fails to inspire a thorough 
reform of social institutions. 
The third part of the chapter shows how the persistence of this problématique 
leads to a conceptual turn in Kant’s political writings. By assessing the role of 
cosmopolitanism in Kant’s philosophy of history and in his theory of right, I try to show 
how an abstract and ill-defined concept, as cosmopolitanism is by the middle of the 18th 
century, acquires political prominence and full conceptual dignity. Kant is the first to 
reconcile patriotism and cosmopolitanism, principles and agency, a cosmopolitan idea of 
                                                                                                                                        
Lessing (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1989), Thomas J. Schlereth, The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment 
Thought (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977). 
4
 Throughout this work I use the terms “state”, “political community” and “polity” interchangeably. The 
exact definition of political community is provided in chapter V. By patriotism I mean, roughly, a 
principled allegiance to the state and to the political community underpinning it. 
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equality and the normative standing of the state. Clarifying the historical relevance of 
Kant’s statist-cosmopolitan approach to global justice introduces to the rest of this 
research where an ideal similar to the Kantian one is further defended from an analytical 
perspective. 
 
2. Positive and negative cosmopolitanism 
 
“When he was asked where he came from he would say: ‘I am a citizen of the world’.” 
Antiquity commentators (Greek and Latin) have invariably attributed the term 
kosmopolitēs to both Socrates and to Diogenes the Cynic.5 Yet the spirit in which either 
(if any of them) would have pronounced the sentence is rather different, and different 
were also the models they inspired during the Enlightenment. 
The essence of Socrates’ predicament was to teach people to think for 
themselves, a maxim that Kant would later transform in one of the founding principles of 
the Enlightenment.6 For Socrates, every human being was equally able of moral 
rectitude, regardless of where he came from. Cosmopolitanism represented a “positive” 
commitment, the attitude of a philosopher who believed in the universal force of reason 
and decided to put it at the service of moral virtue in both citizens and foreigners. Yet 
such cosmopolitanism did not undermine a firm political allegiance to native political 
institutions. Socrates was a good citizen (he had even risked his life during the first stage 
of the Peloponnesian war) and when arrested for not honouring local gods and corrupting 
young people, he refused to escape and submitted to execution.7 
In the case of Diogenes the Cynic – a character that Plato allegedly called 
“Socrates gone mad”8 – we confront a completely different meaning of the term 
cosmopolitanism. Diogenes’ assertion to be a citizen of the world expressed no positive 
commitment; he recognized no attachment to anyone in the world, refused to abide by 
                                                
5
 See Eric Brown, “Hellenistic Cosmopolitanism,” in A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, ed. Mary 
Louise Gill; Pierre Pellegrin (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 549 , Derek Heater, World Citizenship and 
Government : Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1996) 6-8. 
6
 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment,” in Practical Philosophy, ed. 
Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1784] 1996), 11. 
7
 It must be noted that Socrates commitment to Athens was not unconditional. As Plato often makes clear, 
Socrates appreciated Athenian democracy and its requisite respect for free speech because he recognized 
that only where such values were politically realized did his teaching become at all possible. See Grg. 
461e1-3; Apology 37c5-e2; Meno 80b4-7, in Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the 
Letters, ed. Huntingon Cairns, Hamilton, Edith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961 ). 
8
 Brown, “Hellenistic Cosmopolitanism,” 551. 
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the polity’s laws and dismissed conventional politics. Here the loyalty to the world 
[kosmos] instead of a particular polis was a merely negative statement, it did not 
correspond to any positive assumption of ethical responsibility extending to the cosmos 
the civic feelings of the polity. Diogenes considered living in harmony with the laws of 
nature the sole legitimate moral philosophy but he never attempted to teach a similar 
doctrine. While rejecting all positive obligations to friends, family or the polity, 
Diogenes’ emphasis on being a “citizen of the world” was merely intended to deride the 
assumption of any civic responsibility. 
Interestingly enough, both understandings of cosmopolitanism – the positive and 
the negative one – were revived during the Enlightenment. Throughout the 17th and the 
18th century, Europe appeared dramatically torn by political conflicts determined by the 
clashes of particularistic religious, ethnic and political allegiances. A new world had 
started to emerge from the agony of medieval institutions, which, having lost legitimacy, 
exploited confessional hostility to ensure a contingent survival. The crisis of the 
Christian res publica, the emergence of Renaissance ideals and a renewed interest in the 
study of Greek and Latin texts understandably brought cosmopolitanism to the fore. The 
Socratic ideal appeared particularly apt for responding to the needs of a new age, 
promising as it did to maintain universal secularism and subjective autonomy, earthly 
solidarity and everyday tolerance. Yet, the negative meaning of cosmopolitanism was 
also employed by selfish and irreverent individuals, who declared to be citizens of the 
world only as a means of denying responsibility for any kind of political engagement. 
Leibniz was among the first to refer implicitly to the Greek “positive” 
understanding of cosmopolitanism. “Justice”, he claimed, is the virtue guiding affection 
to all human beings, “the Greeks call it philanthropy”, it is “a charity of the sage who 
follows the decrees (dictata) of wisdom and the dictates of reason”.9 The exercise of 
justice should be considered unbound to national conventions and particular political 
circumstances because, he clarified, “as long as something of consequence can be done, I 
am indifferent on whether it is done in Germany or France, I only wish the good of the 
human race”.10  
                                                
9
 See his Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus (1694) in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Political Writings, ed. 
Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 165-76. For a discussion of these issues, see 
André Robinet, “G. W. Leibniz: L'esprit Cosmopolitique Jusqu'à La Lettre,” ed. Lorenzo Bianchi (Naples: 
Liguori, 2002). 
10
 Ibid. 
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Leibniz interpreted this cosmopolitan “sense of justice” as a universal instinct of 
compassion, a sociable feeling found in every human being that the exercise of reason 
had the duty to bring into light when obscured by opposing conventions or by selfish 
inclinations.11 Yet he was sadly aware that the philanthropic attitude of single individuals 
was not enough for cosmopolitan projects to develop worldwide. One had to start from 
somewhere, seek support from this or that sovereign monarch, and construct relevant 
alliances. As he confessed to Peter the Great in 1712, while asking him to sponsor the 
project of an international Academy of Sciences, gathering researchers from all over 
Europe: “as long as I can find the means and occasions to contribute efficiently to the 
common good on all these subjects – and here I make no distinction between nations and 
parties – I would rather see the sciences brought to flourish in Russia than see them 
cultivated in mediocrity in Germany. The country where this project will go best, will be 
the one most dear to me, since the entire human race will profit from it and the real 
treasures will increase”.12 
Leibniz’s attitude was typical of several other philosophers throughout the 
Enlightenment. So Denis Diderot wrote to David Hume: “my dear David, you belong to 
all the nations of the earth and you never ask a man for his place of birth. I flatter myself 
that I am like you, a citizen of the great city of the world”.13 Again, in introducing the 
term “citoyen du monde” in his Encyclopèdie, Diderot approvingly reported the Baron de 
Montesquieu’s saying: “If I know of anything advantageous to my family but not to my 
country, I should try to forget it. If I knew of anything advantageous to my country 
which was prejudicial to Europe and to the human race, I should look upon it as a 
crime”.14 
This positive understanding of cosmopolitanism, which equated philosopher to 
citoyen du monde, rejected political chauvinism and praised universalistic patriotism, 
was by no means the only one to circulate during the Enlightenment. Towards the middle 
of the 18th century it was being heavily counterweighted by a more negative conception, 
going back all the way to the model of Diogenes the Cynic and indeed employing the 
very Greek word with which Diogenes allegedly introduced himself. It is possible to find 
this second use of the term in the first 18th century text where the term “cosmopolite” 
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explicitly appears for the first time. Indeed Louis-Charles Fougeret de Montbron – one of 
the lesser-known French men of letters of the 18th century whom Diderot knew and 
despised – gave a rather unappealing definition of cosmopolitanism. 15 In his 
autobiography Le Cosmopolite ou Citoyen du monde, which allegedly inspired Voltaire’s 
Candide, he describes how he travelled everywhere without being committed to anyone 
because everything was indifferent to him: 
 
Tout les pays me sont égaux pourvu que j’y jouisse en liberté de la clarté des cieux et que je puisse 
entretenir convenablement mon individu jusqu’à la fin de son terme. Maître absolu de mes volontés et 
souverainement indépendant, changeant de demeure, d’habitudes, de climat, selon mon caprice, je tiens a 
tout et ne tiens a rien.16  
  
In a somewhat similar tone, Raynal’s Histoire des deux Indes has a cosmopolitan 
merchant declare his intentions: 
 
Périsse mon pays, périsse la contrée ou je commande, périssent les citoyens et l’étranger … Tout les lieux 
de l’Univers me sont égaux. Lorsque j’aurais dévasté, sucé, extenué une région, il en restera toujours une 
autre où je pourrais porter mon or et en jouir en paix.17 
 
The examples of Leibniz and Fougeret de Montbron clearly illustrate the double 
interpretation to which the cosmopolitan idea was subject over the course of the 18th 
century. On the positive understanding, the concept appears morally strong but 
politically empty; it presents an admirable declaration of principles yet fails to be 
integrated by a positive conception of agency. Too weak to inform a concrete political 
vision, the best version of cosmopolitanism cultivated a mere academic fashion: the 
fashion of travellers, scientists, or writers whose communion of interests was embodied 
by that secular ecclesia called “république des lettres”. 
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On the other hand, the negative understanding of cosmopolitanism does not seem 
without political implications. Cosmopolitanism emerges here in dangerous opposition to 
any kind of patriotism and challenges individuals’ loyalty to the civic body. It threatens 
an already fragile social bond; it encourages individual anarchy and social hypocrisy. It 
leads to a sceptic and rather libertine attitude, stressing how the citizen of the world is in 
fact nothing more than an ironic and dismissive character, swapping homeland 
institutions and changing country according to his whim. 
Under no circumstances would the 18th century philosophes – many of whom had 
put themselves at the service of enlightened monarchs - wish to be confused with these 
irreverent characters whose citizenship in the world turned out to be a sort of 
adventurous vagabondage and anarchical derision of the social order. Far from providing 
a remedy against selfishness and individualism, cosmopolitanism would in this case 
merely amplify those instincts. Therefore, if on one hand the potential contribution of 
moral cosmopolitanism was appreciated, its unqualified opposition to patriotism would 
rather be suspected. The concept maintained this ambiguity for most of the 18th century 
until a new combination of principles and agency emerged from opposing considerations. 
 
 
3. Patriotism and the citoyen du monde 
 
Although Voltaire does not explicitly mention the term “cosmopolitanism”, the concept 
is introduced in his Dictionnaire philosophique with reference to the entry “patrie” 
(homeland). As Voltaire defines it:  
 
A homeland is made up of several families; and just as you normally stand by your family out of pride 
(amour propre), when there is no conflicting interest, because of the same pride, you support your town or 
your village, which you can call your homeland.18 
 
Further down, the same point is made even more clearly: 
 
We all want to be sure of being able to sleep in our own beds without someone else arrogating to himself 
the right to tell us to sleep elsewhere. Everybody wants to be sure of his wealth and his life. With everyone 
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thus having the same desires, it works out that the private interest becomes the general interest: when we 
express our hopes for our selves, we are expressing them for the Republic.19  
 
In sketching this Hobbesian hypothesis on the foundation of the state, Voltaire 
sounds hardly enthusiastic about the greatness of patriotic feelings. Only a natural 
instinct of self-protection and the need to preserve their own life, nurtures people’s 
attachment to collectively framed political institutions. Individuals’ motivation to support 
particular political communities is simply due to their amour propre. For Voltaire, as for 
Hobbes, the need for a socio-political aggregation leading to a civic union does not arise 
out of a common effort celebrating people’s good will. On the contrary, if humans were 
naturally good they would not need to pay collective security at the price of individual 
liberty. They would not need a coercive force to suppress their natural instincts. Hence, 
the origin of political power does not suggest fraternity but potential aggressiveness; 
common decisions are not due to tolerance but to reciprocal fear; association is not 
imposed by solidarity but by uncontained egoism. Far from grounding political 
community on humanitarian values and cosmopolitan feelings, state institutions arise 
precisely to compensate for their absence.  
It is clear that for Voltaire human beings do not transform their character by 
entering the civic sphere. Subordinating themselves to political institutions does not 
determine any qualitative transformation in people’s natural instincts. They support their 
homeland in so far as they support themselves and they respect the community’s bond in 
so far as this bond protects them from external threats. Such attitude marks no progress 
from a purely individualistic and interest-maximising attitude to something more 
authentic from a collective moral perspective. Not only do human beings never mature 
deeper social feelings towards their fellows, but also they may even actively harm them, 
if personal or national security is endangered. In the words of Voltaire:  
 
It is sad that in order to be a good patriot one is very often the enemy of the rest of humankind. The elder 
Cato, that good citizen, always said when speaking in the senate: “That’s what I think, and let Carthage go 
hang”. To be a good patriot is to want one’s city to prosper through trade and to be powerful through arms. 
Clearly, one country cannot win without any other losing, and it cannot conquer without making some 
people unhappy.20  
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Hence, individuals do not cure their natural egoism by being citizens of a 
political community. On the contrary, states might have an amplifying effect on their 
antagonistic impulses and exploit human ambition to serve their own competitive drive 
and will for power. “That is the human condition”, stresses Voltaire, “to want your own 
country to be great is to wish your neighbours ill”.21 The general interest arising by the 
shared goal of individuals to preserve their security, regains its particularity in serving 
the aggressive purposes of separate political communities. 
Voltaire mentions the cosmopolitan spirit as a unique exception to this familiar 
trend: “The man who would want his homeland never to be larger, or smaller, or richer 
or poorer would be a citizen of the world”.22 Yet he does not develop the issue further 
and it would be certainly wrong to suggest that Voltaire is here embracing the 
cosmopolitan viewpoint. The Dictionnaire philosophique does not go beyond a simple 
mention of the term “citoyen du monde” and an implicit appreciation for the all-
encompassing sense of justice that it embodies. This is because, in spite of his critical 
observations on amour propre as the main cause of rivalry among individuals and (by 
extension) among political communities, Voltaire did not consider it an obstacle to the 
enlightened progress of his age. In Voltaire’s own interpretation of history, selfishness 
and the bourgeois search for profit play a positive role in encouraging the expansion of 
wealth and civilization. For him the age of Louis XIV was one of the most successful 
stages of human history since what really mattered were not greater freedom and the 
promotion of social justice, but military strength and the intensification of commerce and 
the arts.23 
The same ambivalent evaluation of cosmopolitanism emerges very clearly in the 
writings of Rousseau, especially if we compare the use of the term in the Discours sur 
l’inegalité parmi les hommes and in Du contract social. The point of departure is 
however radically different from that of Voltaire. While the latter considered amour 
propre in society to arise out of a natural instinct of self-preservation, for Rousseau the 
parts are reverted: the egoistic character of bourgeois society generates all human evils 
and sets a limit to the development of an originally good nature. The role of history is 
also differently interpreted: in Voltaire the evolution of science and the arts constitute a 
measure of human progress whereas in Rousseau this very progress ultimately leads to 
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the triumph of luxury, to the corruption of mores and to what he calls society’s 
“glittering misery”.24 
Voltaire particularly disliked Rousseau and ridiculed his Discourses as “the 
philosophy of a beggar who wished that the rich be robbed by the poor”.25 However, it is 
interesting to notice that cosmopolitanism is mentioned in the Discourses in a context 
very similar to Voltaire’s discussion of patriotism. Here Rousseau argues that even if one 
accepts that the artifice of the social contract may have temporarily contributed to 
establish a legal order and save people from the consequences of natural selfishness, 
contrasts have reappeared when the actors in the political scene ceased to be individuals 
and were replaced by states. 
The Bodies Politic, he claims, 
thus remaining in the state of Nature among themselves soon experienced the inconveniences that had 
forced individuals to leave it, and this state became even more fatal among these great Bodies than it had 
previously been among the individuals who made them up. From it arose the National Wars, Battles, 
murders, reprisals that make Nature tremble and that shock reason, and all those horrible prejudices that 
rank among the virtues the horror of spilling human blood […] more murders were committed in a single 
day’s fighting, and more horrors at the capture of a single town than had been committed in the state of 
Nature for centuries together over the entire face of earth.26 
 
The complaint of Rousseau is obviously on a very different level from Voltaire’s. 
Yet, the context in which he mentions the cosmopolitan virtue of universal love for the 
entire humanity, as opposed to states’ rivalry and will for power is interestingly the same. 
As Rousseau puts it,  
 
Civil right having thus become the common rule of the Citizens, the Law of Nature no longer obtained 
except between different Societies where, under the name of Right of nations, it was tempered by a few 
tacit conventions in order to make commerce possible and to replace natural commiseration which, losing 
in the relations between one Society and another almost all the force it had in the relations between one 
man and another, lives on only in a few great Cosmopolitan Souls, who cross the imaginary boundaries 
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that separate Peoples and, following the example of the sovereign being that created them, embrace the 
whole of Mankind in their benevolence.27 
 
For Rousseau the main virtue animating cosmopolitan characters is the social 
expression of a feeling people possess before entering into civil society: compassion. 
Such a feeling, that we also saw Leibniz mention, is one that: 
 
Hobbes did not notice, and which – having been given to people in order under certain circumstances to 
soften the ferociousness of his amour propre or of the desire for self-preservation prior to the birth of 
amour propre – tempers his ardour for well-being with an innate repugnance to see his kind suffer.28  
 
This feeling is so natural to human beings and this virtue is so universal and 
useful that even Mandeville, ‘’the most extreme detractor of human virtues”, was forced 
to recognize it. Cosmopolitan souls are the only ones to preserve intact such an old 
natural virtue, threatened by the expanding corruption of human nature in civil society. 
One would expect, given such a passionate praise of the moral purity of 
cosmopolitanism, to find it inspiring a new educative model or at the heart of a future 
political project aiming to overcome the state of nature among nations. Instead, nothing 
of this kind happens. Not only do these particular examples of compassionate characters 
hardly return in the following writings of Rousseau, but also if we insist on investigating 
the fate of such “great cosmopolitan souls” we will be surprised to notice a radically 
different approach. In the Geneva manuscript version of the Social contract Rousseau 
complains that cosmopolitans “boast of loving everyone” (tout le monde) so that “they 
might have the right to love no one”.29 In Emile he goes even further, and recommends to 
“distrust those cosmopolitans who search out remote duties in their books and neglect 
those who lie nearest”.30  
It is important to understand what motivates this shift in the interpretation of 
cosmopolitanism from the Discours sur l’inégalité parmi les hommes to Rousseau’s later 
writings. If dedication to one’s homeland means nothing more than amplified amour 
propre, why are characters once admired for their capacity to show compassion towards 
the others now considered some kind of impostors indifferent to any moral constraint? 
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Why has Rousseau decided to make a target of his critique the negative conception of 
cosmopolitanism rather than maintain the positive one he initially embraced? In order to 
answer this question, we need to focus on the different function that patriotism plays in 
Rousseau’s successive political writings in light of his new interpretation of the origin 
and scope of the contractarian device. 
In the Discourses on Inequality, the assessment of the state of nature and the 
critique that Rousseau moves to the social contract serve to condemn the unjust 
foundation of the civil order. Whatever the historical hypothesis on the origin of the 
social contract, Rousseau argues – contra Hobbes – that the civil union is unable to 
restore peace and preserve justice. The emergence of private property seems to constitute 
an insurmountable obstacle to an overall equal distribution of resources.31 The 
contractual union serves to merely legitimize an arbitrary process of acquisition started 
by the emergence of private property, and give it the appearance of a rightful action. 
Here, blind egoism and the unlimited ambitions of human beings cultivate the rule of the 
strongest and establish the power of some over that of many others. Society and its laws 
change a “skilful usurpation” into an “irrevocable right” and “for the profit of a few 
ambitious men” subject “the whole of Mankind to labour, servitude and misery”.32 The 
state being grounded on a mere sum of individual interests and distorted by the same 
vices that amour propre generates, the anarchical dynamic of an egoistic, pre-civil 
condition can only be expected to escalate. 
The question appears deeply transformed in the Social Contract. “Man is born 
free, and everywhere he is in chains. How did this change happen? I do not know. What 
can make it legitimate? I believe I can show it”.33 It is possible to notice, from the initial 
pages of the book, how the problem of an allegedly unjust initial distribution does not 
concern Rousseau anymore. Instead, his interest lies in the remedies that could be offered 
in order to morally justify the civil order. Returning to a state of nature in which human 
beings enjoyed peace and had infinite resources available does not appear a viable 
alternative. Civil society, whatever its limits might be, appears as the unique possible 
framework of coordination; political cooperation is the only means through which human 
selfishness and greed may be restrained. 
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In the Social Contract, collective agreement is not analysed in the perspective of 
a historical hypothesis establishing the legacy of unjust acquisition or marking the origin 
of institutionalized corruption. It is transformed into a regulative idea concerning the 
unique social mechanism of which human beings dispose in order to resolve social 
conflict. The complete alienation of individual freedom leads to a collective exercise of 
popular sovereignty whereas the mutual obligation of obedience is tempered through 
civic education.34 The social contract does not merely re-propose a sum of singular 
individual wills (volontè de tous) but qualitatively transforms this common force into a 
unitary entity capable of serving the impartial good of the community (volonté générale). 
Society cannot be rescued through the efforts of a single moral agent, who may always, 
as such, indulge his selfish inclinations. It is the dynamics of the union of all, and the 
kind of obligation this generates, which establish the possibility of overcoming the 
particular interests of the pre-political man (of the bourgeois) in a rational determination 
of interests carried out by the same subject as a citoyen.  
Popular sovereignty and civic education confer to the Rousseauean theory of the 
state a special normative standing. Its ethical strength derives from the collective 
participation in democratic practices that arise not just because of the common 
recognition of mutual normative constraints. As Montesquieu had already emphasized, 
the efficiency of laws and exercise of solidarity is also tightly bound to the uses and 
mores of a particular political community, to its historical development, major virtues 
and dominant vices. Rousseau emphasizes this point in one of the most important parts 
of the Social contract: “morals, customs, and above all opinion” constitute the secret 
attendance of a great legislator “while he appears to restrict himself to particular 
regulations which are but the ribs of the arch of which morals, slower to arise, in the end 
form the immovable Keystone”.35  
Rousseau therefore agrees with the Hobbesian account that no individual moral 
will could ground the social contract, if the latter is understood merely as a historical 
hypothesis on the origin of political union. This does not imply, however, renouncing the 
regulative idea that a community of people and their collective effort to uphold a 
particular civic order may also promote an ethical goal: developing the common good in 
a disinterested way. Of course, politics does not arise out of morally good intentions but 
to compensate for their absence. However, if the general will historically succeeds in 
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limiting the arrogant emergence of particularism, associative political duties may also 
become a means through which the scope of the polity is further extended. 
Similar considerations on the function of the social contract and the relationship 
between individual and political community, singular and universal, led Rousseau to a 
different evaluation of cosmopolitanism. It is now easier to understand why, in his later 
writings, cosmopolitanism is considered only negatively and identified with the attitude 
of single individuals who dismiss that civic essential bond though which moral 
obligations are discharged. The model of a non-interested community of moral persons 
cannot be embodied by the solipsistic attitude of individual human beings and their 
perhaps sincere but nonetheless contingent feelings of solidarity. Natural compassion 
cannot substitute political activism. What modern society needs is not promoting 
compassion but reinforcing justice, and the good faith of single individuals simply does 
not seem enough when a collective effort addressing the whole political order is required. 
As long as the citoyen du monde claims to overcome with his all-encompassing 
humanistic feelings particular political boundaries, he is essentially placing himself 
outside the moral and political context where the general will is expressed, at best risking 
to reduce his active commitment in favour of common political obligations, at worst 
threatening the fragile constitutive balance of the collective association.  
Rousseau’s observations invite one to seek a solution to the outburst of injustice 
and arbitrariness within the power-relations and political-institutional context upon 
which the general will is grounded. The Social Contract however leaves essentially 
unanswered the further question of anarchy in the international sphere that Rousseau’s 
Discourses on inequality had raised. This issue becomes extremely relevant if one 
focuses on Rousseau’s theory of the general will and considers the possibility that it may 
be precisely the collective interest of one particular community to nurture hostility and 
competition towards individuals belonging to other political groups. Would it be possible 
to expand the borders of the polity and to encompass every individual considered simply 
as member of the human community? More specifically, is it possible to reconcile 
cosmopolitanism and the states’ “general will”? 
Although Rousseau does not raise these questions in the Social Contract, he 
comments extensively on them in the following writings, especially the ones concerning 
the project of perpetual peace of the Abbé de Saint Pierre. If the social order, he claims,  
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were really, as it is pretended, the work not of passion but of reason, should we have been so slow to see 
that, in the shaping of it, either too much, or too little has been done for our happiness? That each one 
being in the civil state as regards our fellow-citizens but in the state of nature as regards the rest of the 
world, we have taken all kinds of precautions against private wars only to kindle  national wars a thousand 
times more terrible? And that, in joining a particular group of men, we have declared ourselves enemies of 
the whole race?36 
 
In the following pages of this essay Rousseau seems to support the idea that the 
only rational alternative to the precarious principle of balance between powers is 
extending to the international order the principles of civil coexistence present in the 
nation-state. He defends Saint Pierre’s proposal for a European political federation 
which, although not requiring states to renounce their national sovereignty, aims to 
preserve their internal security by means of collective agreement on matters of common 
interest. As Rousseau puts it, 
 
if there is any way of reconciling these dangerous contradictions, it is to be found only in such a form of 
federal government as shall unite nations by bonds similar to those which already unite their individuals 
members, and place the one no less than the other under the authority of the law.37  
 
One can easily note how – despite the relevance of a federative project for 
promoting perpetual peace – the constituent parts of this association are not individuals 
but states. In fact, the creation of a political community capable of overcoming the state 
of nature between states does not express the general will of individuals as members of 
an international community but the common interests of their states. However, the 
realistic tone assumed by the Rousseauean discussion suggests that the project for a 
future European federation is not guided by moral principles and good intentions but by a 
purely rational calculation founded on states’ utility maximisation.38 Here the need to 
reach an agreement on the organization of international affairs does not undermine the 
normative standing of particular political communities. On the contrary, precisely 
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because they constitute legitimate authorities, embodying peoples’ general will, no 
superior tribunal is allowed to judge the moral legitimacy of their interests.  
There are good reasons to remain sceptic of states, judged from this egoistic and 
interest-based perspective. Yet, as we have seen, there are also good reasons to suspect 
the cosmopolitan individualist attitude, especially its dangerous oscillation between 
moral flamboyance and political aridity. Is there a way of combining the positive 
meaning of cosmopolitanism with the normative relevance of the state? This is the 
question inspiring the Kantian reflection on global justice. 
 
4. From weltbürgerliche history to a principle of justice 
 
It is only in the work of Immanuel Kant that the shift from an individual conception of 
cosmopolitanism (understood either as a moral utopia or as a dangerous anti-patriotic 
sentiment) to a principle of global justice becomes fully comprehensible. In order to 
understand this shift, which seems strongly influenced by Rousseau’s analysis of the 
concept, it is important to consider closely Kant’s essay: Idea for a universal history 
from a cosmopolitan purpose, published in 1784. The very title of the essay, and the fact 
that cosmopolitanism is linked to a “purpose” (Absicht) orienting the historical 
interpretation of world-events, already reveals two Kantian innovations in the analytical 
understanding of the concept. The first one is related to the fact that Kant seems to have 
isolated the term from its Cynic individualist meaning, in order to make it a category for 
understanding the collective progress of the human species (Menschengattung). The 
second innovation points at the inclusion of the antinomy egoism-cosmopolitanism in a 
theoretical approach that combines politics and morality within a teleological account of 
history. Let us consider both more in depth. 
Like Rousseau, Kant starts from the problématique of the anarchical condition of 
the international scene and focuses on the regulative function of collectively exercised 
power. However, Kant does not limit the moral scope of the social contract to particular 
political boundaries. “What is the use of working for a law-governed civil constitution 
among individual men, i.e., of planning a commonwealth?” he asks. “The same 
unsociability which forced men to do so gives rise in turn to a situation whereby each 
commonwealth, in its external relations (i.e., as a state in relation to other states), is in a 
position of unrestricted freedom. Each must accordingly expect from any other precisely 
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the same evils which formerly oppressed individual men and forced them into a law-
governed civil state”.39  
Kant’s theory of history seems to share the early-Rousseauean view that the 
development of civilization does not necessarily lead to that of morally good intentions. 
However, his essay on universal history brings forward a teleological conception in 
which antagonism among human beings is considered a “means” through which the need 
for a law-governed social order arises. As Kant puts it,  
 
the first true steps are taken from barbarism to culture, which in fact consists in the social worthiness of 
man. All men’s talents are now gradually developed, his taste cultivated, and by a continued process of 
enlightenment, a beginning is made towards establishing a way of thinking which can with time transform 
the primitive capacity for moral discrimination into definite practical principles; and thus a pathologically 
enforced social union is transformed into a moral whole.40  
 
Egoistic feelings therefore promote people’s disposition to sociability and then to 
an authentic moral spirit. From an initial stage of antagonism, characterized by the 
emergence of aggressive instincts of self-protection, a kind of calculating rationality, 
utilitarian in scope, emerges. According to Kant, one is not entirely free insofar as 
practical action is oriented by selfish interest. However, decision-making at this stage is 
also not entirely determined by natural instincts, given that people are still able to 
calculate their advantages and rationally choose among different options. Such an 
attitude is distinctive of that historical age of human development in which man is 
divided between the realm of nature and that of freedom and in which egoism is 
associated with a capacity of choice unknown to animals, although not fully developed.  
Therefore, Kant shares with Voltaire and with the Rousseauean Discourses the 
idea that the development of antagonism constitutes a crucial moment to understand the 
passage from nature to civil society. Moreover, he shares the idea of the Social contract 
whereby the unilateral, interested, egoistic origin of the social union does not preclude its 
future promotion of morally good intentions, in Rousseauean terms: of the general will. 
For Kant, as for Rousseau, this can only happen through a common effort to attain “civil 
society which can administer justice universally”.41 However, if the revaluation of the 
antagonistic moment, of this “unsocial sociability” among men seems enormously 
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helpful to understand the exit from the state of nature and the formalisation of the ethical, 
utilitarian instances, this does not seem to be enough. There is another question emerging 
as soon as we consider the social contract not as a mere historical hypothesis (in the 
sense of the Discourses) but as an idea of reason (in the sense of the Social contract). 
In the latter case it is important to bear in mind that the development of morally 
good intentions is not only threatened by individual antagonism but also by the anarchy 
of international society, by war and by states’ expanding ambition for power. Hence, 
Kant says, until the spirit of mediation and the collective effort in promoting “united 
power” and “deliberation according to laws of a unified will” will be able to guarantee 
peace and develop freedom for all human beings, history shall be marked by stages of 
destruction and progress, with this fragile balance always threatening unconditioned 
obedience to rational moral imperatives. 
Here the Kantian project starts to emerge clearly, developed further in his essay 
on Perpetual Peace and in the Doctrine of Right. It is related to the planning of a “great 
political body of the future” which, 
 
although it exists for the present only in the roughest of outlines, nonetheless seems as if feeling to stir in 
all its members, each of which has an interest in maintaining the whole. And this encourages the hope that, 
after many revolutions, with all their transforming effects, the highest purpose of nature, a universal 
cosmopolitan existence, will at last be realised as the matrix within which all the original capacities of the 
human race may develop.42   
 
This is precisely the point in which the cosmopolitan concept, defined in Leibniz, 
Voltaire and Rousseau as part of an ethical doctrine referring to the attitude of single 
individuals who think of themselves as citizens of the world, starts changing its original 
meaning. Cosmopolitanism ceases to be associated to abstract sentiments of love for 
humanity and a vague sense of justice and requires instead “entering a federation of 
peoples” in which every state may obtain security “not from its own power or its own 
legal judgement”, but only from “a united power and the law-governed decisions of a 
united will”.43  
Interpreters usually converge on the opinion that in the development of his 
thought from the Idea for a universal history to the Doctrine of right Kant may have 
progressively abandoned this original idea of a single political body with coercive 
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powers in favour of a less demanding but pragmatically more appealing project of a 
voluntary association of states. An ongoing scholarly debate focuses on the reasons 
motivating Kant’s oscillation from the former to the latter thus raising the question of the 
enforcement capacities of a free league of states.44 However, the difference between the 
1784 essay and Kant’s later political writings may not lie in the modification of the 
substantive proposal but rather in the systematic role of the principles of 
cosmopolitanism and in the different conceptualization of the agents required for their 
promotion.45  
Indeed, in Idee zu einer allgeimener Geschichte cosmopolitanism constitutes a 
mere point of view from which to interpret the antagonistic development of human 
interactions in light of a teleological understanding of universal history. In the writings 
after the French Revolution, this proposal acquires a specific political meaning whose 
“objective reality” may be proved by the realization of republican ideals in a “powerful 
and enlightened people” the constitution of which inevitably promotes the highest 
political good, i.e. perpetual peace.46 In the Doctrine of right the ius cosmopoliticum is 
distinguished by both the rights of citizens within a state (ius civitatis) and the right of 
nations (ius gentium) and stands as a separate systematic category regulating the 
conditions of interaction among citizens of different states or citizens and strangers.47 
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 The evolution of the term’s significance becomes clearer if we consider the 
association cosmopolitanism-philanthropy, as it appears in On the common saying: ‘This 
may be true in theory but it does not apply in practice’, in Perpetual peace and in the 
Doctrine of right. In the first case, Kant understands cosmopolitanism in exactly the 
same way as Leibniz: a “universally philanthropic attitude” inspiring the regulative idea 
of a collective political organization upon which to ground the right of nations. However, 
in Perpetual peace, Kant seems to have abandoned this individualist conception of 
cosmopolitanism. In striking contrast with Leibniz’s view, he argues here: “it is not a 
question of philanthropy but of right”.48 Along similar lines, the opening section on 
cosmopolitanism in the Doctrine of right declares that the rational idea of a “peaceful, 
even if not friendly, thoroughgoing community of all nations on the earth that can come 
into relations affecting one another is not a philanthropic (ethical) principle but a 
principle having to do with rights”.49 
The solution to the question of the state of nature in the international domain is 
investigated here in the spirit of The Social contract where rights, instead of being 
affirmed through morality, provide the condition of possibility for its further 
development. By breaking with philanthropy, cosmopolitanism constitutes the regulative 
ideal of a political project combining principles and agency. This is achieved by 
proposing a form of statist cosmopolitanism, a project where republican states interact 
with one another while internally promoting freedom, equality and independence.50 The 
conflict between cosmopolitanism and patriotism is thereby resolved not by opposing the 
former to the latter but by rendering the cosmopolitan union an internal political end of 
sovereign states.51  
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5. Ius gentium  and ius cosmopoliticum 
 
The reflections above lead precisely to what Rousseau, in his observations on Saint 
Pierre’s project for peace, had failed to provide. Analogously to Rousseau, Kant grounds 
political obligation on the dialectic between the distributive will of all and the collective 
general will. However, he does so in a broader perspective whereby the ius 
cosmopoliticum is systematically derived by both domestic and international public right.  
The Metaphysics of morals contributes significantly to clarify the meaning of this 
passage. In the Doctrine of right the category of “public right” introduces the necessity 
of a sum of laws regulating the conditions of interaction among human beings both taken 
as single individuals and as members of constituted political units. Since “they all affect 
one another”, Kant claims here, “a rightful condition under a will uniting them”, is 
needed.52 
 From here it is possible to consider more in detail the necessity and systematic 
challenges faced by the conceptualization of cosmopolitan right (ius cosmopoliticum) as 
distinctive from and related to the right of states (ius gentium). Both ius cosmopoliticum 
and ius gentium appear normatively desirable to put an end to the anarchy of the 
international sphere where states, “like lawless savages” are in a “non-rightful 
condition”.53 However, Kant specifies the limits of the analogy by clarifying the diversity 
of agents operating in the domestic and in the international sphere. International right 
involves “not only the relation of one state toward another as a whole, but also the 
relation of individual persons of one state toward the individuals of another, as well as 
toward another state as a whole”.54 
The implications of such distinction are clarified in further detail in the section 
on Cosmopolitan right, immediately following the discussion on the right of nations and 
the conditions of war and peace between sovereign states. The specificity and all-
encompassing relevance of cosmopolitan right is deduced by the global extension and 
reciprocal influence of interactions among people: “all stand originally in a community 
of land”.55 This is, as Kant clarifies, a “community of possible physical interaction 
(commercium)” in which each member may offer “to engage in commerce with any 
other, and each has the right to make this attempt without the other being authorized to 
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behave toward it as an enemy because it has made this attempt”. 56 However, it is 
important to notice how the only category of right that recognizes the status of 
individuals, as such, amounts to a mere “attempt to try to establish community with all 
and, to this end, to visit all regions of the earth”.57  
Cosmopolitanism does not therefore replace statism. It does not cancel the right 
of states to territorial integrity and autonomous decision-making, even when the goal is 
to ensure that “crude peoples will become civilized”58 (or to promote human rights - one 
would be tempted to say in modern jargon). Cosmopolitanism integrates traditional 
conceptions of ius gentium with a political duty to facilitate non-exploitative forms of 
exchange (including trade) between states – a constraint that goes alongside with a 
powerful critique to colonialism and foreign intervention.59 Far from establishing the 
normative superiority of individuals over states, cosmopolitan right protects organized 
territorial entities from the violent or manipulative moves of powerful countries. Indeed, 
Kant claims that even when the goal is that of obtaining consent to sign a contract, such 
contract should not “take advantage of the ignorance of those inhabitants”.60 But how 
could one take seriously cosmopolitan right in the absence of a positive agent realizing 
its principles, critics ask? 
This is where the prospect of a just framework for regulating interactions among 
sovereign states becomes crucial for the analytical understanding of cosmopolitanism. 
Kant alludes to it in the very definition of the concept: “this right, since it has to do with 
the possible union of all nations with a view to certain universal laws for their possible 
commerce, can be called cosmopolitan right (ius cosmopoliticum).61 As it is clear from 
those passages, although recognizing the intrinsic validity and trans-national sphere of 
application of individual claims, political agency is linked to the capacity of cooperation 
and to the collective will of each sovereign state.  
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Kant’s scepticism towards the creation of a unitary political body with coercive 
powers is not due to concerns on the empirical feasibility of the project, as it might 
superficially appear from a hastened reading of The doctrine of right.62 Instead, it is 
consistent with two strong arguments by virtue of which the analogy between individual 
and state anarchy in the international sphere ultimately collapses.  
The first one refers to Kant’s remarks on the undesirability of a sovereign 
enforcer of cosmopolitan justice. In The doctrine of right he emphasizes that a single 
political body, globally extended and with coercive powers, would be impossible to 
govern, might soon degenerate into despotism and establish an irreversible anarchy.63 In 
Toward perpetual peace he comments on this issue with an observation which reminds 
very much of Rousseau’s discussion on patriotism in The social contract. Rousseau 
noticed here that “the more the social bond stretches, the looser it grows” and Kant 
seems to quote this passage implicitly when he emphasizes that “as the range of 
government expands laws progressively loose their vigour”.64 As Rousseau had 
emphasized, unlimited territorial extension would undermine patriotism by turning 
citizens into strangers who share nothing but a coercively imposed allegiance to laws. 
Without popular sovereignty being integrated by civic education, without a substantive 
ethical bond and laws designed to reflect the spirit of a people, the general will would be 
corrupted by the emergence of selfish particularism and political institutions would lack 
motivational stability. For Kant too, the diversity of cultures and religions – even if it 
may initially give rise to conflict – allows for a “gradual approach of human beings to 
greater agreement in principles”.65 Cosmopolitanism is in this case “produced and 
secured” not merely through the coercive use of forces but “by means of their 
equilibrium in the liveliest competition”.66 
The second argument relates to Kant’s explicit emphasis of the difference 
between the anarchical condition of individuals in the domestic sphere and that of states 
in the international one. As he clarifies, “such a state of affairs cannot be pronounced 
completely unjust since it allows each party to act as a judge in its own cause”. In fact 
states, intended in the Rousseauean sense of political communities, do not face the same 
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“lawless” condition as that of individuals in the state of nature. For, as to states, Kant 
claims, “they already have a rightful constitution internally and hence have outgrown the 
constraint of others to bring them under a more extended law-governed constitution in 
accordance with their concepts of right”. 67 
The superiority of public right over an arbitrary way of accommodating 
controversies between private individuals produces a shift away from any easy analogy 
of the international order with the domestic state of nature. For Kant, as for Rousseau, 
justice is realized through citizens’ participation in collective political practices of 
deliberation, through the exercise of popular sovereignty supplemented by civic 
education. Ius cosmopoliticum represents a necessary “supplement to the unwritten code 
of the right of a state and the right of nations”, it shows the possibility of a normative 
articulation of global principles of justice.68 It constitutes the condition of development of 
the ius gentium but it neither leads to an exercise of power with juridical rule – which is 
always statual or inter-statual - nor does it require a substitution or vertical dispersion of 
sovereignty.69  
While replacing the individualistic aspect of cosmopolitanism with a project of 
global justice which aims to take into account the claims of all affected parties, the moral 
concern of cosmopolitanism is transformed into a typical Rousseauean political demand, 
vindicating the need for a collective effort at the level of the general will. However, 
Kant’s ius cosmopoliticum does not abolish the preceding ius gentium; instead, it 
constitutes its historical-universal condition of development. This seems to be a relevant 
element to take into account while discussing the link between principles and agency in a 
theory of global justice. Within the Kantian paradigm, ius cosmopoliticum acts as a 
regulative principle orienting historical and political initiatives with global inspiration. 
Realizing such a principle requires however mobilizing political agency within the state 
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because only here the political, social and cultural conditions of reciprocity, required for 
the allocation of political obligations, may be found. 
 
6. Statist  cosmopolitanism? 
 
Kant’s statist cosmopolitanism may appear naïf, relying as it does on political 
communities to provide the most appropriate associative framework for cosmopolitan 
political agency. One may object that states always seek to promote their own interests 
and that there is no reason why they should take seriously cosmopolitan political 
responsibilities, especially if such responsibilities challenge them to relinquish the 
benefits they presently receive. Kant acknowledges the strength of the objection. 
“Admittedly”, he argues, “if there were no freedom and no moral law based upon it and 
everything that happens or can happen is instead the mere mechanism of nature, then 
politics, as the art of making use of this mechanism for governing human beings) would 
be the whole of practical wisdom”.70 Interactions between states would rely on selfish 
interest, and the whole concept of cosmopolitan justice, indeed of justice altogether, 
would be “an empty thought”.71  
Yet morality does seem to have a role to play within domestic politics, it grounds 
the general will, and raises the concept of right to “a limiting condition of politics”.72 
Since moral considerations are never ruled out domestically, it becomes plausible to 
assign the role of promoting global justice to “moral politicians”, understood as agents 
who take seriously the principles of prudence but are also able to reconcile them with the 
requirements of morality. Similar agents, Kant claims, will act within the state in a way 
that promotes cosmopolitan justice. They will act based on the principle that “once 
defects that could not have been prevented are found within the constitution of a state, or 
in the relations of states, it is a duty […] to be concerned about how they can be 
improved as soon as possible”.73 For even though it would be absurd, and indeed 
contrary to both prudence and morality, to require that “those defects be altered at once 
and violently”, it seems possible (and plausible) to ask moral politicians to “take to heart 
the maxim that such an alteration is necessary”.74  
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The last chapter of this work will return to the idea of similar agents (the 
cosmopolitan avant-garde) who make it their duty to act within the state in conformity 
with cosmopolitan initiatives. Here it seems important to stress that if enough citizens 
(Kant would say “moral politicians”) were able to mobilize in favour of global justice, 
there would be nothing to prevent a transformation of states in a cosmopolitan direction. 
If anything, the associative conditions upon which the general will is founded within the 
state would provide a firm ground for further expanding its scope in a way that includes 
the claims of all affected parties. 
It seems difficult to circumscribe Kant’s contribution to a normative theory of 
global justice to the explicit formulation of “cosmopolitan” principles, as many authors 
seem to suggest.75 Taken literally, Kant’s idea of cosmopolitanism is a rather limited one, 
restricted to conditions of “universal hospitality” and explicitly ruling out anything that 
goes beyond that. The real Kantian contribution to the global justice debate is 
unfortunately the one that has been most neglected. Kant was the only philosopher of the 
Enlightenment able to go beyond both the moral optimism of his cosmopolitan 
predecessors and the political pessimism of their anti-cosmopolitan adversaries. He could 
combine a cosmopolitan view of principles with a statist conception of agency. He did so 
not merely out of scepticism on the possibility of finding a global political authority able 
to enforce cosmopolitan justice but on grounds of a deeper critique to the limits of any 
political theory that detaches moral norms from the associative context in which they 
become political obligations. 
Cosmopolitanism in Kant is not only a product of his theory of right and of the 
project of perpetual peace but, most importantly, a “regulative idea of history”, guiding 
the progressive introduction of global moral principles in the development of collective 
democratic practices. The normative recognition of the validity of cosmopolitanism does 
not suffice to bridge the gap between valid moral imperatives and concrete political 
initiatives. Only the internal, conflicting development of each political process may lead 
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to a gradual transformation of selfish interests and prudential considerations into 
common moral ends.  
The difficulties of realizing cosmopolitanism cannot be avoided by recurring to 
an ethics of the categorical imperative in politics. A complete theory of global justice 
must take into account the relationship between ideal and non-ideal, principles and 
agency, political theory and political practice: the latte promoting moral ends appropriate 
to each political stage and the former conferring clarity to these ends by expounding their 
ethical implications. This chapter has tried to illustrate from a historical perspective how 
states neither set an arbitrary limit to the principles of global justice (as many 
contemporary non-cosmopolitans insist) nor may be easily replaced by alternative agents 
(as their cosmopolitan rivals wishfully think). The task of unfolding such an argument in 
more analytical detail belongs to the remaining chapters. 
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Chapter II 
                            Against the State? 
 
 
1. Preliminary remarks 
 
The present chapter focuses on contemporary cosmopolitan critiques of the state and on 
their defence of global egalitarianism.1 It exposes their flaws in arguing for global 
egalitarian principles and it ascribes such flaws to the cosmopolitan disregard of the 
normative relevance of particular political communities. It also introduces an 
alternative (Kantian-inspired) view of the role of political communities, which, far from 
weakening the case in favour of global egalitarian justice, lends support to it.2 
The chapter targets in particular cosmopolitan arguments based on the claim 
that political communities are arbitrary for the scope of global justice. The argument 
from arbitrariness is usually invoked both with regard to the justification of principles 
of global justice (i.e. what kind of shares are global parties rightly entitled to) and with 
regard to the issue of agency (i.e. what motivates them to support institutions realizing 
cosmopolitan principles). This chapter tries to illustrate where cosmopolitans go wrong 
with regard to both issues and to explain why. It also emphasizes that it is unnecessary 
to criticize the state in order to prove the validity of cosmopolitan distributive principles 
or to solve the problem of agency in the global sphere. A strong case in favour of global 
equality could be made even if one conceded the normative relevance of political 
membership. 
Let me start with a few methodological preliminaries. The focus of this chapter 
is rather narrow. Its critique targets only egalitarian forms of cosmopolitanism, i.e. 
                                                
1
 The terms “global egalitarianism”, “global distributive justice” and “global principles of distributive 
“equality” are here considered synonymous. 
2
 Such an alternative is developed in further detail in the third part of this work. 
 48 
accounts trying to obtain global principles of distributive equality by applying a revised 
contractarian method of justification to the global sphere.3 Such accounts usually 
represent a “strong” form of cosmopolitanism, advocating demanding principles of 
global distributive equality rather than the mere satisfaction of basic needs or the 
recognition of general moral obligations to everyone.4 
This chapter does not extend its critique to strategies defending weaker forms of 
cosmopolitanism such as duty-based, right-based, or consequentialist, to mention but 
the most prominent theories.5 Such weaker perspectives provide a less demanding but 
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often also rougher account of the exact distributive form cosmopolitan claims take 
when applied to existing political institutions.6 One objection they have attracted is that 
it is difficult to see who would not ascribe to the idea that there are duties owed to all 
human beings, regardless of their race, gender or citizenship, and that such duties may 
comprise the satisfaction of minimal subsistence claims worldwide. As one prominent 
critic of cosmopolitanism has put it, “my own position is also cosmopolitan by this 
criterion, since I have explicitly defended a universal obligation of justice to respect the 
basic rights of people everywhere”.7 This clarifies why my critique will be limited to 
strong cosmopolitan accounts: if we can reconcile statism and cosmopolitanism even 
when more demanding obligations of distributive justice are at stake, extending the 
argument to weaker forms of cosmopolitanism should be straightforward. 
Further, it is also important to emphasize that in defending the role of political 
communities against global egalitarians using the contractarian device, this chapter 
does not attempt to restate familiar communitarian or particularist objections to 
contractarianism as such. It also does not emphasize the non-arbitrary standing of 
political communities in order to undermine the validity of cosmopolitan principles of 
distributive justice. Its main claim is more restricted and more constructive. The chapter 
does not deny the general possibility of using the social contract device to justify global 
distributive principles; it only argues against present cosmopolitan defences of global 
egalitarianism that consider political communities arbitrary for that purpose.8 It tries to 
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show that the cosmopolitan normative critique of political communities is both flawed 
and unnecessary. While failing to establish global distributive principles, a 
contractarian-styled cosmopolitan critique of political membership simply weakens the 
method’s potential of justification. 
In order to illustrate these points I examine a number of contractarian 
assumptions regarding both the choice situation and the background conditions required 
to develop principles of distributive justice. More particularly, I focus on some features 
of the original position concerning: i) the circumstances of justice; ii) the nature of the 
parties; iii) the use and function of the veil of ignorance. In the following three sections, 
I endorse the cosmopolitan version of the original position and try to illustrate some of 
its flaws in arguing for global distributive justice. Exposing some internal 
inconsistencies of this particular way of applying the contractarian model will serve to 
refute the argument that political communities are arbitrary for the scope of justice and 
to illustrate some weaknesses in existent defences of global egalitarianism. 
 
2. The circumstances of justice 
 
The fiction of a social contract represents in contemporary political theory a 
methodological device for investigating on the principles according to which the 
benefits and burdens of social cooperation ought to be distributed. Most famously 
associated to Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, the contractarian method has recently been 
deployed by various cosmopolitan scholars trying to extend the findings of Rawls’s 
domestic theory of justice to global political institutions.9 The idea of an original 
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principles. Since I only focus on cosmopolitan applications of contractarianism, I cannot go into the 
details of Rawls’s global theory of justice in this chapter. Instead, I shall discuss some key features of his 
domestic theory of justice as endorsed by various cosmopolitan egalitarians and emphasize some of the 
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position in which reasonable contractors discuss a number of competing conceptions of 
justice and determine by overlapping consent principles for distributing benefits and 
burdens is extended to global political institutions.10 
One of the fundamental premises of contractarian theories is to treat the 
principles of justice as necessitated by a specific choice situation. This situation is 
characterized by circumstances of justice, understood as background conditions that 
give rise to the necessity of coordinating the claims of conflicting parties with regard to 
the distribution of certain primary goods. The domestic theory of justice that 
contractarian cosmopolitans take as a starting point clarifies these conditions by 
endorsing specific circumstances of justice whereby certain subjective and objective 
factors make human cooperation both possible and necessary.11 On the one hand, 
sharing the same geographical territory, scarcity of resources, and human vulnerability 
to attack, are objective circumstances. The presence of scarcity means that resources 
are not so abundant to make human cooperation superfluous, yet scarcity is moderate in 
that it does not destroy all possibilities for a common venture. On the other hand, 
subjective circumstances refer to the motivational background of parties considered 
roughly equal in mental and physical powers: there is a complementarity of needs and 
interests, which makes possible assessing a cooperative venture, and there is a diversity 
of life plans which gives rise to conflicting claims on the best scheme of distribution. 
Furthermore, the parties consider their conceptions of the good as worthy of recognition 
but suffer from several limits, moral and natural, to the full exercise of their human 
capacities such as knowledge, thought and judgement.12 
It is important to examine the global circumstances of justice upon which the 
cosmopolitan original position relies and to assess the role that the abstraction from 
particular political communities plays at this point of the argument. Let us consider first 
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the objective circumstances and start with the requirement that parties interact in a 
defined geographical territory under conditions of vulnerability and moderate scarcity. 
Several cosmopolitan scholars have suggested that we understand as territory the whole 
world and emphasize that the global original position should abstract from political 
membership.13 In similar circumstances of justice, cooperation under conditions of 
scarcity would be affected by two main factors. Firstly, there are the human and social 
efforts contributing to economic development and influencing the parties’ different 
endowments of primary goods. Secondly, there is the natural component of human 
cooperation, those material resources or “utilities derived from any portion of the earth” 
due to would-be arbitrary features such as the parties’ geographical location.14  
It is precisely on this second element that the cosmopolitan original position 
relies in order to justify the need for a global principle distributing natural resources. 
Cosmopolitans argue that since political communities simply happen to find themselves 
in resource poor or resource rich regions of the earth, political membership is irrelevant 
for determining what individuals are entitled to in global circumstances of justice. 
Charles Beitz has considered this claim analogous to Rawls’s account of natural talents 
in the domestic version of the contract and claimed that “citizens of a nation which 
finds itself on top of a gold mine do not gain a right to the wealth that might be derived 
from it”.15 Resources must be present in nature before they are appropriated and “no 
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one has a natural prima facie claim to the resources that happen to be under his feet”.16 
Thomas Pogge also emphasizes how “the natural assets in a state’s territory are not a 
reflection of the moral worth of – are not deserved by – either this state or its 
citizens”.17 Brian Barry goes on to make a similar claim when he argues that “the 
economic prospects of a country depend on something for which its inhabitants (present 
and past) can take absolutely no credit and lay no just claim to its exclusive benefits, 
namely its natural resources – including in this land, water, minerals and so on”.18 Since 
the citizens of particular states have done nothing to deserve the natural resources lying 
under their soil, the parties in global circumstances of justice are entitled to an equal 
portion of the earth’s natural resources, regardless of their political membership. 
This argument is problematic.19 In the following pages I try to show how it is 
both problematic to assume that political communities are arbitrary for the distribution 
of natural resources and unnecessary to a contractarian-type of argument in favour of 
cosmopolitan justice. From the point of view of the former, I shall try to clarify what it 
means for resources to be available in nature and what role political communities might 
play in the claims of individuals to an equal share of the earth’s resources. From the 
point of view of the latter, I shall argue that focusing on the arbitrariness of political 
communities for the distribution of natural resources unnecessarily weakens the use of 
contractarian strategies to justify cosmopolitan distributive principles. 
 
 
2. 1. Where the arbitrariness-argument goes wrong 
 
Let us start with the first objection. Let us suppose that particular citizens of particular 
countries have done nothing to deserve the wealth potentially derived from the gold 
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mine lying under their feet. Now the example of the gold mine which Beitz provides to 
illustrate what one finds in nature is already problematic since it is obvious that mines 
are not usually ‘found’ but constructed, in which case it may not be entirely arbitrary 
that those who constructed the mine are also entitled to its product. However I will not 
comment more on this point but simply assume that the word ‘mine’ has been wrongly 
used where one intended to refer to gold ‘reserves’. The difficulty even with this latter 
assumption is that it is not the arbitrary fact of being out there, ready for use, which 
makes gold reserves amenable to the production of wealth. Gold reserves would not 
produce any wealth unless those potentially profiting from this wealth knew that it 
would be possible for it to do so. Whether given resources are needed and for what 
purpose does not depend on their availability in nature but on the social meaning they 
acquire and the use that is made of them. Therefore, while it may be true that the simple 
location of natural resources is arbitrary from a moral point of view, this arbitrariness is 
also irrelevant. What matters here is not determining whether individuals are justly 
entitled to an equal share of resources that could produce wealth but whether they are 
justly entitled to those that do. And in order to answer this latter question one has to 
establish whether the significance for use and potential value of such resources are 
everywhere the same regardless of community membership.   
In order to understand that they are not, and that community membership 
constitutionally affects the social meaning of natural objects, consider the following 
anecdote that Marx tells when explaining the fetish character of commodities: 
 
No divinity was so deadly to the savages as gold, which they believed certainly to be the Fetish of the 
Spaniards, judging the type of the Spaniards belief according to their own and according to the profound 
veneration they saw in the Spaniards for this metal. The barbarians of Cuba, knowing that a flotilla from 
Castille was going to descend on their land, judged that they had better conciliate first to the God of the 
Spaniards, and then distance it from themselves. They gathered all their gold in a basket. Behold they 
said the God of these foreigners; let us celebrate a festival in its honour in order to obtain its protection; 
in this way we will make it depart from our island. They danced and sang according to the way of their 
religion around the basket, then threw it in the sea. 20   
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The Cubans are thus unaware of the value of gold; they have simply observed 
that the Spanish adore it and have assumed that it must therefore constitute their god. It 
is not a natural resource they lack - the Cubans dispose of plenty of gold but they ignore 
the use that could be made of it. If their understanding and that of the Spanish naturally 
converged, they would have perhaps hidden the gold, exchanged it for other benefits, or 
traded it to their own advantage. Instead, interpreting the behaviour of the Spanish 
according to their specific cultural categories they think it more appropriate to dance 
and sing around gold, throw it into the sea and hope that this will suffice to expel the 
Spanish.  
It seems clear here that the kind of society to which the Cubans and the Spanish 
belong is relevant to account for the way in which gold is valued and for the use that is 
consequently made of it. The difficulty with accepting the cosmopolitan claim on the 
arbitrariness of political communities resides in its assumption that the value given and, 
consequently, the use made of primary resources does not depend on their social 
meaning and on collective efforts to render them valuable. This argument, as one can 
see, wrongly focuses on individual entitlements in natural circumstances but 
underestimates the role of collective social and political factors. 
Here two possible objections might arise. The first one is to say that even 
though one might agree that community membership plays a relevant role in shaping 
the social meaning of natural objects it is not clear why the boundaries of such 
significance-conferring community ought to be specifically domestic-political. The 
example above, one might argue, obscures the fact that the interest of Spain for gold 
was common to all European states at the time, thus inviting us to consider that the 
boundaries of the significance-conferring community might be wider than those of 
particular states.  
Before we attempt to clarify how specifically domestic political factors might 
have an important role to play in the valorisation of natural resources, let me emphasize 
that such an objection does not contribute to strengthening the individualist 
cosmopolitan case in favour of the arbitrariness of political communities. It does not, in 
other words, show that it is possible to determine what natural resources individuals are 
entitled to if we completely abstract from community membership. Indeed the objection 
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above grants that community membership matters but asks us to show why it is that 
domestic political boundaries are more relevant than additional social or cultural ones. 
Notice however that in so doing such an objection implicitly undermines the 
cosmopolitan case for an individualist distribution of natural resources with which we 
started. The objection, that is, does not prove the correctness of the cosmopolitan 
arbitrariness argument; it does not show that it is possible to determine what individuals 
are entitled to if they are considered as such. It simply tries to extend the relevance of 
political communities to take into account additional collective features and requires 
clarifying the specific role of state institutions in determining different ways of relating 
to natural resources.  
Focusing precisely on the case of Spain in the sixteenth century, I try to show 
below that even in the presence of a general awareness on the relevance of natural 
resources (such as that shared by European elites at that time) domestic institutions 
mattered tremendously for understanding the performance of, say, Spain, France and 
Holland. Nevertheless, before going into the details of such claim let me emphasize 
what an objector would have to show in order to both prove the arbitrariness of political 
communities and strengthen the case for an individualist approach to natural resource 
distribution. In order to succeed with both tasks, a critic would need to argue for a 
global overlap in individual judgments with regard to what natural resources ought to 
be considered valuable. This is precisely what the second objection mentioned above 
attempts to show.  
The second objection grants that social meaning might have mattered in the past 
in relation to conventionally precious metals. Yet it emphasizes that this does not seem 
to be the case under current circumstances of injustice, whereby all actors involved 
seem to know enough about what count as relevant scarce resources. Gold may not 
have been valuable for Cubans a few centuries ago, just as oil may not have been 
considered relevant by the citizens of Kuwait when it was first discovered. But when 
everyone is exposed to the pressure of the same international markets, as in current 
global economic practices, it seems hard to concede that people will fail to converge on 
their judgment of what natural resources are deemed to produce wealth.   
Notice, however, that this objection only targets the idea that it seems difficult 
in a globalized world to abstract from community membership as far as epistemic 
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considerations on what natural resources are likely to produce wealth are concerned. It 
does nothing to discredit the thought that those who have tried to transform potential 
wealth into actual wealth are entitled to the benefits of their work or bear responsibility 
for its loss. Products are not “found” in the state of nature and individuals do not enrich 
themselves by bumping into inherently valuable natural resources. Instead, even natural 
resources must be analysed, extracted, exchanged, traded and so forth. Human labour, 
scientific and technologic expertise, background infrastructures, societal, cultural and 
political circumstances are essential elements for the optimization of their exploitation. 
But how do we move from here to the fact that specifically political boundaries and 
domestic political factors have a relevant role to play in this process? 
Going back to the previous example, precisely the case of Spain and its 
incredible rise and fall between the sixteenth and seventeenth century might help us 
illuminate the issue at stake here. Early sixteenth-century Spain was one of the largest 
political hegemons in Europe, influenced by Erasmian thought and in close contact with 
the rest of the continent’s cultural centres. Ambitious monarchs such as Ferdinand and 
Isabella of Castile approved the Navigation Acts, invested resources in maritime 
enterprises following royal standards and together with Charles V seem to have played 
a major role in determining the success of colonial enterprises, morality of such 
enterprises aside. All the treasure entering in Europe during the sixteenth century 
passed through the ports of the country, no other state had access to American mines 
and the Spanish were the first to perfect amalgamation processes for extracting precious 
metals such as silver and gold.21 
Within one century only however - roughly after 1598 - large parts of the 
population were on the verge of famine, maritime investments had practically ceased 
and following several naval defeats the Spanish flag allegedly disappeared from the 
seas.22 Historians seem to converge on ascribing the causes of such failure to the 
Spanish culture of “hidalguia”, the dissolute habits of the aristocracy, their avid 
expenditures on castles and jewellery instead of technological advancement, and the 
absence of an administrative reform for tax collection. In addition to these factors the 
persecution of Jews and Moors led to the migration of some of the most industrious and 
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entrepreneurial workforce in the country whereas the prevalence of catholic bigotry and 
the consolidation of the Inquisition prevented students from attending foreign 
universities, impeding any intellectual exchange and rendering scientific and 
technological innovation improbable.23  
It is not necessary to focus on further historical details here or to dwell on the 
morality of the colonial enterprise as a whole. Suppose colonized states did not suffer 
from violent resource-deprivation but rather agreed to concede the use of their territory 
for some other benefit, say because the Spanish promised to build schools in return. 
The point is that the mere availability of resources in nature seems irrelevant for 
determining how much Spain was able to profit from such availability as opposed to 
other European countries. Failure to adapt Spanish techniques to the French and Dutch 
standards of shipbuilding, to update technological expertise and to advance scientific 
enquiry seem to have been among the primary causes of the decline in standards of 
extraction and trade determining the eclipse in the country’s shipping industry. The 
exclusive access of gold reserves throughout the century was unable to prevent the 
economic misery caused by a sinister development in the Spanish political system and 
by the obtuse choices of narrow-minded leaders. Out of fear from contagion by heretic 
thought, Spain was unable to compete with its neighbours and keep the pace with the 
political and cultural reforms that were taking place around Europe thus losing the 
advantage it initially had on the distribution of natural resources. The causes for the rise 
and fall of Spain in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century and its inability to 
compete with the rest of European nation states seem ascribable to domestic factors 
which differ from country to country: factors including the state’s class structure, its 
particular legal system, specific minority policies, its dominant religious tradition and 
so forth.24 
Membership in a particular political community need not entitle citizens to the 
primary resources that just happen to be territorially available. Yet the same does not 
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hold for the product of their use once they become accessible through collective human 
labour. Notice, however, that it is this and only this latter feature that seems relevant for 
distinguishing from all resources present in nature that could potentially produce wealth 
those few that are able to do so as a matter of fact. To say it more clearly, the claim that 
“the citizens of a nation which finds itself on top of a gold mine do not gain a right to 
the wealth that might be derived from it” is true so long as we are clear that “might be” 
is very different from “is”. But what “might be derived” from natural resources is also 
irrelevant. Indeed as soon as that abstract possibility becomes a matter of fact those 
contributing to the actual conversion of natural resources into wealth may, by virtue of 
their efforts, have a justified claim to that wealth just as they may, by virtue of their 
misdeeds, be considered responsible for its loss. 
Notice that I have explicitly left aside here the empirical discussion on whether 
access to natural resources is indeed the most important variable determining economic 
growth, all things considered. This question is controversial and requires much more 
empirical work to be settled.25 Instead, I have tried to show that even if we grant that 
natural endowments play a primary role in influencing material development, it would 
be impossible to abstract completely from community membership in determining how 
various agents value accessibility to natural resources, what use they make of it and 
consequently who is entitled to what. 
That membership in a particular community is indeed essential to determine 
how one uses particular resources does not mean however that any cosmopolitan 
attempt to search for global distributive principles is inevitably bound to fail. It only 
shows that if cosmopolitans choose to pursue contractarian strategies in justifying 
global distributive principles, such strategy should avoid desert-based claims on 
political membership.  
Now of course one might object here that even if it is impossible to abstract 
completely from the input of human labour and collective political responsibility in 
determining who is entitled to what, we might still consider an injustice the result of a 
specific allocation of natural resources in the presence of equal amounts of effort. 
Suppose, for example, that both Spain and the Netherlands had a very similar political 
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system, very similar social conventions and the same population size. If the 
Netherlands fared worse because of lack of access to natural resources, we might still 
consider it an injustice that Dutch citizens have to work harder to compensate for not 
having been blessed by nature in the distribution of natural resources. This objection 
does not however challenge the relevance of political communities in determining 
entitlements to the product of collective efforts; it merely shows that political 
membership is an irrelevant factor in the distribution of initial endowments. Something 
may be irrelevant without being morally objectionable. But if the defence of political 
communities is irrelevant (not wrong) for that initial process of endowment-
distribution, so is the cosmopolitan critique that usually accompanies it. 
 
2.2. Where the arbitrariness-argument becomes unnecessary 
 
This leads us to the second, even more serious, objection to the cosmopolitan-
contractarian critique of political communities. As I will attempt to show, not only is 
such critique misleading but also unnecessary to the cosmopolitan case for global 
distributive justice. To understand this point it is important to consider how the 
argument on the arbitrariness of political communities implicitly modifies the 
assumptions made in contractarian circumstances of justice. Recall that according to the 
contractarian premises with which we started, all that is required for given 
circumstances to qualify as objective circumstances of justice is for them to be 
characterized by a conflict over scarce resources and by a common interest in solving it. 
The contractarian perspective on the circumstances of justice is agnostic about the roots 
of this conflict, and does attempt neither to ascribe causal responsibility to any of the 
parties involved, nor to examine who was or could have been justly entitled to what 
prior to the conflict in question. The contractarian account is silent on how the parties 
found themselves in those specific circumstances of justice, and desert-based 
considerations are alien to the deduction of specific principles of justice.  
This point is particularly clear in Rawls’s domestic theory of justice which, as it 
has been pointed out, inspires several cosmopolitan-egalitarian reconstructions of the 
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original position.26 Indeed, as Rawls puts it, “the principles of justice that regulate the 
basic structure and specify the duties and obligations of individuals do not mention 
moral desert, and there is no tendency for distributive shares to correspond to it”. 27 
What matters is neither how the conflict came about, nor who is entitled to what, but in 
what way it continues to affect the parties’ life in common and what kind of 
consequences it has for our fundamental social institutions.  
This means that the principles that will eventually guide the re-allocation of 
scarce resources are not historical or rectificatory principles, trying to identify at which 
point in time a presumed just process of appropriation was interrupted. They are instead 
“end-result principles” according to which the justice of a distribution is determined by 
“how things are distributed (who will get what) as judged by some structural 
principle(s) of just distribution”.28 In the contractarian account, the principles 
determining the pattern according to which resources should be distributed are the pure 
procedural ones resulting from an agreement among parties in the original position.   
How does the cosmopolitan argument on the arbitrariness of political 
communities implicitly modify the contractarian account on the circumstances of 
justice? It does so by introducing an entitlement-based conception of justice that shifts 
focus from the social consequences of a specific distributive process to its initial 
starting point. 29 By asserting that membership in a political community is arbitrary as 
regards what natural resources its citizens deserve to access in the first place, 
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cosmopolitans substitute the need for patterned principles of just distribution with a 
query on historical principles of justice in acquisition.30 This however implicitly 
assumes that the solution to the conflict over resources in given circumstances of justice 
may be obtained by proceeding backwards and identifying the unjust causes of an 
initial process of resource allocation. The kind of principles to which such an analysis 
leads are contained in the Lockean proviso, requiring the parties involved in the 
original process of acquisition to leave “enough and as good for others”. Many 
cosmopolitans seem to sympathize with this type of analysis and the principles to 
which it leads.31 What they fail to realize is that there may be a tension between such 
principles and the contractarian premises employed at the start. Let us see why. 
Suppose we wanted to show the arbitrariness of political communities in 
determining entitlements to the wealth produced by natural resources. We would first 
need to distinguish between human input and raw natural resources and while granting 
that political communities play a role in the former, we would claim to abstract from 
them with regard to the latter. We would then presumably identify some kind of 
rectificatory principles distributing equally natural resources in accordance with the 
Lockean proviso. It is not clear however, in what way this would contribute to 
resolving the conflict in existent circumstances of justice with which the contractarian 
account starts. Even more obscure is how it could justify the selection of “distributive” 
principles requiring a continuous re-allocation of primary goods, in an egalitarian form. 
A historical analysis of the circumstances of justice would lead, at best, to rectifying 
past injustice in acquisition. Following an entitlement-based conception, once the 
process of rectification is over one is free to ignore the further consequences of specific 
interactions, however great the inequalities produced by them.32 The logic underpinning 
an attempt to identify the historical patterns of resource acquisition is such that only the 
original processes of acquisition and transfer matter, not their outcome. This rules out 
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the possibility of identifying end-state principles of distributive justice of the kind made 
necessary every time – for whatever reason – the parties find themselves in specific 
circumstances of justice. 
One could of course argue here that cosmopolitan contractarianism may 
reconstruct the circumstances of justice in a way that ascribes conflict to an initial 
injustice in the process of acquisition. Once that conflict is over, cosmopolitan 
contractarianism might be satisfied with whatever inequalities arise because of 
successive interactions and ignore the need for further distributions of primary goods. 
Yet this statement would be incompatible with the cosmopolitan commitment to 
equality as an important human good, with the idea that everyone is entitled to equally 
adequate standards of well-being that constitutes the moral core of the theory. Equality 
in an entitlement-based conception of justice constitutes merely a starting point, not a 
criterion to satisfy any time a distributive conflict threatens stability in society and 
material inequalities arise. However, it is precisely the presence of this conflict, 
whatever its origin, and the amount of inequality to which it leads that seems to 
preoccupy contemporary cosmopolitan theories. 
In short, arguing that political membership is arbitrary for determining the 
entitlements of individuals to a portion of the earth’s natural resources is beside the 
point as regards resolving the conflicting claims of parties in contractarian 
circumstances of justice. Showing that the citizens of particular political communities 
do not deserve the wealth that they dispose is difficult, but it is also irrelevant. For even 
if those individuals or communities did deserve that wealth (as they indeed may) we 
would, true to our contractarian premises, assess the circumstances of justice from the 
point of view of their consequences on fundamental global interactions, not from the 
point of view of how it came about. And here the argument on the arbitrariness of 
political communities would become superfluous. Indeed even accepting that political 
communities are not arbitrary to determine the entitlements of their citizens, one could 
argue that there are relevant international circumstances of justice such that their 
consequences worldwide override desert-based claims of both communities and 
individuals and require us to rethink the principles promoting equality worldwide. 
Consider the case of migration or the pressure put by economic globalization. 
These are only two among the most relevant examples of globally pervasive conflicts: 
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they affect any political community in the world and everyone has a reason to accept 
principles that would allow resolving the tensions they bring about. It is not clear 
however how desert-based considerations on the arbitrariness of political communities 
help us identify the principles required. Surely, even if the companies of specific states 
had a legitimate claim to their wealth we would think it appropriate to tax them for the 
sake of improving the economic conditions of those negatively affected by their 
activity. Surely, even if some countries had deserved some additional wealth drawn 
from the use of natural resources we would think it appropriate to require they sacrifice 
part of such wealth to accommodate the claims of starving human beings.33 But the 
principles drawn out of desert-based considerations introduced by the argument on the 
arbitrariness of political communities give us no normative tools for dealing with issues 
such as these.  
For standard contractarians, valid principles of justice in given conflicting 
circumstances – no matter how they arise – are those that no one could reasonably 
reject. Yet it is not clear how the argument on the arbitrariness of political communities 
contributes to their identification. Only the collective impact of the conflict in given 
circumstances of justice, and the reasons agents might have to solve it, need to be taken 
into account while reconstructing the contractarian perspective on global justice.34 
Anything existent cosmopolitan accounts add to this point with regard to the 
arbitrariness of political membership loads the argument with unnecessary claims 
turning contractarianism into a weaker justificatory strategy. 
 
 
3. The nature of the parties 
 
Having illustrated some weaknesses in the cosmopolitan reconstruction of the 
contractarian account from the point of view of the circumstances of justice, I will now 
examine its critique of political communities by analysing the nature of the parties 
involved in the original deliberative situation. The previous section emphasized how 
the cosmopolitan account of the circumstances of justice modifies the contractarian 
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premises in a way that, even if justified, would lead to a different set of principles from 
the ones originally envisaged. This section tries to show how abstracting from political 
membership and relying on a cosmopolitan idealized account of the original position is 
unwarranted and renders those principles unnecessary.  
Firstly, the section argues that the cosmopolitan reconstruction of the original 
position modifies and ultimately weakens the contractarian account of the subjective 
circumstances of justice. Secondly, it emphasizes that even if one accepts it 
hypothetically, the degree to which it moralizes the parties is so considerable that it 
becomes difficult to understand why principles of justice are needed in the first place. 
Finally, it suggests that a cosmopolitan-contractarian need not ground his case in favour 
of global distributive justice on dubious assumptions on the arbitrariness of particular 
political communities. One can instead start with an idea of agents embedded in 
particular social and political relations and consider political membership an important 
premise in the argument for global distributive equality. 
 
3.1. Where the arbitrariness-argument goes wrong 
 
Let us first clarify the nature of the subjects in cosmopolitan circumstances of justice. 
Without rejecting Rawls’s domestic account on the circumstances of justice, Pogge 
starts with an idea of the global original position in which the “parties are 
representatives of persons, never of associations or states”.35 Other cosmopolitans 
pursue this argument further. According to David Richards, since “one's membership in 
one nation as opposed to another and the natural inequality among nations may be as 
morally fortuitous as any other natural fact” all individuals are entitled to be included in 
the global original position as such.36 For Charles Beitz “if the original position is to 
represent individuals as equal moral persons for the purpose of choosing principles of 
institutional or background justice, then the criterion of membership is possession of 
the two essential powers of moral personality”.37  
The cosmopolitan original position however, although claiming to start with a 
roughly analogous account to the domestic circumstances of justice, over-idealizes the 
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nature of the parties. One simply fails to understand why justice is at all required given 
everyone is so moral from the start. In standard contractarian theories, the issue appears 
more complex. Rawls’s domestic theory of justice refers to Hume’s account of society 
where parties are engaged in a conflict as well as an identity of interests. Cooperative 
interactions are due to the interdependence of needs and interests, rough equality of 
power and the limited natural and intellectual abilities of the parties. As Hume puts it: 
“By the conjunction of forces our power is augmented: By the partition of 
employments our ability encreases: By mutual succour we are less expos’d to the 
fortune of accidents”.38 The need for principles of justice arises when equally powerful 
and equally motivated parties are willing to work together to resolve conflicting claims 
and to identify institutions that fairly distribute societal benefits and burdens.39 
How does the cosmopolitan original position reframe the subjective 
circumstances of justice? What role does its critique of political communities play at 
this point of the argument? The first relevant difference concerns the presupposition of 
the rough equality of individuals in the global original position. While we can indeed 
assume that within particular political communities human beings are more or less 
equal in power due to their development in similar cultural circumstances and to their 
joint involvement in framing collective social institutions, it is obviously not so if we 
consider how very different social environments, standards of education and cultural 
backgrounds shape differential life expectations. The construction of a global original 
position cannot ignore how particular social, political and linguistic boundaries might 
exert a deep impact on the claims people make on each other and on the strategies 
chosen to pursue specific ends. Those differences in cultural, educational or religious 
backgrounds are so relevant that they might ultimately affect the very possibility of 
identifying a common set of primary goods subject to distributive requirements.  
Consider the following example that a cosmopolitan egalitarian might suggest 
to show the relevance of global circumstances of justice where the parties coincide with 
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individuals and political membership is irrelevant. Suppose we start with a global 
original position where, for example, individuals from Papua New Guinea and 
individuals from Sweden are represented. It would be difficult to see how membership 
in each may be an arbitrary feature and how cultural, linguistic and educational 
backgrounds would not affect the bargaining capacity of such individuals. It is absurd 
to assume that the citizens of Papua have roughly equal needs and interests to the 
citizens of Sweden and from this conclude that they would also converge on the 
primary goods to be distributed worldwide. At least in the present stage of human 
development, the needs and interests contributing to make certain social goods 
desirable do not arise merely in response to natural motives but are mediated by 
cultural and historical factors, the organization of labour, standards of education, and so 
on. As the collective social and political environment that shapes the character of 
individuals as well as their social preferences, political communities cannot simply be 
ignored. Reducing membership to an “arbitrary” feature or pretending that one can 
abstract from it without affecting the way in which the parties will interact to choose 
specific distributive principles turns contractarianism into a much weaker justificatory 
device. 
Of course, such cultural and educational differences between individuals matter 
even in domestic subjective circumstances of justice. However sharing a public 
political culture and being aware of the general facts of social cooperation that 
influence individuals’ position within domestic institutional structures means that the 
chances of converging on a set of primary goods that individuals would require to be 
equally distributed are much greater in domestic circumstances. I will return to this 
point when discussing some aspects concerning the device of the “veil of ignorance” 
and its extension to issues of political membership. Here it is important to be clear that 
the argument I have put forward does not target any defence of the very idea of an 
original position but only those defences of it that believe it possible to ignore political 
membership.  
But now consider the following objection. A critic might say that if the parties 
in the original position did not know which country they belonged, if they did not know 
whether the subjects in circumstances of justice were Papuans or Swedish, for example, 
they would converge on global principles of justice satisfying Papuans and Swedish 
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people alike. Such principles would reform the world-political institutions in a way that 
provided individuals with equal opportunity sets worldwide thus designing a system of 
international cooperation that would benefit any of them, regardless of the country they 
ended up in. But if we accepted this suggestion we would encounter the well-known 
difficulty of identifying what exactly the principles of justice equalizing the position of 
individuals worldwide might consist of.   
This problem goes under the name of the “metric problem”. What it emphasizes 
is the difficulty in a culturally and politically plural world to identify a unique ranking 
of preferences and a metric of distribution that equally suits every individual in the 
same way. The issue at stake here is not merely due to an empirical difficulty of finding 
data that would allow us to compare the positions of individuals worldwide regardless 
of community membership. It is the difficulty of identifying the meaning of equality of 
opportunity in a culturally plural world, where social goods may be constructed and 
evaluated in entirely different ways. As one author points out, “we can only make 
judgments with any confidence in extreme cases, and in those cases, what seems at first 
sight to be a concern about inequality may well turn out on closer inspection to be a 
concern with absolute poverty or deprivation, a concern which suggests a quite 
different understanding of global justice”.40 Thus, the difficulty of introducing an 
arbitrariness claim on political membership in contractarian defences of global justice is 
that it leads to an unwarranted defence of individual equality of opportunity. If we tried 
to rescue the argument by recurring to the facts of global poverty and severe 
deprivation, we might end up losing the specificity of global egalitarian claims. 
 
3.2. Where the arbitrariness-argument becomes unnecessary 
 
The cosmopolitan critique of political communities is not only problematic but also 
unnecessary for a contractarian case in favour of global justice. In order to understand 
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this issue it is necessary to examine in further depth how the moral constraints 
cosmopolitans put on the parties in the global original position over-idealize global 
circumstances of justice. Consider first the contrast with domestic theories of justice. 
While embracing a Humean account on the subjective circumstances of justice, Rawls 
emphasizes two human features that create a special necessity for distributive 
principles: individual selfishness and moderate generosity. He then goes on to argue 
that this presumption ensures that the principles of justice do not rely on strong 
assumptions. Indeed “the original position is meant to incorporate widely shared and 
yet weak conditions”.41 Justice constitutes the outcome of a shared agreement on 
common interests; it is the virtue of practices where “there are competing interests and 
where persons feel entitled to press their rights on each other”.42 As Hume also 
reminds: “encrease to a sufficient degree the benevolence of men, or the bounty of 
nature, and you render justice useless, by supplying its place with much nobler virtues, 
and more valuable blessings”.43 Were moral feelings reliable enough in every human 
being, justice would become superfluous.  
The cosmopolitan original position inadvertently modifies this account of the 
nature of the parties. The model of international association envisaged in this case does 
not rely upon “free bargaining” but upon “some values that are genuinely shared”.44 In 
the cosmopolitan account, the subjects of the original position represent “moral 
persons” who assess the rationality of global distributive principles “with reference to a 
baseline of equality”.45 Clearly, the subjects involved in this choice situation are quite 
different from those interacting in Humean circumstances of justice. While in Hume’s 
and, more ambiguously, Rawls’ case the parties of the original position are strategic 
and selfish human beings interested in maximising their interests, in the cosmopolitan 
one they represent moral subjects, committed to some basic principles of equality and 
justice.  
The difficulty with such an account is that by idealizing the subjects of the 
original position, cosmopolitanism relies precisely on that for which justice is required. 
Indeed, what differentiates the global original position from the domestic contractarian 
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one is that for the latter, the social contract does not constitute the outcome of moral 
agreement on a specific conception of justice but of the need to coordinate parties 
interested in framing common rules of interaction. Rawls’s contractarianism here 
echoes Rousseau’s enquiry on whether there can be “a legitimate and reliable rule of 
administration in the civil order taking men as they are and laws as they can be”. As 
Rousseau puts it in the beginning of the Social contract, “I shall try always to reconcile 
in this research what right permits with what interest prescribes so that justice and 
utility are not at variance”.46  
Far from starting with parties that naturally possess a sense of justice, this type 
of contractarianism justifies the necessity of external authority precisely in the case of 
the absence of agreement on general moral principles. Rather than creating ex nihilo a 
particular political union, one needs to presuppose it. Normative theory starts with a 
given set of political institutions and enquires on the principles needed for their reform. 
Rousseau also makes this point very clear while discussing the necessity of a legislator: 
“in order for an emerging people to appreciate the healthy maxims of politics […] the 
effect would have to become the cause; the social spirit, which should be the result of 
the institution, would have to preside over the founding of the institution itself, and men 
would have to be prior to laws what they ought to become by means of laws”.47  
Hence, one cannot expect natural moral duties to ground political agreements, 
since it is precisely because of their unreliability that justice is required. As I tried to 
show in the first chapter, Kant also insists on the issue while discussing the role of 
political legislation in promoting human moral progress. Indeed, as he puts it, “it is not 
the case that a good state constitution is to be expected from inner morality; on the 
contrary the good moral education of a people is to be expected through a good state 
constitution”. In fact, Kant adds, by relying on morality alone “nothing will be 
achieved”.48  
This understanding of moral capacity not as an original property shared by all 
individuals but rather as a disposition of “humanity” which needs to be historically 
developed marks an important, though little noticed, difference with contemporary 
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cosmopolitan accounts.49 Far from raising obstacles to the emergence of moral 
personality, as in the cosmopolitan theories we are examining, membership in a 
political community contributes to its full emancipation. As Kant claims in his early 
essay on universal history, it is only by entering into a civil constitution that “all the 
germs implanted by nature can be developed fully”.50 This also explains why, in Kant’s 
theory of international relations, the conflict among different political communities is 
not quite analogous to the condition of individuals in an anarchical state of nature. 
Indeed states, unlike individuals, “already have a rightful constitution internally” and a 
republic is by nature “inclined to perpetual peace”.51 The public recognition of a 
collective authority limiting individual claims constitutes the first step towards a 
process of human emancipation by virtue of which political subjects agree to obey the 
laws that they have given to themselves. 
If in this standard contractarian account of justice individuals in the state of 
nature are interest-maximisers and political communities provide the most relevant 
associative context in which their moral powers may be fully realized, the opposite 
occurs in the cosmopolitan account. The two relevant starting points for a cosmopolitan 
interpretation of the original position are the concept of individuals considered as “free 
and equal moral persons” and a bargaining situation from which all “morally arbitrary” 
factors should be excluded.52 As with Leibniz’s cosmopolitan account, examined in the 
previous chapter, the parties are here individual moral units whose natural sense of 
justice leads them to favour specific global distributive principles.53 This issue is 
however controversial: if we could rely on such ideal premises, on individuals’ altruism 
and ability to comply spontaneously with specific moral laws, one would have 
difficulty explaining how claims of justice might arise.  
One response might be that justice is required for reasons of coordination, in 
order to support the parties’ distribution of benefits and burdens and prevent unintended 
consequences of social interactions. But if this were indeed the case, what is gained by 
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declaring political communities arbitrary from a moral perspective? If anything, they 
might contribute to a partial resolution of the coordination dispute by making available 
a set of institutional mechanisms through which the claims of members (at least) are 
accommodated. This thought, as already emphasized, animates Kant’s statist 
cosmopolitan account of international justice where, far from being arbitrary entities, 
collective political agents who have internally realized public right subject themselves 
to external non-coercive agreements serving their interest in just reciprocal relations. 
Cosmopolitans need not over-idealize individuals or prove political 
communities arbitrary in order to reflect on international circumstances of justice. 
Showing that a conflict between subjects roughly equal in abilities and needs gives rise 
to specific claims of justice is possible even starting from premises that recognize the 
relevance of political membership. Following Rousseau and Kant, one might argue that 
existing tensions among states and an unequal distribution of power in the global 
sphere threaten to deliver an unfair international system of cooperation and to 
disadvantage the life-prospects of citizens in each political community.  
On this view, rather than assuming the widespread diffusion of naturally moral 
subjects, we would consider the state a cultivating ground for cosmopolitan morality. 
Taking part in collective processes of decision-making already limits the arbitrary 
wants of individuals, teaches them to live in common, and educates them to a sense of 
the collective. Once individuals have learned to live in a political association, it is 
easier for them to see the advantages of fair collective deliberation and consider the 
interactions between them and outsiders from a less narrow-minded perspective. 
International anarchy would be just as unattractive as the anarchy of the state of nature 
and having enjoyed the benefits of abandoning the latter they might be more motivated 
to also exit from the former.  
The advantage of such a view is that it need not start from dubious assumptions 
about the degree of moral awareness individuals in circumstances of justice must 
already possess. It is sufficient to argue that some members of the international society 
have reasons to want to avoid the potential harms of a perpetual condition of 
international anarchy and may jointly contribute to the establishment of a collective and 
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cooperative institutional regime.54 Of course, one might retort here that considering 
political membership in this light is as ideal as the assumption of moralized parties in 
the cosmopolitan contractarian account we are trying to challenge. Some implications 
of this objection are considered more in detail in the following section. 
 
4. The sense of justice 
 
To justify the assumption of moralized parties and the shift away from the postulates of 
mutual disinterest and limited altruism characterizing domestic circumstances of justice 
cosmopolitans might underline the hypothetical character of the social contract. Such 
an interpretation would be coherent with an interpretation of the original position as an 
“idea of reason” that allows us to think of the choice situation in ways “similar to the 
point of view from which noumenal selves see the world”.55 The idea is operationalized 
through the device of the veil of ignorance concealing all contingent information on 
particular characteristics of the parties and facilitating their consequent choice of the 
principles based on purely rational moral motives. This section examines the demands 
of the veil of ignorance in the global original position and illustrates some of its 
shortcomings in bracketing political membership and generating support from a 
cosmopolitan conception of agency.  
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls clarifies that the idea of a veil of ignorance is 
introduced in order to eliminate the effects of specific contingencies that would tempt 
people to exploit the choice situation to their own advantage. Thus, “the veil of 
ignorance deprives the persons in the original position of the knowledge that would 
enable them to choose heteronymous principles”.56 The parties in the original position 
are unaware of their class and social status, or do not know their particular natural 
talents or social skills, and ignore their life-plans as well as their psychological 
disposition to specific opportunities.57 The informational restrictions introduced by the 
veil of ignorance aim to guarantee bargaining conditions which should lead to fair 
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principles of justice endorsed by all contracting parties. 
 
4.1. Where the arbitrariness-argument goes wrong 
 
Cosmopolitans suggest that in the global original position, the veil of ignorance should 
extend to the parties’ knowledge of the particular community to which they belong. 
Beitz has argued that “the parties to the original position cannot be assumed to know 
that they are members of a particular national society […]. The veil of ignorance must 
extend to all matters of national citizenship, and the principles chosen will therefore 
apply globally”.58 Pogge has also emphasized how “nationality is just one further deep 
contingency (like genetic endowment, race, gender, and social class) one more potential 
basis for inequalities that are inescapable and present from birth”. If one takes seriously 
the idea of abstracting from all contingent features for the sake of a fair bargaining 
situation, he claims, “there is no reason to treat this case differently from the others”.59  
This argument has been criticized by underlining how such an extended 
interpretation of the veil of ignorance in the original position would make it difficult to 
assess which institutions fall under considerations of justice and which ones could be 
taken for granted.60 It is emphasized for example that, if followed rigorously, the 
cosmopolitan thought experiment might challenge every institution through which 
individuals organize collectively, not only political communities but also international 
organizations, civil associations, the market sphere, and even the family. An 
indiscriminate extension of the veil of ignorance in the global sphere appears to raise 
the question of the amount of information that the parties would choose to maintain or 
reject. If the idea of the veil of ignorance were pursued to its logical conclusion, the 
parties would not only ignore their citizenship but also the generation to which they 
belong, the economic and political conditions of the international sphere, humanity’s 
level of civilization, and so on. Martha Nussbaum underlines this point by claiming 
that: “if you do not know that a multinational cooperation exists, you will probably not 
imagine one as part of an ideal structure of global justice. [I]f you do not know about 
the Internet, it will not be easy to imagine it; but then you will not be able to address the 
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inequalities created by differential access to it”.61  
This critique however seems to neglect one important feature of the veil of 
ignorance and risks being misleading. While the thought experiment requires 
individuals to abstract from contingent personal features in the original choice situation, 
it does not exclude the knowledge of general facts about society as well as of the basic 
principles of political organization. One of the most relevant elements characterizing 
the parties behind the veil of ignorance is that they are taken to know as little as 
possible when it comes to specific individuals preferences, talents or social status and 
as much as possible on the general rules of the system of cooperation to which their 
conception of justice applies. As Rawls clarifies, “there are no limitations on general 
laws and theories, since conceptions of justice must be adjusted to general systems of 
social cooperation which they are to regulate, and there is no reason to rule out these 
facts”.62 
The real question raised by the cosmopolitan extension of the veil of ignorance 
is then not so much absence of clarity about how far the thought experiment can 
proceed without becoming impracticable. It is, rather, whether the parties’ political 
membership is the kind of knowledge one can afford to ignore without weakening the 
justification of global distributive principles. Here there are two possibilities to 
consider. In one version of the cosmopolitan argument, we might imagine individuals 
abstracting from the existence of any form of collective association and deliberating, in 
general, whether a global distribution of benefits and burdens should follow territorial 
lines with a designated authority holding monopoly over the use of force. The parties in 
the original position, that is, would ignore the existence of states and reflect on whether 
some kind of state-like form of organization would be appropriate in reforming the 
basic structure of society. 63  
This argument appears particularly weak however. Egalitarian conceptions of 
domestic justice applies to society understood as a well-established system of practice 
and is grounded on assumptions considered to be widely shared. From this perspective, 
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ruling out some kind of general knowledge about the existence of a world divided into 
bounded political communities seems inappropriate. Indeed, in the domestic case, the 
parties do not question the existence of certain institutional arrangements such as the 
constitution, courts of justice or the presence of market interactions. These are all taken 
for granted as part of society’s basic structure. Rather the burden of decision relies on 
what kind of constitution, what kind of courts and what kind of markets, are required to 
accommodate the claims of justice. Analogously, in the international sphere the 
question is not whether political communities ought to exist at all but rather how the 
distribution of benefits and burdens among a given plurality of them could be 
conceived.  
This leads us to a second potential restriction that the veil of ignorance might 
introduce regarding the parties’ information on their political membership. One might 
imagine that although knowing about the existence of particular political communities 
and their characteristics, the subjects of a global original position are deprived of 
knowledge as to how they relate to each other. For example, each subject in the original 
position might be aware that China, Zimbabwe, and the United States are part of the 
world’s political map, and they might also have access to the general social facts 
relevant to those countries, yet simply ignore whether (s)he is Chinese, Zimbabwean, or 
American. According to this second cosmopolitan interpretation, the only relevant 
feature to take into account while evaluating claims of justice in the global original 
position would be whether all parties have “a capacity for an effective sense of justice 
and a capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good”.64 
The appeal to the parties “effective sense of justice” is indeed crucial to build a 
persuasive contractarian case in favour of specific distributive principles. In Rawls’s 
domestic theory the sense of justice motivates the parties to act by the principles chosen 
in the original position, thus illustrating how justice as fairness emerges as the most 
stable conception given a plurality of alternatives. As Rawls puts it: “a system in which 
each person has, and is known by everyone to have, a sense of justice is inherently 
stable. Other things being equal, the forces making for its stability increase as time 
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passes”.65  
This emphasis on “time” as a crucial feature for understanding how the sense of 
justice may develop and strengthen among the subjects of the original position is linked 
to the moral psychology that A Theory of Justice, inspired by Rousseau’s Emile, 
provides.66 The appeal to the moral force of the “purely conscientious act”, “the desire 
to do what is right and just simply because it is right and just” is clearly not enough.67 
Rousseau was among the first to raise the question of moral motivation in the 
acceptance of contractarian principles when he claimed that: “it is not by sumptuary 
laws that luxury can be successfully extirpated; it is from the depth of the heart itself 
that you must uproot it by impressing men with healthier and nobler tastes”.68 Here the 
willingness to act not merely due to coercion but spontaneously according to the 
principles of justice depends upon practices of cooperation in a particular society. It 
relates to specific processes of psychological and political emancipation, to the way in 
which individuals come to form their beliefs, rely upon specific intuitions and discard 
others, and develop feelings of mutual trust and solidarity. In order for justice as 
fairness to emerge as the most stable conception in a constructivist procedure of 
justification, the parties’ sense of justice must reflect the public norms of political 
communication as rooted in the institutional development of a particular society. 
Indeed, “what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order 
antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of 
ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that given our history and the 
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traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us”.69 
  
4.2. Where the arbitrariness-argument becomes unnecessary 
 
It is now easy to see how the cosmopolitan construction of a global original position 
modifies classic contractarian assumptions on the parties’ sense of justice so as to 
unnecessarily weaken the method’s justificatory potential. The cosmopolitan extension 
of the veil of ignorance to issues of political membership requires precisely that the 
history, traditions and civic life shaping the social expectations and motivation of 
different subjects are considered arbitrary features and assumes that they play no role in 
the parties’ forming an “effective sense of justice”. While imprudently ignoring the 
criterion of stability in the justification of global distributive principles and 
ambiguously returning to an ideal doctrine of the “purely conscientious act”, the 
cosmopolitan-contractarian reconstruction of the global original position encounters an 
even greater obstacle. It places behind the veil of ignorance features that might be 
crucial for understanding the basis for public agreement and conceals all the 
commonsense intuitions that one needs to take into account in weighting alternative 
views. Ultimately, it fails to examine the background assumptions that might lead to a 
widely acceptable account of distributive justice.  
By bracketing the parties’ attachment to a particular set of collective political 
institutions, the cosmopolitan reconstruction of the global original position is left with a 
rather obscure view on the parties “effective sense of justice” and an extremely weak 
analysis of what might motivate them to act in accordance with specific principles. 
Except for a few moral heroes, an “effective sense of justice” does not arise exclusively 
out of the subjects’ attachment to pure moral motives but may be socially and 
politically constructed as well as specific to each form of collective political 
association. To claim that an innate, universal “sense of justice”, understood as an 
unconditional compliance with rationally justified principles, might be very rare or that 
one needs to take into account the way particular societies inform their members’ desire 
for justice does not mean ruling out that it might be possible to justify distributive 
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principles on a global scale. What it emphasizes is that extending the veil of ignorance 
on issues of political membership might not be the most appropriate kind of 
informational restriction to introduce in the global original position in order to ensure a 
fair justificatory procedure. The sort of knowledge that one would be brought to ignore 
in this case might affect what remains of the parties’ sense of justice, thus turning the 
contractarian account into a very weak methodological device. 
One might of course object here that the sense of justice amounts to nothing 
more than the motivation to comply that people internalize by virtue of living under just 
institutions. If this were indeed so, the veil of ignorance would not conceal any 
important information: one may emphasize that people behind the veil have a minimal 
motivation to comply so that whatever sense of justice we assume domestically we can 
count on internationally too. In a way, it is undeniable that, with regard to some issues 
at least, people’s sense of justice overlaps worldwide, regardless of political 
membership. Perhaps one does not need to know where he or she comes from to 
consider torturing babies wrong and the sense of justice on this particular question 
would be enough strong to support institutions prohibiting such a practice. Whether this 
kind of thin, reactive, motivation is also enough to support the more demanding global 
distributive reforms required by cosmopolitan egalitarian justice is a different matter. 
Domestically at least, the sense of justice is not due merely to people’s abstract respect 
for a public system of rules. It is complemented by other psychological pro-attitudes, 
developed in the process of growing in a particular political community, of sharing the 
values of a public culture, of maturing particular attachments to a set of people, of 
speaking the same language, and of knowing a particular history. But cosmopolitan-
egalitarians need not consider these features arbitrary or detrimental to their own cause: 
they may instead approach global political reform by virtue of an internal 
transformation of political communities compatibly with cosmopolitan goals.70 The veil 
of ignorance on issues of political membership does nothing to consolidate people’s 
motivation to comply with cosmopolitan principles. It merely succeeds in weakening 
the sense of justice that they might already have thus rendering global political reform 
even more difficult to achieve. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Assessing existent defences of global distributive justice with a particular emphasis on 
the cosmopolitan critique of political membership, I have rejected the claim that 
political membership is arbitrary for the scope of justice. Focusing on the circumstances 
of justice, the nature of the parties, and the use and function of the veil of ignorance, I 
have argued that the cosmopolitan attempt to abstract from political membership in 
justifying global distributive principles is both unwarranted and unnecessary. With 
regard to the first issue – the circumstances of justice – the cosmopolitan analysis of the 
role of political communities unnecessarily introduces desert-based claims that, even if 
justified, would lead to historical principles of justice and not to the distributive ones 
originally required. With regard to the second issue (the nature of the parties), the 
cosmopolitan attempt to bracket political membership over-idealizes the contractarian 
premises and moralizes the subjects of the original position to the point of abolishing 
all instances of conflict and rendering justice unnecessary. In the third case, I tried to 
illustrate how the demand to extend the veil of ignorance to issues of political 
membership limits the parties’ sense of justice, negatively affects the quest for stability 
and fails to indicate which widely shared intuitions might provide a common ground 
for public deliberation among parties at the global level. Rejecting the normative 
standing of political communities does not reinforce the case for global distributive 
principles; it succeeds only in turning contractarianism into a very weak justificatory 
strategy. 
Existing defences of the normative relevance of the state usually couple with a 
critique of all cosmopolitan arguments in favour of global distributive justice. Here I 
tried to separate the two questions, and while forcefully rejecting several cosmopolitan 
arguments concerning the arbitrariness of political communities, I remained agnostic 
about the possibility of justifying global distributive principles once we admit the role 
of political communities. The main aim of this chapter has been critical and 
interpretative. If one takes seriously the need to integrate the moral core of 
cosmopolitanism with principles regulating the global distribution of benefits and 
burdens, efforts made to deny the relevance of political membership may be liable to 
undo the argument.  
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Chapter III 
Against Cosmopolitanism?  
 
 
1. Preliminary remarks 
 
We already emphasized how any reform of social institutions must start with people as 
they are and reflect on laws as they should be. Normative theory can (and ought to) 
apply the highest moral standards to its analysis of society - yet it will only deliver 
sound principles when placing its premises at the appropriate level of abstraction.1 The 
previous chapter tried to show how starting with all too ideal assumptions on the 
arbitrariness of political membership may end up undermining the very aims of 
cosmopolitan theories. This chapter targets non-cosmopolitan approaches and argues 
that their limitation of egalitarian obligations to state-based associative relations will 
leave us with an objectionable account of global justice.2 
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Besides criticizing non-cosmopolitan accounts of global justice, this chapter 
also assesses the role that ideal and non-ideal considerations should play in normative 
theorizing about global justice more broadly.3 It argues that the failure of both 
cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans to combine adequately a reflection on matters of 
principle with a reflection on matters of agency is due to the inability of both to place 
ideal and non-ideal constraints at the right level within their theories. Clarifying how 
cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans confuse or misplace ideal and non-ideal 
considerations should pave the way to understanding the alternative approach to global 
justice developed in the rest of this work. Once we have explained at which stage of 
normative theorizing on global justice, cosmopolitan or non-cosmopolitan observations 
ought to prevail, it may be easier to reconcile the normative defences of both 
cosmopolitanism and the state. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. I start by outlining the ideal vs. non-ideal 
distinction in political theory and recall how cosmopolitans have been ideal on issues in 
which non-ideal considerations should prevail whereas their critics are non-ideal where 
an ideal approach would be more appropriate. To clarify such issues further, I examine 
a number of arguments non-cosmopolitans have offered to reject global egalitarianism. 
More specifically, I consider the non-cosmopolitan foundation of distributive equality 
on state-based associative relations and the issue of what kind of alternative principles 
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of justice may substitute a cosmopolitan approach. On the first point, I argue that the 
non-cosmopolitan defence of the state is ideal when it ought to be non-ideal: it 
discusses the relevance of special relations from a justificatory perspective instead of 
considering which conception of human relations supports political transformation in 
the world as we know it. On the second point, I try to show that the discussion on 
remedial principles for fighting global poverty is non-ideal, limited to examining the 
impact of severe material deprivation in unfavourable conditions of domestic poverty. It 
ought to be ideal: investigating on the ideal principles of justice emerging from global 
circumstances of injustice. 
While discussing both issues (the foundation of distributive equality on state-
based associative relations and the priority given to principles of assistance to burdened 
societies) I also emphasize the failure of existent cosmopolitan counter-arguments to 
respond at the appropriate level of analysis. Instead of criticizing their rivals for 
confusing the roles of ideal and non-ideal assumptions, cosmopolitans have endorsed 
their methodological premises and entered potentially endless substantive controversies 
on the nature of associative duties and the corresponding principles of distributive 
justice. Clearing the ground from such methodological confusion on both sides will 
introduce to a (hopefully) more sophisticated way of combining ideal and non-ideal in 
discussions of global justice as well as anticipate some of the issues developed in our 
third part. 
 
2. Ideal and non-ideal: the two-stage construction  
 
We tend to think first and foremost of Rawls when differentiating between ideal and 
non-ideal. But of course the distinction goes back at least to Plato. It emerges most 
clearly in books five and six of The Republic where Socrates attempts to defend his 
ideal theory of the polity from one critique of Glaucon that he considers to be the 
“greatest and heaviest wave” faced so far by his account. Glaucon’s initial argument is 
that every previous reflection Socrates has offered on perfect justice and the ideal polity 
relies on the assumption of full compliance and citizens’ motivation to obey the polity’s 
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laws.4 Yet these considerations seem to deflect the discussion from the real issue 
Socrates needs yet to address: “is such an order of things possible, and how, if at all”?5 
Glaucon’s remarks proceed from a contrast between the hypothetical 
acceptance of ideal principles of justice (“if only this state of yours were to come into 
existence we need say no more about them”) and the practical feasibility of 
transforming a polity in a way that conforms to such principles (“assuming then the 
existence of the State, let us now turn to the question of possibility and ways and means 
– the rest may be left”).6 Yet, Socrates rejects such strong distinction between the 
normative and empirical level of analysis and attempts to illustrate their mutual 
implication. He does so firstly by clarifying the regulative role of an “ideal” of justice 
when reflecting on the highest virtues of the polity; and secondly by focusing more 
specifically on the agents and transformations that would bring about a social order if 
such ideals were realized in practice. 
The first point concerns the nature of the relationship between the hypothetical 
possibility of the principles of justice and their exhibited reality.  That relationship can 
be one of merely of approximation rather than one of perfect compatibility. Ideals 
embody the abstract representation of a polity run by perfectly just principles - 
principles that everyone would have a reason to endorse if their judgments were 
impartial.7 The assumption of perfect compliance is intrinsic to those being normative 
ideals rather than descriptive accounts. Firstly we need to assume that the polity’s 
citizens will be equally motivated to promote ideal justice, only afterwards we can go 
on to consider what non-ideal institutional arrangements could offer the best scheme for 
its realization. 
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The second point, regarding the feasibility of an “ideal” polity in non-ideal 
circumstances, concerns the issue of political organization in attempting to realize the 
ideal principles of justice. To say that ideal principles constitute a standard for 
evaluating the polity’s degree of justice in non-ideal circumstances, and to require that 
the latter (circumstances) are progressively modified so that they reflect the former 
(principles), raises the question of “by whom” and “how” this change is going to take 
place. Approximation clearly does not imply that “the actual State will in every respect 
coincide with the ideal”, i.e., the realization of the principles of justice does not assume 
perfect compliance. As Socrates  says in reply to the request for a “feasibility proof” of 
how legislators and political mechanisms might progressively conform to the ideal: “if 
we are only able to discover how a city may be governed nearly as we proposed, you 
will admit that we have discovered the possibility which you demand; and will be 
contented”.8 
The feasibility of politics paying this mediating role in shaping the social 
conditions under which the ideal principles of justice are progressively realized in 
practice need not depend on the perfect compliance of all citizens. In The Republic 
Socrates suggests that it suffices that a special class of subjects, those who appear less 
corruptible and more likely to pursue the idea of justice for its own sake, are assigned 
responsibility for being political guides and civic educators. Socrates was here referring 
to philosophers but we do not need to enquire further on either the significance of this 
proposal or its adaptation to modern conditions and the interesting substitution of the 
category with what Rousseau would have later called the “legislators” and Kant the 
“moral politicians”.9 We need merely note instead the two-stage construction of a 
coherent theory of justice: firstly, focus on the ideal principles according to which a 
polity’s institutions ought to be shaped under conditions of perfect compliance; 
secondly, assign responsibility for the project’s practical realization to the most 
adequate agents of change in non-ideal circumstances. 
Several theories of justice, both domestic and international, adopt a formally 
analogous approach. The usual modus operandi most familiarly associated nowadays 
with Rawls is to divide the theory into two parts: the first, “ideal”, part defines a 
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standard of social interaction worked out in favourable conditions of cooperation and 
perfect compliance. Once the principles according to which all affected parties decide 
to shape their common social institutions are established, the question of how to deal 
with cases of non-compliance, lack of motivation or historical failures to realize such 
an ideal is assigned to the non-ideal part of the theory of justice.10  
Yet the combination of ideal principles with non-ideal presuppositions, existing 
background institutions and particular associative relations in global theories of justice 
is far from clear. Cosmopolitan accounts, as we pointed out in the previous chapter, are 
typically more or less always ideal. They over-moralize parties in the global original 
position or they fail to account for how ordinary agents might be motivated to promote 
cosmopolitan political initiatives.11 Even those authors underlining the need to take 
seriously non-ideal circumstances end up admitting that “even if it is unlikely that the 
ideal would be fully realized it is implausible to insist that no necessary steps towards 
that ideal should be taken”.12 But this response is clearly insufficient. Positively 
identifying the agents and circumstances under which the benefits and burdens 
demanded by ideal principles of justice could be distributed is a necessary requirement 
for any politically sensitive global theory of justice.  
On the other hand, non-cosmopolitans take seriously political circumstances 
and defend the relevance of existing associative relations in determining the scope of 
distributive equality. Their approach to global justice is, more or less, non-ideal: the 
point, they claim, is not so much to establish how the world should look like if its basic 
social institutions were redesigned from scratch but how we could justify their 
existence to people affected by them. Yet non-cosmopolitans are often criticized for 
simply endorsing the global status quo when they emphasize how equality requires 
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sovereignty as a “general enabling condition”13 or when they deploy unwarranted 
empirical arguments to avoid scrutinizing the global economic order from the point of 
view of ideal justice.14  
Some problems with such an account and with the cosmopolitan response to it 
are examined more in detail in the following two sections. 
 
3. What’s ideal about associative relations? 
 
The first point of controversy between cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan approaches 
to global justice concerns the grounds of distributive equality. Non-cosmopolitan 
accounts consider distributive obligations grounded on special associative relations. 
These associative relations are usually understood either in a cultural or in a political 
way. As far as cultural relations are concerned, it is often claimed that distributive 
justice requires a bounded political community where social goods are equally valued 
and in which citizens share “common sympathies” motivating them to comply with 
reciprocal distributive obligations.15 As far as political relations are concerned, it is 
emphasized that the cooperative or coercive nature of state institutions places on those 
institutions higher burdens of justification with regard to the relative well-being of the 
people they represent.16 
Cosmopolitans emphasize that, on both points, non-cosmopolitan accounts rely 
on controversial empirical assumptions concerning the reasons for which distributive 
equality is a justified worry only within particular political communities. Against the 
first, cultural, argument the normative relevance of states is criticized for romanticizing 
the national community and for not taking into account that “common sympathies” may 
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be lacking in culturally heterogeneous societies or may not follow territorial lines but 
rather ideological or group-based ones.17 Against the second, political, argument it is 
often emphasized how instances of coercion and cooperation may be found even in 
international institutions affecting individuals’ life globally. Hence, critics claim, there 
are no good reasons for grounding distributive equality on special relations within 
existing state boundaries.18 
But of course non-cosmopolitan accounts following Rawls intend their theory 
of global justice to be ideal. The point - they argue in response to the first question – is 
not so much verifying whether any existing collection of individuals really exhibits all 
the relational properties associated with the normatively relevant features for grounding 
distributive obligations. No one, certainly not liberal theorists, would deny the 
existence of fundamental disagreement on comprehensive doctrines among citizens of 
modern societies or build consent on a substantive account of the common good.19 But 
an ideal theory of global justice does not need to imply that any existing society 
actually fulfils the criteria non-cosmopolitans ascribe to it. The relevant question is 
instead whether the notion of “common sympathies” constitutes a sufficiently desirable 
form of human social organization to serve as the basic unit of the global society, not 
whether it realistically describes any actually existing state.20 Hence, cosmopolitans use 
non-ideal arguments to discredit a theory that their rivals intended to be ideal, as if one 
wished to have apples and was told that oranges are bad for his health. 
Suppose however, that non-cosmopolitans convinced cosmopolitans about the 
normative relevance of the ideal argument in favour of culturally homogenous entities. 
Cosmopolitans would still want to know why such entities should differ along 
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territorial lines. If we are merely interested in ideal possibilities, cosmopolitans might 
plausibly insist, then gender, religion or social class – to give only few examples - are 
more relevant units of aggregation around common sympathies than the non-
cosmopolitan assumption of bounded political communities.21 
The second line of defence of special associative relations tries to provide an 
answer to this objection. It does so by setting aside special cultural relations, and 
focusing instead on special institutional ones. Contra cosmopolitans, their critics 
emphasize justice’s specifically “political” character. They argue that the priority of 
states (and not individuals or other groups) as grounds for distributive equality does not 
rely on individualist principles of justice or on a moral comprehensive doctrine. 
Instead, it relates to the presupposition of a particular kind of associative relation that 
justice requires in order to be exercised. Principles assessing the justice of particular 
institutions should reflect the nature of that institution and do not apply uniformly to all 
kinds of entities, including individual choices.22 In the non-cosmopolitan version of this 
last argument, principles of distributive justice presuppose the existence of a collective 
body that mutually acknowledges, cooperatively enacts and coercively imposes a 
particular institutional framework reflecting the political ideal of reciprocity and 
enjoying the legitimacy of its members.23  
This argument is problematic. The fact that justice requires state-based political 
institutions to be exercised does not mean that its principles may only be considered 
valid within states’ domestic jurisdiction. The non-cosmopolitan argument rests on a 
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confusion between legitimacy as a criterion of feasibility with agreement as a criterion 
of moral justification. It seems to rely on a shift away from the question of what kind of 
relations ground valid distributive claims and should be included in the normative 
assessment of the principles of justice (Socrates’ ideal of the polity) to what kind of 
relations would need to be in place for such an ideal to become a feasible one 
(Glaucon’s concern with non-ideal circumstances). From the point of view of the 
former justice is interested in the conditions of possibility of fair distribution, 
rectification or commutation among all affected parties (or all parties finding 
themselves in specific circumstances of justice). This is a matter of principle.24 From 
the point of view of the latter, justice shows the way in which particular institutions 
create special sets of obligations, the fulfilment of which is not a matter of individual 
good-will but rather of collective constraint among members of specific associative 
schemes. This is a matter of agency. 
Issues of principle and issues of agency must not be confused, but they should 
also not be isolated from each other. We could conceive of them as part of the same 
theory, but simply characterizing each of its two stages. In the first stage, the ideal part 
of the theory, the principles regulating interactions among different subjects would only 
have to take into account their relations within specific circumstances of global 
(in)justice. In the second, non-ideal, stage, we would be concerned with the 
transformation of existing political institutions and the criteria constraining collective 
initiatives ought to be politically sensitive: feasibility, legitimacy, stability.  
Notice that in tracing such a distinction between principles and agency we need 
not abstract from the political membership of subjects in specific circumstances of 
justice, as we have seen several cosmopolitans do in the previous chapter. We may 
even grant that there will be special sympathies or special political relations between 
some people and not others. Saying that such issues need to be taken into account 
already in the first stage is not the same as saying that when they are taken into account 
they necessarily undermine the global scope of distributive equality. What we need to 
emphasize is that where such associative relations obtain particular significance is the 
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second stage of the theory, when the issue of agency for the realization of cosmopolitan 
claims is discussed. Indeed all the arguments usually brought by non-cosmopolitans to 
defend the normative standing of states become relevant at this second (non-ideal) 
stage. For example, coercion is necessary to guarantee feasibility, reciprocity is 
necessary to guarantee legitimacy, cooperation is necessary to guarantee stability. But it 
would be as wrong to prioritize such criteria already at the level of principle in order to 
constrain the scope of equality, as to ignore them altogether.  
Prioritizing special associative obligations at the level of principle runs the risk 
of arbitrarily excluding people who might be affected by the economic policies of 
powerful states in just the same way their citizens are. If associativist arguments 
obtained, non-citizens would cease to be a target of distributive claims – all other things 
being equal – simply because they lived on the other side of the border. We have ruled 
out in the previous chapter that political membership may be considered arbitrary. But 
this is not the same as saying that it should have distributive priority, or that it should 
have any kind of priority in the ideal stage of the theory. Accepting the non-
cosmopolitan prioritization of the state at an ideal level runs the risk of promoting an 
unduly exclusionary conception of distributive justice. Such an account fails to take 
into account how citizens and non-citizens alike might cooperate in producing specific 
goods and be equally affected by structural economic injustices. Why not start with a 
more inclusive conception of relevant relations among citizens of different states and 
consider whether particular distributive claims follow from there? 
There may be an objection here. A cosmopolitan could argue that it is 
impossible to even get started with the analysis of global distributive principles if one 
does not abstract from political membership. Otherwise cosmopolitan principles might 
be rejected (even at the ideal level) from citizens of states who do not share values 
often associated with liberal cultures such as autonomy, impartiality or fairness.25 The 
argument however seems to rely on the assumption that only parties educated in liberal 
societies are able to engage in a certain kind of deliberation in specific circumstances of 
justice. But the history of thinking about justice is longer than the history of liberalism 
and, if anything, the latter represents only one possible model for solving distributive 
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conflicts in an institutional way (and not necessarily the most successful one). In the 
situation I have just sketched, we do not expect subjects in circumstances of justice to 
share the same political model of organization since this question is left to the initiative 
of non-ideal agents. Instead, we make the much less demanding argument that they will 
probably discuss, confront and share specific distributive concerns and even though 
these may arise from a plurality of ethical systems such systems do not need to be 
incommunicable.26  
 Having introduced a distinction between issues of principle and issues of 
agency (the first kind of query belonging to the ideal part of the theory and the second 
to its non-ideal part), it seems easier to see where recent approaches to global justice go 
wrong. Most cosmopolitan accounts focus on the ideal part of the theory, on the claims 
of principle, and seem to undermine the question of agency in transforming social and 
political institutions by ignoring questions of compliance and motivation. Issues of 
feasibility are, to be sure, occasionally raised. But even when they are, it is difficult to 
know precisely what kind of agents are supposed to take initiatives for reforming which 
particular institutions, where the locus of political decision-making is supposed to be in 
the global sphere and how decent arrangements reflecting the principles of justice are 
supposed to emerge given cosmopolitan’s scepticism towards state-based agency.27 
Taking seriously into account non-ideal agency, for example the coercive power of 
states, the associative conditions under which ideal principles of justice become 
feasible and agents might be motivated to promote cosmopolitan initiatives would 
immensely benefit the political allocation of distributive cosmopolitan obligations. 
Non-cosmopolitan theories, on the other hand, do seem to pay attention to the 
relevance of states in the global sphere.  But they confuse issues of agency with issues 
of principle: they limit egalitarian concerns to particular political boundaries yet lack a 
normative account of how one ought to deal with cases where the circumstances of 
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justice do not necessarily coincide with specific state boundaries. This is particularly 
evident if we consider the case of global poverty, one other source of controversy 
between non-cosmopolitans and cosmopolitan approaches to global justice where the 
consequences of the ideal/non-ideal confusion emerge clearly again. The following 
section considers some shortcomings of non-cosmopolitan arguments with regard to the 
principles required to fight global poverty and introduces an alternative way of 
exploring the circumstances of global justice. 
  
4. What’s non-ideal about global principles? 
 
In the previous section, I underlined the mistaken application of ideal and non-ideal 
categories in recent accounts of global justice with regard to the relations necessary to 
ground claims of distributive equality. More specifically, I emphasized that all 
arguments either for or against the centrality of states were played at the “ideal” level 
(discussing the role of state-based relations in grounding distributive equality) when 
they should have been “non-ideal” (raising the issue of feasibility and stability in the 
application of the principles of global justice). This suggests that, in order to complete 
the two-stage construction of a global theory of justice, rather than discussing the role 
of states’ from an ideal perspective, one should focus on the political agency they make 
available in non-ideal circumstances. This means placing at the heart of normative 
theory an analysis of the way through which political agents distribute power, impose 
certain moral constraints on the members of a political association and make feasible 
specific principles of justice under conditions of imperfect compliance.  
I shall return to this issue in the following chapters. For now, it is important to 
assess non-cosmopolitan arguments also from the point of view of their favourite 
principles of global justice. Contrary to the discussion on states (which as I tried to 
show was driven by ideal arguments when it should have focused on non-ideal issues of 
agency, feasibility and motivation) the opposite occurs with the analysis of principles. 
The non-cosmopolitan discussion on principles is non-ideal (focusing on contingent 
cases of unfavourable domestic conditions) when it should be ideal, i.e. addressing the 
issue of what kind of distributive principles are necessary in global circumstances of 
justice  after scrutinizing international socio-economic practices. 
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Let me clarify better what I mean by “ideal” in this context. Ideal principles of  
global justice are the ones that would emerge from a critical scrutiny of the 
international order at the appropriately fundamental level. The thought is here that one 
should not be limited to noticing the “facts” of global poverty and propose remedial 
principles that fail to address the issue of why there is poverty in the first place. This 
argument is analogous to Marx’s critique of those socialists who emphasized the need 
to improve the conditions of workers without engaging with the forces and relations of 
production that led to such miserable living conditions. As Marx emphasized, “any 
distribution whatever of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the 
distribution of the conditions (or means) of production themselves”.28 This point is not 
merely one of efficiency; i.e.  Marx did not simply claim that policies addressing the 
problem of misdistribution at the level of production would be more successful than 
those tackling it at the level of consumption. Rather, as G. A. Cohen emphasized, the 
critique plays at a more fundamental, ideal, level: “it is a confusion to direct censure 
against the predictable and regular consequences of a cause which is not itself subjected 
to criticism”.29  
This means that, while arguing about ideal principles of global justice we need 
to consider the causes of global injustice at the appropriately fundamental level. This 
requires introducing in the global theory of justice a number of inferences different 
from the ones usually made by both cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans. As already 
pointed out, the need for specific principles of justice arises in specific circumstances of 
injustice, and such principles may have global scope if those circumstances are 
considered as being globally extended. Hence, the ideal discussion of the principles 
required to redress severe poverty at a global level requires justifying several claims on 
the injustice of global distribution in existing socio-economic practices. Such 
theoretical claims should be grounded on an assessment of current international 
practices sensitive to the relationship between absolute individual deprivation and the 
relative deprivation of states representing them. What we need to show, therefore, is: a) 
that individual absolute deprivation is linked to the relative deprivation of states 
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protecting them; b) that the relative deprivation of states is in turn due to an uneven 
distribution of power at the global level and; c) that it is impossible to abstract from 
such unequal distribution of power in establishing the right principles of justice in a 
globalized world. 
The next chapter tries to show how the failure to satisfy absolute deprivation at 
the individual level relates to states’ unequal access to power in the global sphere. It 
also argues that we cannot worry about absolute poverty at the individual level without 
worrying about relative inequality at the level of states. However, it seems that the 
misapplication of ideal and non-ideal categories in the analysis of global justice renders 
existing theoretical approaches ill equipped to develop further such an investigation. 
Let me first explain why. 
Non-cosmopolitan accounts of a Rawlsian type consider the question of 
extreme poverty and resource deprivation part of the “non-ideal” theory of global 
justice. They claim that the lack of resources in what Rawls calls “burdened societies” 
does not need to preoccupy global justice theorists as such and does not therefore 
require principles of a distributive kind to be redressed. Rather, we have only a duty to 
assist societies facing unfavourable domestic conditions limiting their participation as 
members in a good standing to the global society of states. The difference between a 
sufficientarian principle of assistance and one involving an equal distribution is that 
while the latter has no target and cut-off point, obligations of assistance may be 
allocated only until burdened societies have enough as is necessary to create or preserve 
just political institutions.30 
This justification of a duty of assistance instead of global distributive principles 
has both empirical and normative aspects. The former relates to a specific interpretation 
of the global causes of poverty and material deprivation, as well as a number of 
prescriptive claims as to how these could be most efficiently eradicated. The latter rests 
on two interdependent arguments: firstly the defence of the relevance of states and the 
attribution of collective responsibilities to their members and secondly a statement of 
the role of equality in global theories of justice. More specifically, non-cosmopolitans 
argue that the causes of wealth and poverty in burdened societies lie in their public 
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political culture or in the specific religious, cultural and societal traditions that support 
certain background political and legal institutions, for the development of which 
members bear specific responsibility. Distributive principles would therefore represent 
an inadequate alternative since the question of global poverty is not resolved by 
transferring wealth from rich to poor countries without a target point but rather involves 
improving the political and cultural conditions that would allow burdened societies to 
stand up on their own.31 
Cosmopolitans normally react to the empirical claim by showing how it fails to 
consider the impact of globalization processes on poor countries; to the normative one 
by emphasizing how responsibility-based arguments also weaken domestic distributive 
principles. On the first point, they argue that the non-cosmopolitan argument would be 
valid only under conditions of political and economic autarchy but not, as it happens, in 
the presence of trans-national economic interdependence and globalization processes 
under way.32 On the second point, they argue that the two combined notions of 
collective responsibility and respect for the autonomy of specific associative forms 
might also apply to families or groups in domestic societies, thus prohibiting any 
domestic institutional distribution of primary goods as the principles of distributive 
equality prescribe.33 
Both points however expose cosmopolitanism to a number of potential counter-
arguments. Their critics could for example respond to the first (empirical) claim by 
saying that even if one accepts that there may be a certain degree of interference by 
global factors in the domestic distribution of resources this does not mean that such 
interference affects burdened societies negatively. One could instead argue, as 
libertarians usually do, that the extension of market economy contributes to the 
liberalization of specific forms of life, promotes a certain wealthy individualism in 
                                                
31
 See most especially Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice  111-62, Rawls, The Law of 
Peoples  118-21, Mathias Risse, “How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor? ,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 33, no. 4 (2005). 
32
 See especially Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples.” 
33
 See Thomas Pogge, “Do Rawls’s Two Theories of Justice Fit Together?,” in Rawls's Law of Peoples, 
ed. Rex Martin and David Reidy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), Peter Singer, “Outsiders, Our Obligations to 
Those Beyond Our Borders,” in The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distance Needy, ed. Deen K. 
Chatterjee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).Although ultimately rejecting 
cosmopolitanism, Leif Wenar also notices that if Rawls had taken seriously the principle of responsibility 
in domestic societies he would have ended up endorsing a typical Nozickian argument, see Leif Wenar, 
“The Legitimacy of Peoples,” in Global Justice and Transnational Politics, ed. Pablo De Greiff and 
Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge (MA): Mit  Press, 2002), 53-76. 
 97 
hierarchical societies, and enhances the values of toleration thus bringing non-liberal 
states culturally closer to liberal ones and promoting global stability.34 Call this the 
“pro-global argument”.  
On the second (normative) claim, instead of being embarrassed by the 
analogous application of the autonomy and responsibility constraints to domestic 
societies, non-cosmopolitans could respond by emphasizing the different value of 
equality in domestic and global theories of justice.35 In other words, following Rawls, 
they might stress that relative inequalities matter more in domestic societies because of 
the need to preserve just institutions by guaranteeing citizens a fair treatment and equal 
access to public opportunities as required by the criterion of political reciprocity.36 
Their alternative theory of justice is not interested in the cross-national comparison of 
the positions of individual subjects since the target of a duty of assistance is defined by 
societies’ ability to sustain decent institutions. Once that goal is reached obligations of 
assistance cease to apply.37 Call this the “differential value of equality argument”. 
Assessing these two counter-arguments forces us to consider the issue of global 
poverty from the standpoint of ideal justice. Here it may be useful to recall a finding 
from the previous section: the non-cosmopolitan account is justified only on a strictly 
political interpretation of states as non-ideal agents of global justice. Once it has been 
proved: a) that from an ideal point of view there are reasons to consider other parties as 
relevant sources of valid claims of justice, all we need to show in addition is b) that 
these parties have an interest in framing certain distributive principles of justice 
because of the global circumstances of injustice in which they find themselves. I will 
further use (a) to reject the “differential value of equality argument” and elaborate more 
on (b) to reject the “pro-global argument”.  
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5. The differential value of equality argument 
  
The understanding of what justice as a virtue of social institutions requires usually 
marks the difference between cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan approaches to global 
poverty. Cosmopolitans are interested in the relative comparison of the position of 
parties across boundaries; their critics believe that the political institutions by which 
they are represented filter the wealth of individuals and the obligations owed to them.38 
For cosmopolitans severe inequalities among individuals constitute a problem as such 
and equality is a value to pursue for its own sake; for non-cosmopolitans the extent of 
inequalities across borders is irrelevant insofar as people are able to frame and preserve 
decent domestic institutions. Justice, the latter argue, prescribes different things at 
different levels, according to the characteristics of the basic structure that constitutes a 
target of its principles. In domestic societies, distributive principles are rendered 
necessary by the background circumstances in which individuals share the benefits and 
burdens of social interaction; at the global level, those individuals are collectively 
represented by their states, which alone shape the rules of international political 
cooperation. Hence, the only principle of justice owed to burdened societies is a 
sufficientarian duty of assistance, aiming to improve not the direct living conditions of 
their members but the level of decency of those political institutions to which the well-
being of individuals is owed. 
Such considerations relate to the non-cosmopolitan emphasis on how 
distributive justice is not an allocation problem but requires designing a fair basic 
system of cooperation: at the domestic as well as at the global level. 39 Yet it is not clear 
how - even accepting the non-allocative nature of distributive principles – equality 
between states ceases to be a concern at the international level. This is because the non-
cosmopolitan argument does admit a large level of cross-national interdependence, 
which requires designing a fair global basic structure. But this claim is in turn 
incompatible with a diagnosis of economic development that relies exclusively on 
domestic factors. If one agrees that interdependence and cooperation characterize the 
                                                
38
 For the most articulate versions of the argument see Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice  
51-80, Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” 138, Rawls, The Law of Peoples  106-18. 
39
 This point is clarified in Freeman, “The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and 
Distributive Justice ”: 62-67. 
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distribution of benefits and burdens in the global as well as the domestic sphere, we see 
that the analogy between the two basic structures is greater than it was initially 
admitted. In this case non-cosmopolitans must either grant that even the domestic 
distribution of benefits and burdens should be limited to the domestic analogous of a 
duty of assistance, or concede for the global arena something more demanding.  
It is worth however considering a little more in detail the demands of justice in 
the domestic and global basic structure, given that it is precisely their would-be dis-
analogy which confers normative strength to the “differential value of equality” 
argument. It seems that here non-cosmopolitans fail to consider again how 
considerations of principle and considerations of agency interplay when assessing 
reciprocal obligations in global circumstances of justice. To clarify the point we should 
begin by asking ourselves: is it from an ideal perspective that we assess the value of an 
equal distribution of goods in the international sphere or is it from a non-ideal concern 
for the circumstances of its feasibility? 
The thesis of the dis-analogy seems grounded on an assessment of the 
institutional mechanisms that make certain political obligations feasible and stable in 
the domestic sphere and on the absence of such circumstances in the global one. But 
recall Socrates’ two stage construction of his theory of the ideal polity. Issues of 
feasibility and compliance become relevant only after principles of justice have been 
assessed from a more general relational perspective, when we ask ourselves how such 
principles could obtain political agency. The different way non-ideal agents operate in 
the domestic and global sphere could be an argument for diversifying political routes in 
realizing ideal principles of justice. Yet claims about principles are different from 
claims about how agents should act. This means that the political practice of non-ideal 
agents is a wholly different question from the ideal assessment of principles by subjects 
in circumstances of justice. Therefore, one does not change the value of equality by 
arguing for a change in the circumstances of its feasibility. Different circumstances will 
lead to different institutional routes of realizing specific principles of justice but they do 
not necessarily require that such principles be different. 
The “differential value of equality” argument is then a typical case of would-be 
ideal reasoning based on a confusion between the political circumstances in which 
justice is realized, demanding feasibility and compliance, and the conflicting 
 100 
circumstances in which the necessity for specific principles arises. For the “differential 
value of equality” argument to succeed in both stages of a theory of justice non-
cosmopolitans must prove the relevance of the domestic and global dis-analogy not 
only from a non-ideal point of view, emphasizing the different political circumstances 
in which justice is realized but also from an ideal perspective in which the need for its 
principles arises.  
One possible attempt to prove the domestic-global dis-analogy even from the 
point of view of the circumstances of justice is by emphasizing the “pro-global” 
argument that I introduced above. Non-cosmopolitans might insist that the distribution 
of goods at the global level is not subject to claims of justice because of the absence of 
relevant circumstances of injustice which are both globally extended and irreducible to 
domestic factors. The next section sketches one possible response to such an argument, 
further explored in the following chapter. 
 
6. The pro-global argument 
 
The cosmopolitan defence of global distributive principles usually starts with an 
intuitive appeal to the principle of equal opportunity and to the natural duty of justice to 
relieve human suffering. Its evidence of the extension and pervasiveness of global 
inequalities is often a range of facts on how many children starve every hour around the 
globe or how little effort it would take to cure devastating diseases in the Third world. 
Thomas Pogge, for example, mounts his attack against the present state of affairs by 
reminding us that: 
 
the annual death toll from poverty-related causes is around 18 million, or one-third of all human deaths, 
which adds up to approximately 270 million deaths since the end of the Cold War.1 This problem is 
hardly unsolvable, in spite of its magnitude. Though constituting 44 percent of the world’s population, 
the 2,735 million people the World Bank counts as living below its more generous $2 per day 
international poverty line consume only 1.3 percent of the global product, and would need just 1 percent 
more to escape poverty so defined. The high-income countries, with 955 million citizens, by contrast, 
have about 81 percent of the global product. With our average per capita income nearly 180 times greater 
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than that of the poor (at market exchange rates), we could eradicate severe poverty worldwide if we 
chose to try—in fact, we could have eradicated it decades ago.40 
 
Shocking as they may be, these facts will hardly move the pro-globalist. Simply 
registering the moral abomination of severe material poverty around the world does not 
prove that his domestic account of the causes of poverty, and the non-cosmopolitan 
theory of justice that follows from it, are wrong. What it proves is that every individual 
in the world may have moral obligations to relieve absolute poverty as far as it is in his 
power yet such obligations need not be of a kind that requires more than sufficientarian 
assistance to burdened societies. The reason is not as in the previous argument that 
there are no agents capable of enforcing the claims of justice in a politically relevant 
sense, but that there are no global circumstances of injustice in a morally relevant 
sense. To argue this point the pro-globalist does not need to deny the presence of a 
global order, including political agents and institutions which go beyond domestic ones. 
For he can simply try to show that all the harm that cosmopolitans usually attribute to 
global factors can be reduced to the impact of local ones, and insofar as the current 
global order may be ascribed any role on poverty-related matters it will be that of 
historically contributing to their progressive improvement.41  
What do we need to reject the pro-globalist thesis? To prove that there are 
relevant claims of justice – and not simply humanity – we must show that there are 
relevant circumstances of injustice. Call this “the test of circumstances”. To prove that 
the kind of principles to which the claims of justice lead are principles of a distributive 
kind we need to show that what makes those circumstances unjust is the way in which 
goods are globally distributed under conditions of moderate scarcity. Call this “the test 
of global principles”. To prove that this unjust way of distribution is globally extended 
we must be able to show that the circumstances of injustice escape the possibility of 
control of particular agents (both human and artificial ones) and constitute the outcome 
of spontaneous interactions and of the rules of resource allocation in a globalized 
market society. Call this “the test of global pervasiveness”.  
                                                
40
 Pogge, “Real World Justice,” 1. 
41
 Risse, “Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or Rectification?.”, Mathias Risse, “What We Owe to 
the Global Poor,” Journal of Ethics 9 (2005). 
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In the next chapter I shall consider these issues together. I will try to show how 
in order to respond to the pro-globalist challenge we must establish a clear link between 
individual absolute deprivation at the domestic level and the relative position of their 
states in the global sphere. The negative impact of interactions in the global basic 
structure over the prospects of individual parties may be proved by showing how in 
global circumstances of justice access to a certain good by a specific agent or plurality 
of agents modifies the relative position of others. This means that cosmopolitanism will 
be able to make a stronger case in favour of global distributive principles if it can show 
how global interactions are characterized by unequal access to certain positional goods 
the absolute value of which depends on the relative standing of their possessors 
compared to each other.42 If we can identify at least one kind of primary good in the 
international sphere which cannot be provided through sufficientarian principles of 
assistance but requires an ongoing distribution we would have responded to the pro-
global argument.  Positional goods are relevant here since their fair distribution can 
only be obtained through principles of an egalitarian kind. Emphasizing the unequal 
distribution of positional goods in the international sphere justifies egalitarian 
requirements.  
Now consider how the alternative approach sketched above might contribute 
passing the three tests mentioned: circumstances, principles and global pervasiveness. 
Firstly, the circumstances of injustice would be defined as the conditions under which 
unequal access to positional goods renders some of the agents (states) engaged in 
international bargaining worse-off than they would have been under an alternative 
arrangement. Secondly, the kind of principles required in this case would need to be 
principles of an egalitarian kind since an agent could only be made better off by 
equalizing his access to positional goods in comparison with others (even by levelling 
down). Thirdly, access to global positional goods does not depend on internal domestic 
factors: however much a state does to advance its domestic prospects, it remains 
vulnerable to improvement in the relative position of others. This means that any 
                                                
42
 I shall return to the issue of positional goods and to what might constitute a positional good in the 
global sphere in the next chapter. The more articulate discussion of positional goods may be found in 
Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1976)., for normative 
explorations see Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, “Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods,” Ethics 
116 (2006), Martin Hollis, “Positional Goods,” Philosophy 18 (1984), Judith Lichtenberg, “Consuming 
Because Others Consume,” Social Theory and Practice 22 (1996). 
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attempt to introduce regulations and enforce the territorial control of single political 
agents is insufficient to revolve a process that is structurally dependent on what others 
do as well.  
What cosmopolitanism needs to reject the pro-globalist argument is then to 
establish a link between absolute deprivation at the individual level (domestically) and 
relative deprivation at the level of states (globally). A similar analysis of the 
background circumstances under which global political interactions occur would lead to 
a new way of conceptualizing the principles of global justice. Non-cosmopolitan 
theories consider the issue of absolute material deprivation and extreme material 
poverty simply as an unfortunate exception in the otherwise well-ordered global society 
of states, not as the product of a systematic failure to assess from the point of view of 
distributive justice the rules of distribution of positional goods in its basic structure. 
Yet, as I tried to show, analysing the issue of the principles of global justice from an 
ideal point of view requires starting with global circumstances of injustice in 
production and distribution and assessing it from the point of view of all affected 
parties. I shall return to this new way of conceptualizing the link between poverty and 
inequality in the next chapter.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
Ideal and non-ideal categories each have their place in political theory.  Principles 
ought to be ideal, agents realistically non-ideal. The nature of states ought to be 
approached from a non-ideal perspective (raising the question of what kind of agents 
and political arrangements are necessary and available to realize the claims of justice) 
rather than, as with non-cosmopolitans, from an ideal perspective (treating associative 
relations as grounding equality-related claims). An assessment of global circumstances 
of justice should provide the ideal grounds of distributive equality whereas state-based 
associative relations are essential for making distributive obligations feasible in the 
non-ideal world. Once this much is clear, the controversy between cosmopolitans and 
non-cosmopolitans dissolves in the two-stage construction of a global theory of justice 
accommodating the claims of both: the need for ideal principles to consider the issue of 
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global inequalities and the necessity of non-ideal agents sensitive to the political 
conditions of their realization.  
As we already clarified, the non-cosmopolitan analysis of the principles 
redressing global poverty is non-ideal (restricted to cases of unfavourable domestic 
conditions) when it should have been ideal (raising the question of what kind of 
principles would emerge when assessing the circumstance of justice at the appropriately 
fundamental level of analysis). I have argued against sufficientarian principles of 
assistance, of the type non-cosmopolitans envisage, and emphasized the need for 
cosmopolitans to integrate in their theories a link between absolute deprivation at the 
individual level and relative deprivation at the level of states. 
My discussion of what specific ideal cosmopolitan principles might inspire the 
reform of the global order and of how non-ideal agents should operate to make those 
principles feasible and stable was, admittedly, short. A deeper exploration of such 
issues is the task of the last part of this work. The aim of this second part was to 
illustrate the use of ideal and non-ideal categories in several discussions on global 
justice and open to the possibility of an alternative way of considering the ethical aims 
and political applications of the two-stage construction. As it now stands the global 
justice debate forces us to choose between the realism of statists on matters of principle 
and the utopianism of cosmopolitans on matters of agency. That is not a happy choice.   
It is also not the right way of combining ideal and non-ideal considerations in 
normative theories of global justice. We should be just the opposite: cosmopolitans in 
matters of moral principle and statists in matters of political agency.  
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RECONCILING  
COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE STATE 
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Chapter IV 
Statist Cosmopolitanism: Principles 
 
1. Statism: moral not just political 
 
This part of the thesis defends statist cosmopolitanism. I try to show how it is possible 
to combine the idealism of cosmopolitans in matters of principle with the realism of 
statists in matters of agency. In particular, this chapter defends a cosmopolitan 
approach to the principles of global justice. It argues that the acknowledgment of non-
cosmopolitan obligations to relieve absolute poverty supports a cosmopolitan 
conception of global distributive equality. 
Let me start with an example taken from the real world. On Friday 2nd 
November 2007, Adonis Musati, a former police officer from the region of 
Chimanimani in eastern Zimbabwe, starved to death in Cape Town while queuing at the 
offices of South Africa's home affairs refugee centre.1 Fellow Zimbabweans told the 
BBC news service that Adonis had crossed into South Africa to escape the economic 
crisis in Zimbabwe and was trying to obtain a temporary work permit in Cape Town. 
He was reported to have spent two weeks sleeping in a cardboard box, with nothing to 
eat, while repeatedly enquiring at the refugees’ centre about the fate of his work permit. 
Adonis’ death was discovered by his twin brother Adbell by reading news on the 
internet. Neither the Zimbabwean consulate nor the South African government appear 
to have informed the family about the event. 
As the previous chapter illustrated, both cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans 
agree that letting people starve to death is wrong. The controversy arises on how to 
make sure that similar events do not reoccur. Adonis’ case is striking in many ways. In 
                                                
1
 See “Zimbabwean dies queuing for visa” on  http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7090730.stm, 
published on 2007/11/12 13:30:30. 
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this chapter I shall explore only two crucial issues it raises. The first involves the 
distinction between absolute and relative deprivation and the conceptions of justice 
related to each of them. In the example above, absolute deprivation ultimately leads to 
starvation. Remedying it requires giving agents enough to have basic subsistence 
claims satisfied. Call this the sufficientarian conception of justice. 
The above case also presents an instance of relative deprivation. Adonis has 
been denied a relative share in the distribution of social goods enjoyed by citizens of 
South Africa; he has been denied an equal opportunity to work in Cape Town. 
Remedying relative deprivation requires distributing to agents in the relevant position 
as much as that enjoyed by others. Call this the egalitarian conception of justice. 
The second issue this chapter raises is that of justice to non-citizens. What (if 
either) of those conceptions of justice should we adopt when reflecting on the relations 
between citizens and strangers? On the cosmopolitan interpretation, Adonis may 
legitimately claim equal access to a relative share of the social means provided to the 
citizens or legal residents of Cape Town. On the non-cosmopolitan interpretation, 
Adonis may be legitimately denied an equal share of them. For cosmopolitans the 
relevant conception of justice to adopt when reflecting on justice to non-citizens is 
egalitarian. For non-cosmopolitans the relevant conception of justice to adopt when 
reflecting on relations between non-citizens is sufficientarian.2 
As we saw in the previous chapters, both the cosmopolitan and the non-
cosmopolitan interpretation have been subjected to significant criticism. At the level of 
principle, cosmopolitans are criticized for failing to explain why citizens ought to give 
strangers more than “enough”. Non-cosmopolitans are criticized for failing to explain 
why (all other things being equal) strangers ought to receive from citizens less than “as 
much as”. At the level of agency, cosmopolitans often ask how the world’s political 
institutions would look like if they were redesigned from scratch. To some this sounds 
utopian. Non-cosmopolitans ask how we could justify the institutions that we have to 
all affected parties.3 To others this sounds conservative. 
                                                
2
 As already clarified in chapter II, not all cosmopolitans need to be egalitarians. However in this work I 
am only concerned with egalitarian versions of cosmopolitanism. If cosmopolitan principles can be 
reconciled with the defence of states when demanding egalitarian obligations are called into question, 
dealing with more moderate cosmopolitan positions should be easier. 
3
 Michael Blake traces a similar distinction with reference to non-institutional and institutional 
approaches to the analysis of global justice, see Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and 
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This chapter approaches these issues from an alternative perspective. It tries to 
defend the account of global justice that I have called statist cosmopolitanism. Statist 
cosmopolitanism supports the global scope of distributive equality without endorsing 
the usual cosmopolitan premises. It avoids starting with arguments on the moral 
arbitrariness of one’s place of birth or with queries into how the world’s political 
institutions would look like if they were redesigned from scratch. It articulates an 
alternative defence of global egalitarianism, which follows from the acknowledgment 
of the global scope of sufficientarian principles.  It tries to show how, in global 
circumstances of justice, the relief of absolute deprivation at the individual level relates 
to the relief of relative deprivation between states.4 The realization of sufficientarian 
justice at the individual level demands an egalitarian distribution at the level of states. 
What equality specifically requires at the global level depends of course on the 
aspects of relative deprivation that matter globally. I take up this issue in the second 
half of the chapter. I argue that the aspect of relative deprivation that matters globally is 
the distribution of power between states. Notice that claiming that the unequal 
distribution of power between states represents an important aspect of relative 
deprivation at the global level, is not the same as saying that the distribution of power 
between states is the only aspect of relative deprivation that globally matters. Full-
blooded cosmopolitans might insist that the position of individuals rather than states 
should be equalized or that the position of individuals should be equalized in addition 
to that states. I am neutral on such issues. My claim about equality of power between 
states does not try to substitute the cosmopolitan viewpoint. I offer it as an alternative 
way of thinking about global justice in the absence of decisive evidence against several 
objections that existing cosmopolitan accounts have attracted.5  
The conclusion about the need to equalize power between states is reached by 
means of an analogy between those positional goods that individuals in specific 
circumstances of justice need in equal amounts to ensure fair terms of interaction with 
each other, and the kind of positional good states might need in the international sphere 
                                                                                                                                      
Autonomy,” 262-66. Even though his distinction does not map onto the cosmopolitan vs. non-
cosmopolitan one, his own (institutionalist) approach endorses several of the non-cosmopolitan 
conclusions I criticize below.  
4
 For the definition of global circumstances of justice see my chapter II. 
5
 Some of these objections are assessed in section 4, below. I already anticipated a few of them in chapter 
II, sections 2 and 3. 
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in order to (also) fairly interact with each other. Positional goods are often defined as 
goods the absolute value of which is determined by their relative possession.6 They are 
comparative-relational by virtue of their very nature. How much of a positional good an 
agent absolutely enjoys, depends on how he fares compared to others. The argument of 
this chapter is that just as equal access to certain positional goods is necessary for 
individuals to ensure fair terms of interaction, states in the international sphere need 
equal power. 
In global circumstances of justice, power represents a positional good. One of 
the features of the international order, as we know it, is that it constitutes a kind of 
cooperative-conflicting environment in which agents interact with each other in the 
absence of a hegemonic centre. States can only protect themselves from non-
domination if they enjoy equal power over the making of reciprocal rules of 
cooperation.7 When power plays the role of a positional good, possessing it in 
minimally sufficient amounts requires sharing it in equal amounts. In global 
circumstances of justice, the only way for an agent to possess a “sufficient” amount of 
power is having access to “as much as” others.8 The power of an agent increases or 
decreases according to the relative position of others. Therefore, when dealing with 
power in global circumstances of justice, the only way to guarantee a threshold of 
sufficiency is have in place egalitarian distributive principles.9 
The chapter proceeds as follows. It starts with some methodological 
preliminaries and definitional issues. It then clarifies the notions of absolute and 
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 For the definition of positional good see Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth. On egalitarianism and 
positional goods see especially Brighouse and Swift, “Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods.” 
7
 On the relationship between power and freedom as non-domination see Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A 
Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 69-79. 
8
 Emphasizing “global circumstances of justice” serves as a reminder of the conditions under which an 
unequal distribution of power is unjustified. In other environments hierarchies of power might be 
justified and indeed required. This issue will be discussed more clearly in section 5, below. 
9
 This is a familiar intuition to any student of international relations. The issue of equality between states 
in IR would be framed as a question of “balance” of power. In the course of this chapter, I shall have 
little to say on more technical problems engaging scholars in that field, such as how we measure power, 
whether we consider only the distribution of “hard” power (i.e. military and economic - as in the old 
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recently argued by liberal theorists of international interdependence). For the classical realist approach 
see Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed. (New York 
Alfred Knopf, 1959). For a recent powerful restatement of realism see Robert Gilpin, Global Political 
Economy. Understanding the International Economic Order. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001). For the liberal discussion on “hard” and “soft” power see Jr. Joseph S. Nye, “The Changing 
Nature of World Power,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 2 (1990), Robert Keohane and Joseph S. 
Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). 
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relative deprivation as well as the conceptions of justice corresponding to each: 
sufficientarian justice and egalitarian justice. I criticize the sharp distinction usually 
drawn between such conceptions and argue that under certain circumstances of justice 
the satisfaction of sufficientarian claims requires an egalitarian distribution of relative 
shares. I further investigate the case of global justice and clarify that the satisfaction of 
sufficientarian principles at the level of individuals gives rise to an egalitarian concern 
at the level of states. This is because in global circumstances of justice power represents 
a positional good in need of being equally distributed. The rest of the chapter further 
articulates this statist cosmopolitan account of justice and defends equality of power 
between states against a number of objections.  
 
2. Intrinsic and instrumental egalitarianism, pure and mixed sufficientarianism 
 
Let me start with some methodological preliminaries. In the following pages I argue 
that in global circumstances of justice the claim for sufficiency at the level of 
individuals triggers a claim for distributive equality at the level of states. I reach this 
conclusion by showing how there is a special class of goods, positional goods, with 
regard to which equality and sufficiency cannot be kept apart. I argue that the kind of 
positional good that needs to be equalized in global circumstances of justice is power. 
Power is the “currency” of international justice.  
Notice that the defence of this statist version of global egalitarianism does not 
necessarily lead to endorsing simple equality as a distributive ideal or as the only ideal 
of justice. One may claim that the possession of certain goods by relevant agents should 
be rendered as equal as possible along some dimension specified. This is a strong 
equalisandum claim, with regard to which I argue that in circumstances of global 
justice the relevant agents are states and that the positional good in need of being 
equally distributed is power. However equality of power between states can be 
defended compatibly with limitations imposed by other important values. In the case of 
global justice one such limitation may arise from the requirement that the exercise of 
power be legitimate, by which I mean not simply that the state is formally authorized to 
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act in the name of its citizens but that it also stands up to critical scrutiny in fulfilling 
this task. This is a weak equalisandum claim that I also endorse in the chapter.10 
Other important consequences follow from endorsing a weak equalisandum 
claim from a cosmopolitan perspective. The cosmopolitan position I am interested in 
this work defends the global scope of egalitarianism. But within egalitarianism it is 
common to draw a distinction between intrinsic and instrumental versions of the 
theory.11 An intrinsic egalitarian believes that inequality is bad in itself. An 
instrumental egalitarian believes that inequality is bad when it produces detrimental 
consequences (for example when it harms the absolutely worse-off). Now for a 
cosmopolitan to endorse a weak equalisandum claim will mean to embrace an 
instrumental version of egalitarianism. As I will try to show in what follows, non-
cosmopolitans who are usually keen to emphasize only the global scope of 
sufficientarianism should also embrace the same instrumental version of cosmopolitan 
egalitarianism. 
Within sufficientarian views, we might distinguish between pure and mixed 
sufficientarianism. A pure sufficientarian will think that only sufficiency matters and 
that egalitarianism does not. A mixed sufficientarian will think that equality also 
matters when it improves the conditions of the absolutely worse-off. Mixed 
sufficientarianism is not so far away from instrumental egalitarianism. It is therefore 
surprising to see how most non-cosmopolitans have endorsed mixed sufficientarianism 
at home and pure sufficientarianism abroad. More specifically, they have argued that 
equality of relative shares matters in domestic societies but does not matter in the 
global sphere. As Michael Blake puts it, “only the relationship of common citizenship 
is a relationship potentially justifiable through a concern for equality in distributive 
shares”.12 Or as Thomas Nagel emphasizes, “egalitarian justice is a requirement on the 
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 For the distinction between weak and strong equalisandum claims see Gerald A. Cohen, “On the 
Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics 99, no. 4 (1989): 908.  
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 Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy,” 265. And also “a concern for domestic 
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justice only among citizens (and, indeed, residents) of a state.” See  Sangiovanni, “Global Justice, 
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internal political, economic, and social structure of nation-states and cannot be 
extrapolated to different contexts, which require different standards. [W]hatever 
standards of equal rights or equal opportunity apply domestically; the question is 
whether consistency requires that they also apply globally”.13 
Cosmopolitans have answered this question in the positive by claiming that 
whatever equality requires domestically, it also requires it in the global sphere. This has 
led to a number of controversies on the domestic-international analogy that it is 
possible to avoid by simply asking a different question. That question does not involve 
taking a stand on the inference from domestic equality to global equality. This chapter 
does not try to defend the argument that if equality is justified domestically, it should 
also be justified globally.14 What it tries to show instead is that if sufficiency is justified 
globally, equality cannot be domestically restricted. To put it in different words, the 
kind of pure sufficientarianism endorsed so far by non-cosmopolitans is indefensible. 
Non-cosmopolitans simply cannot rule out that egalitarianism (at least instrumental 
egalitarianism) has global scope. These issues are explained more in detail below.  
 
3. Absolute and relative deprivation 
 
Let us consider first the definitions of absolute and relative deprivation and the 
differences between them. One way to clarify such differences is by reference to those 
basic material goods that allow agents to pursue a functioning moral life wherever they 
are. An instance of absolute deprivation is nicely summarized by Pirate Jenny in 
Bertold Brecht’s second final of The Threepenny Opera when she claims the following: 
“Now all you gentlemen who wish to lead us / Who teach us to desist from mortal sin / 
Your prior obligation is to feed us / When we’ve had lunch your preaching can 
begin”.15 Jenny’s comment that “Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral”16 
suggests that in order to be able to exercise moral agency, people must, at least, be 
given a chance to survive. Absolute deprivation usually refers to an impediment in the 
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satisfaction of certain basic claims – such as meeting nutritional requirements, sleeping 
or being in minimally good health – without satisfying which an agent could not 
function. 
Claims for the relief of absolute deprivation arise from natural vulnerabilities 
easily distinguished from subjective preferences, social requirements and arbitrary 
desires to any good whatsoever. For example, the demands for calories, shelter, and 
minimal health-care constitute claims to the fulfilment of basic requirements upon 
which every individual has a legitimate claim in order to lead a minimally adequate and 
morally meaningful life.17 
Claims for the relief of absolute deprivation are non-comparative. A claim is 
non-comparative when the nature of the claim suffices by itself to determine what is 
due to the claimant without concern for any other relational fact. By relational facts I 
mean facts regarding the position of others vis-à-vis the claimant.18 To know whether 
an agent has been absolutely deprived of access to such necessities we do not need to 
consider whether other agents with who he interacts have also been deprived of the 
same. We assess the situation in its own merit according to an objectively valid 
criterion of well-being that we employ in order to make moral judgments.19  
How do we reach such an objectively valid criterion of well-being? How do we 
justify the validity of claims for the relief of absolute deprivation? We could say that a 
claim is justified a) when it is necessary, b) when it is generalizable and c) when it is 
necessary and generalizable by virtue of its intrinsic properties alone. Roughly 
speaking, a necessary claim is one the absent satisfaction of which prevents any other 
claim from being made. A generalizable claim is one that everyone has a reason to 
endorse. A claim is necessary and generalizable by virtue of its intrinsic properties 
alone when its necessity and generality do not depend on the validity of another claim 
being made.  
It seems that by virtue of their intrinsic properties alone, claims for the relief of 
absolute deprivation are both necessary and generalizable. Claims for the relief of 
                                                
17
 For arguments to this effect see Robert E. Goodin, Reasons for Welfare. The Political Theory of the 
Welfare State. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), Thomas Scanlon, “Preference and 
Urgency,” The Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 19 (1975), Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and 
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 See Joel Feinberg, “Noncomparative Justice,” The Philosophical Review 83, no. 3 (1974). 
19
 Scanlon, “Preference and Urgency,” 658.. 
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absolute deprivation are necessary because they constitute sine qua non claims, in other 
words claims whose absent satisfaction prevents any other claim (including moral 
claims) from being made. They are also generalizable because everyone has a reason to 
endorse them: i.e. everyone has a reason to want subsistence claims satisfied.20  
The non-comparative nature of subsistence claims introduces us to the 
differences between absolute and relative deprivation. Like absolute deprivation, 
relative deprivation arises from a failure to access certain goods. In this case the goods 
in question are comparative and the relational. One’s reasons for having a claim to such 
goods is related to the way in which other agents presently enjoy them. The claims for 
the relief of relative deprivation are related to the claimant’s position vis-à-vis the rest 
of others in society and to certain features of society itself. An agent’s claim over 
specific goods depends on the existence of a particular legal, political, cultural and 
economic framework, on what other agents posses and on how they interact within such 
framework. But what do we exactly understand by “relative” deprivation in such cases?  
“Relative” deprivation may have two different meanings. On the first one 
“relative” indicates the relativity of a desired specific good. One example of a relative 
desired good might be what Adam Smith defined commodities that “the custom of the 
country renders it indecent for creditable people, even in the lowest order, to be 
without”.  One of Smith’s examples clearly introduces us to the difference between 
relative and absolute deprivation as far as specific goods are concerned. A linen shirt, 
he argues, is, “strictly speaking”, “not a necessary of life”. In ancient Greece or Rome 
(and perhaps still in certain tribal societies) people used no linen shirts, and the lack of 
one would not have constituted an instance of deprivation at all. Yet he emphasizes, “in 
the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would 
be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt”.21 Here, being deprived of those 
goods would put one in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the rest of society. One’s 
relative deprivation is determined by the lack of access to a share of specific social 
goods enjoyed by the rest of the group. But one’s being deprived of those goods is 
relative: certainly it would be absurd to assume that one cannot survive without linen 
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shirts or that everyone in the world is entitled to an equal share of them independently 
of where they live. 
The second, more important, way of understanding “relative” in “relative 
deprivation” may indicate the relativity of the means through which a desired good is 
acquired. In competitive environments political power, trade opportunities, educational 
resources, employment availability, returns for exchanging what one owns, legal 
guarantees on property, are means that determine an agent’s ability to access specific 
goods. An agent's need for such means arises not simply because of what he does taken 
singularly but also because of how other agents relate to one another within a specific 
institutional framework. In a market economy for example where the improved 
conditions of life of one group of people determine an increased demand for some 
particular good and a consequent rise in its price, access to such good will be precluded 
to those whose wages are not regulated to match market fluctuations. 22 The agent 
suffering from a reduction of his purchasing power will therefore be deprived of the 
means through which this particular good could be acquired. Yet this deprivation is 
only relative. It would not arise in a planned economy where, say, prices are determined 
by state institutions or in a subsistence economy where people consume what they find 
in nature, neither would it arise independently of how other agents act within a 
particular institutional framework. I will return to this point when assessing what kind 
of means allow us to conceptualize relative deprivation globally understood. 
In the most general terms the notion of relative deprivation has been defined as 
a situation “where people possess less of some desired attribute, be it income, 
favourable employment conditions or power, than do others”.23 Relative deprivation is 
determined by the lack of access of some to a relative share enjoyed by others. The 
satisfaction of claims for the relief of relative deprivation depends on the relations that 
the claimant entertains with other agents and on the circumstances in which they 
interact. This is also why such claims are often associated to citizenship entitlements. If 
everyone else in a particular society enjoys certain benefits, the claimant would be 
disadvantaged by being arbitrarily deprived of a relative share of such benefits. 
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Contrary to the non-comparative claims corresponding to absolute deprivation, claims 
arising from relative deprivation are comparative. Such claims refer to an impediment 
of a member of a certain group to access goods and opportunities shared by the rest of 
it.  
 
4. Egalitarian and sufficientarian justice 
 
Absolute and relative deprivation are often thought to involve two different conceptions 
of justice, conducive to different kinds of principles. Remedying absolute deprivation 
leads to a conception of justice that we have called sufficientarian. Sufficientarian 
justice requires guaranteeing individuals’ the satisfaction of their justified claims for the 
relief of absolute deprivation. Sufficientarian justice appears to be non-comparative in 
form: for example, in order to decide how much is enough to save a hungry man from 
starvation we do not need to consider the position of other agents, for example how 
much food other people consume in the same time.24  
The relief of absolute deprivation requires the fulfilment of basic subsistence 
claims. It gives rise to an obligation to provide agents with “enough” as is necessary for 
them to function. Sufficientarian justice involves non-comparative principles. In order 
to determine how much is enough for you to avoid being absolutely deprived, it is not 
necessary to consider how much others have. It also seems to involve non-relational 
responsibilities: if you lack O and O is necessary for you to survive, there are prima 
facie obligations to provide you with O regardless of the relationship you entertain with 
the agent in a position to help. It is hardly surprising that a consensus has emerged on 
the universal validity of obligations to relieve absolute deprivation, regardless of the 
associative relationship in people we stand to each other. Such non-relational 
obligations are generated by the intrinsic validity of the claims for the relief of absolute 
deprivation that we emphasized above.25  
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 On the other hand, remedial principles for relative deprivation lead to a more 
complex conception of justice: egalitarian justice. According to this second conception, 
what deserves to be called just or unjust is the way in which goods are divided. Plato 
defined it as that “which distributes to each what is proper according to this principle of 
[rational] proportions” and called it “political justice”.26 In Aristotle, egalitarian justice 
is “that which is shown in the distribution of honour and money or such other assets as 
they are divisible among members of a community”.27 The idea of agents related to 
each other in the modes of accessing or enjoying certain goods is analytically contained 
in the claim for a proportional distribution of relative shares. In order to know how 
much to distribute of what, we must have some idea of who are the relevant parties 
concerned as well as where a specific distribution ought to occur. I shall return to this 
issue when examining what egalitarian justice requires in a global world. For now, 
notice the different form that claims for the relief of relative deprivation assume. If 
agent A lacks O, and A’s modes of accession or enjoyment of O partly depend on 
another agent’s (call it B) modes of accession or enjoyment of O, then we will need to 
settle a way for regulating access to O. We shall do so by recurring to some criteria for 
the distribution of benefits and burdens between A and B taking into account of the 
equal demands of both agents in circumstances of justice. Thus, egalitarian justice is 
comparative in form and the responsibilities it generates are relational: they hold among 
agents reciprocally dependent on the relative position of one another. 
How do egalitarian justice and sufficientarian justice relate to each other? One 
view holds that they are logically independent: sufficientarian justice is a matter of 
having “enough” whereas egalitarian justice is a matter of having “as much as”.28 Being 
absolutely deprived is a matter of poverty. Being relatively deprived is a matter of 
inequality. Sufficientarian justice and egalitarian justice may therefore be analysed 
independently from each other. They generate different kinds of principles: non-
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comparative principles in the first case and comparative principles in the second one.29 
Moreover, as we have seen, they are often thought to trigger different kind of 
responsibilities: non-relational responsibilities in the sufficientarian case, relational 
responsibilities in the egalitarian one.30 
But let us consider more carefully whether the principles required to relieve 
absolute deprivation and the principles required to relieve relative deprivation are 
always as different as they initially appear. This is the same as asking whether 
sufficientarian justice and egalitarian justice do indeed rest on wholly separate grounds. 
Consider the following. One typical case of absolute deprivation is the lack of food 
leading to starvation. One typical case of relative deprivation is the absence of an equal 
opportunity to benefit from access to specific goods: say an equal opportunity to work, 
equal enjoyment of certain social benefits or an equal chance to access the means 
through which this good is obtained more generally speaking. When discussing justice 
to non-citizens, those who argue for maintaining the separateness of the remedial 
principles corresponding to each, usually emphasize that absolute deprivation may be 
relieved via sufficientarian principles securing access to “enough” basic subsistence 
goods. Yet they also emphasize that this does not imply satisfying relative claims via 
distributive principles of equality.31  
There are circumstances however, in which the attempt to distinguish between 
sufficientarian principles and egalitarian principles appears ill considered. Taking 
seriously sufficientarian justice is often likely to require the application of egalitarian 
principles. Consider one typical case of absolute deprivation: that of starvation. 
Starvation occurs when people do not have enough to eat. One obvious solution to the 
problem might therefore appear recurring to non-comparative principles increasing 
food supply to agents in need. This is clearly also what sufficientarian justice, with its 
emphasis on giving people enough as is necessary to raise their well-being above a 
minimum threshold, would require. 
However, starvation may not always occur because of a shortage in food. There 
may be plenty of food available but particular groups in society may not have access to 
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the means necessary to acquire food: be those means employment, educational 
opportunities required to access certain market benefits or simply purchasing power. 
What is even more interesting; the worsening in the social position of such groups may 
relate to the material advancement of others. Absolute dispossession is linked to 
relative deprivation, and poverty may result from larger social inequalities. In this case, 
the use of non-comparative principles to realize sufficientarian justice will be out of 
place. What is required in all those cases is equalize access to the means through which 
a sufficient amount of end-use goods (i.e. food) could be obtained.  
This view of the link between absolute and relative deprivation seems 
confirmed by the analysis of some of the greatest famines of the past century. 32 In all 
those cases, what led particular groups of people to starvation was not a shortage in 
food availability but rather their being left behind while other groups advanced 
economically in new political circumstances. In the case of the 1943 Bengali famine, 
for example, difficulties arose not as a result of shortage in rice (harvest was relatively 
similar to that of previous years) but due to modifications in exchange entitlements and 
the emergence of groups relatively deprived of the means through which food was 
acquired. More particularly general inflationary pressure and a shortfall in the food 
release due to war-panic combined with an unequal increase of incomes and purchasing 
power of people engaged in war-related activities. Those employed in the military and 
civil defence sector could earn more, exerting strong demands on food and leading to 
an increase in its price which others employed in less-profitable activities were unable 
to match.33 People starved because they were absolutely poor, yet they became 
absolutely poor due to the emergence of relative inequalities. 
The Bengali famine case is by no means an unfortunate exception. Furthermore, 
the conclusions drawn from it do not lend themselves to easy generalizations on the 
domestic nature of the link between absolute and relative deprivation - as those 
defending a purely sufficientarian approach to global justice often imply.34 Very 
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recently (April 2008), the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization reported 
a 70% increase in world food prices within one year only. It also lamented its 
detrimental contribution to growing political instability, constant impoverishment of 
vulnerable sectors of society and violent hunger riots all over the world: from South 
Asia (Bangladesh or Philippines) to West Africa (Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal); 
from Eastern Europe (Ukraine and  Russia) to South America (Haiti, Argentina, 
Mexico). 35 Here, just as in the famine case mentioned above, the increase in prices was 
not determined by a shortage in food availability. On the contrary, the total cereal crop 
in 2007 has been 1.66 billion tonnes, the largest witnessed ever, and some 89m tonnes 
bigger than the harvest of the previous year, which already was a record.36 As one of 
the World Food Programme’s executive directors declared to the press: “we are seeing 
more urban hunger than ever before […] we are seeing food on the shelves but people 
being unable to afford it”.37  
Here, again, the problem at the root is not absolute lack of access to food but 
growing relative inequalities. Take the following example. One of the reasons for 
which people in poor countries cannot afford bread, is that people in richer countries 
are eating more meat. Indeed, one of the major causes for the recent increase in global 
food prices is reported to be the dietary shift that has recently occurred among growing 
urban middle classes in the largest rice and wheat exporting countries such as China 
and India.38 The fact that people in these countries can now afford to buy meat and 
other dairy products means that farmers keep more animals than they previously did 
and feed larger amounts of cereals to them, significantly contributing to an increase in  
the demand for cereals and therefore to a consequent increase of price. This affects not 
just the domestic poor which, one might plausibly argue, can always be assisted 
through domestic distributive schemes and other public policies). It affects also the 
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poor in other parts of the world, where food accounts for at least half of the consumer-
price index and whose states rely on trade with those major exporting powers to obtain 
necessities such as rice, grain and wheat. In a global market economy, the relative 
improvement in material conditions for some has significant consequences not only for 
domestic members of vulnerable social classes but also for the citizens of some of the 
poorest states. States such as Bangladesh (reportedly facing its major food crisis since 
the 1974 famine), Nepal, Benin or Niger, which depend on India or China for their food 
supply, are the first to suffer the consequences of fluctuations in the domestic markets 
of those countries. 
Consider another frequently cited reason for the increase of food prices: ethanol 
consumption. It is often remarked how the use of ethanol to produce biofuel diverts 
farmer investments from basic agricultural products to maize (used to produce ethanol), 
rendering those products scarcer and more expensive resources.39 Here again the 
modification of relative life standards in one part of the world has significant 
consequences for the poor in other parts of the world. The increase in demand for 
ethanol as fuel for cars in places like the United States, modifies the patterns of 
agricultural production and trade. Thus, relatively affluent countries where cars 
constitute the favourite means of transport may condition the levels of food 
consumption and threaten the subsistence threshold of poor citizens in the poorest 
states. 
Empirically, it is clear that the effects of such modifications in societal style and 
environmental standards cannot be tackled through domestic measures, which are 
unable to prevent globally determined inequalities. But the issue at root is deeper. 
These examples show that claims for the relief of absolute deprivation are related to the 
non-fulfilment of claims for the relief of relative deprivation. Poverty and inequality 
appear closely intertwined. The non-cosmopolitan distinction between the scope of 
sufficientarianism and the scope of egalitarianism does not capture those cases. Pure 
sufficientarianism merely requires that we make sure that people have “enough”, it does 
not tell us anything about the need for some to obtain “as much as” others: in fact it 
explicitly rules this out by saying that distributive equality is only justified within the 
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state. It also does not consider that some may not be able to obtain “enough” precisely 
because they have not had “as much as” others. Yet, as the cases above show, 
sufficientarian principles should be integrated with egalitarian ones. In global 
circumstances of justice, a number of claims for the relief of absolute deprivation 
would not arise if claims for the relief of relative deprivation were satisfied.  
This thought sheds a different light on the distinction between remedial 
principles for absolute deprivation and remedial principles for relative deprivation with 
regard to the scope of justice. It shows that one cannot restrict egalitarian principles to 
domestic circumstances and advocate pure sufficientarian principles for the global 
sphere. It also invites a different type of analysis of the links between sufficientarianism 
and egalitarianism. On this alternative analysis, claims for the relief of absolute 
deprivation are closely related to claims for the relief of relative deprivation. There may 
still be a conceptual difference between them. But the difference emerges only if we 
analyse the problem from the point of view of the “urgency” of the demands they 
generate, not from the point of view of which conception of justice is more global than 
the other.40 If we consider the issue of absolute deprivation purely in terms of what 
people ought to receive in order to lead a minimally decent life, it is clear that claims 
for the relief of absolute deprivation constitute the most pressing types of demands and 
pure sufficientarianism appears as a generally adequate account of justice. However, if 
we consider the distinction between “absolute” and “relative” deprivation, 
“comparative” and “non-comparative” principles from the point of view of what 
generates absolute destitution in global circumstances of justice the answer appears 
more complex.  
Maintaining a strong distinction between poverty and inequality in all these 
cases seems question begging in various respects. If absolute poverty is linked to the 
emergence of relative inequalities it would of course not be very efficient to try and 
address the former yet leave the latter unchallenged. Some sufficientarians recognize 
this point when they claim that equality might prove to be “the most feasible approach 
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to the achievement of sufficiency”.41 But the main point is not one of efficiency or 
feasibility. The main point is one of moral rigour. We would not be taking really 
seriously claims for the relief of absolute deprivation if we ignored the kind of relative 
social inequalities that might in turn produce absolute deprivation. The greatest failure 
of pure sufficientarianism advocated at the global level is that it places exclusive moral 
weight on non-comparative principles. Non-cosmopolitans restrict the scope of 
comparative principles to domestic circumstances of justice and advocate non-
comparative ones at the global scale. This restriction, as I tried to show, is unjustified.  
Non-comparative principles do not allow taking into account the links between absolute 
and relative deprivation and issues such as the relative advancement of certain groups 
in society vis-à-vis others or the relative position of certain dependent states compared 
to ones that are more powerful. 
I shall return to this last point in the next section. For now let me stress again 
that by maintaining a strong distinction between sufficientarian and egalitarian justice 
we would not simply be acting in the least efficient way possible. We would also be 
acting in a morally deficient way. We would worry about the morally objectionable 
nature of absolute deprivation but fail to consider the morally objectionable nature of 
the social, political and distributional mechanisms that lie at its heart. What is 
problematic here is not the feasibility or efficiency of pure sufficientarianism. What is 
problematic is that its lack of theoretical sophistication cultivates moral hypocrisy. 
Sufficientarian principles cannot be considered a completely separate issue 
(with an entirely different domain of application) from egalitarian ones. A different 
kind of moral assessment is required. One ought to engage more seriously with the 
structural roots of absolute deprivation and address the distributive impact of 
economical and political mechanisms through which subsistence claims arise, the way 
they relate to each other, assume a  determinate status within given social standards and 
follow patterns of relative social inequality and political injustice, both domestic and 
international. Highlighting the ways in egalitarianism should integrate 
sufficientarianism demands making a choice between two different ways of 
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conceptualizing the links between absolute and relative deprivation, poverty and 
inequality. 
The first one considers absolute deprivation and the principles generated by 
sufficientarian justice as non-comparative principles of assistance to people in extreme 
need. It confers global scope to sufficientarianism yet insists on the domestic scope of 
egalitarianism. The second one, which I am trying to suggest, considers claims for the 
relief of absolute deprivation linked to claims for the relief of relative deprivation. In 
the first case, the analysis of poverty occurs within a framework which ignores the 
background structure in which global inequalities to arise. In the second case, 
remedying absolute deprivation requires tackling relative deprivation and addressing 
social inequalities: inequalities in income and means of accessing basic material 
resources but also inequalities of power and opportunities for political participation 
more broadly conceived. From the perspective of the former, absolute and relative 
deprivation, sufficientarianism and egalitarianism are radically distinguished and have 
different domains of application. From the perspective of the latter, they differ in the 
relative urgency of their claims but they ought to generate related remedial principles. It 
follows from this relatedness that if sufficientarianism has global scope, egalitarianism 
ought also to have global scope. 
 
5. Equality of power 
 
We seem to have succeeded in showing that in circumstances where agents cooperate 
and compete to access the means for obtaining certain goods, sufficientarian justice 
requires principles of an egalitarian kind. The case of people living in different states, 
who - through their states - interact with one another in a global market society 
provides a concrete example of such circumstances.42 Arguing that in this case global 
sufficientarianism requires global egalitarianism supports an alternative defence of 
cosmopolitanism, which need not rely on assumptions about the moral arbitrariness of 
one’s place of birth or on an attempt to imagine how the world’s political institutions 
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would look like if they were redesigned from scratch.43 But what does global 
egalitarianism require in positive terms? 
Our attempt to link sufficientarian justice to egalitarian requirements relies on 
the assertion of a clear relationship between absolute and relative deprivation. As we 
emphasized, the claims of absolute deprivation generate non-comparative principles 
whereas those of relative deprivation generate comparative principles. Linking non-
comparative principles of sufficiency to comparative principles of equality raises a 
number of questions regarding the ways in which comparative principles operate, what 
they distribute or fail to distribute and among whom. Since egalitarian principles are 
grounded on a comparative conception of justice and require an equal distribution of 
relative shares, they can only be further articulated in positive by specifying what 
“equal” distribution amounts to within a group of agents reciprocally involved in a joint 
enterprise of the kind we specified. 
On closer inspection, it may seem that the relationships of individuals across 
the world are simply not such that they allow us to specify “what” concretely each of 
them is relatively deprived of, how well they fare compared to one another and 
especially how to account for what should be globally equalized.44 Once we go beyond 
the most obvious absolute levels of deprivation, identifying what exactly remedying 
relative deprivation requires in a culturally and politically plural world becomes 
problematic. Indeed what counts as relative deprivation for individuals in one place, 
may not be that relevant in another. Relative deprivation, remember, triggers 
distributive obligations when some members of a group are unable to access benefits 
enjoyed by the rest of them, thus ending up in a disadvantaged position in society. But 
how do we make sense of this claim in the global sphere, where what counts as relative 
– as opposed to absolute - deprivation of individuals across countries is much more 
difficult (if not impossible) to specify?45  
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The objection above was already introduced in the second chapter under the 
name of “metric objection”.46 One way to answer it might be to emphasize that, instead 
of attempting to equalize specific goods that all individuals in the world should enjoy 
we should focus instead on their ability to make use of whatever goods allow them to 
be functioning moral agents, wherever they are. As one advocate of cosmopolitanism 
puts it, “global equality of opportunity requires that persons (of equal ability and 
motivation) have equal opportunities to attain a number of positions commensurate to 
an adequate standard of living”.47 One might still complain here that the expression 
“commensurate to an adequate standard of living” is too vague to respond to the global 
metric of equality objection.48 Yet that is not the basic problem. The basic problem, 
more constructively, is that by emphasizing the “adequacy” of living standards we have 
still left unanswered the question of why an egalitarian rather than sufficientarian type 
of principle is globally required. We have failed to explained why it is always important 
for people in one place not merely to have “enough” for themselves but also “as much 
as” people in another. In other words, the risk with such an answer is that it expresses 
nothing distinctive about the egalitarian agenda. Even more seriously, it undermines the 
purported link between absolute and relative deprivation that we are trying to justify. 
Is there a way out of this dilemma? I think there is. It requires however 
bracketing the attempt to substantively equalize the position of individuals across the 
world and concentrate on the relations between the states representing them..49 That is 
to say, that the only way for us to compare the position of individuals across the world 
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is to see them as citizens of specific states, then in turn compare those states to one 
another and raise the further question of what can and ought to be equalized between 
states. We would then have answered the metric objection. 
Consider the argument against global egalitarianism that I have just 
summarized. The first premise in the objection – as its stands - notes that distributive 
equality requires comparing relative shares of individuals across the world. The second 
premise denies that such comparison is ever possible given the influence domestic 
institutions and particular cultures exercise on how individuals value goods across 
boundaries and on the use that is made of them. Hence, one might quickly conclude, 
distributive justice can only have domestic scope. Equality only makes sense when it is 
possible to identify a way of distributing goods that are equally valued, equally 
desirable for all affected parties in the world, and equally in need of being shared. 
Now if in the argument above we consider the position of states rather than 
individuals, the case in favour of global egalitarian justice becomes more plausible. 
Moreover, we are able to respond to the ‘metric of equality’ objection. Indeed once we 
shift focus from the comparison of the relative position of individuals across countries 
to the comparison of the position of states we discover an analogous concept to 
domestic individual opportunity in the international sphere: state power. If individuals 
need equal opportunities in the domestic sphere in order to interact fairly with each 
other, states in the international sphere need equal power. In global circumstances of 
justice power represents a positional good, relative access to which requires to be 
equalized if the conditions of the absolutely deprived are to be improved.  
It is important to emphasize that we are discussing power in “global 
circumstances of justice”. In fact it is possible that in other kinds of environments 
hierarchies of power would be justified. In certain contexts (universities, businesses and 
so on) we would not think the unequal distribution of power between professors and 
students or between managers and secretaries problematic. In those latter examples 
there would be a clear hierarchy serving the purpose of a specific collective activity for 
the functioning of which an uneven distribution of power is required. Interactions 
between states in the global sphere are different. An unequal or hierarchical distribution 
of power would here lead to the domination of some by others and would therefore 
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undermine the goal of a society of states, as an association of free and equal agents. Let 
us consider why. 
Let us start with a general definition of power. First, power is a dispositional 
concept; it refers to a capacity to yield certain outcomes. Locke’s early definition of 
power conveys this idea: to have “power”, he writes, “is to be able to make, or receive” 
(and one could add resist) “any changes”.50 Power therefore consists in the ability to do 
certain things, independently of whether the agent chooses to actually exercise it or 
not.51 Second, power is a relational concept. An agent’s successful capacity to exercise 
power depends on there being other agents upon which such power is exercised. An 
agent's impediment to exercise power depends on there being some other agents able to 
resist the change. In the widely accepted definition of Dahl, power refers to “subsets of 
relations among social units such that the behaviours of one or more units (the 
responsive units, R) depend in some circumstances on the behaviour of other units (the 
controlling units, C)”.52 Third, power is a comparative ability: an agent is powerful or 
powerless according to how he fares compared to another with more or less abilities. 
Lemuel Gulliver, for example, is powerful in the island of Lilliput, yet powerless in that 
of Brobdingnag not because anything in him has changed but because of how he fares 
compared to the natives of those countries.  
This last point is perhaps the most important for purposes of our discussion. 
Hobbes makes it very clear in Leviathan when he emphasizes that what motivates the 
struggle to obtain more power in the international sphere is not “that a man hopes for a 
more intensive delight than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be content with 
a moderate power”.53 Rather, he argues, it is because “he cannot assure the power and 
means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more”. 54  
In global circumstances of justice, states compete with each other through 
global market structures but also cooperate to establish certain rules of global 
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interaction. In such circumstances, power represents a positional good. The only way to 
enjoy sufficient power is possess it in equal amounts. The relative distribution of power 
is more basic than its absolute possession or lack of possession, indeed the relative 
distribution of power is the only thing that matters. “Enough” can only be secured by 
enabling agents to have “as much as” (analytically and not just empirically speaking).  
To understand what it means for power to be a positional good in a competitive 
environment consider the following example. In Sicily, both the state and Mafia 
exercise power over people’s life. Clearly there is a sense in which the state exercises 
some power, the police is able to put fines on drivers if they fail to respect traffic laws, 
people can bring each other into court and so on. Yet the state is not “as powerful as” 
the Mafia, indeed the existence of a police apparatus does not withhold the owners of 
shops from paying part of their monthly returns to the Mafia simply because they have 
been asked to do so. For the state, having a “sufficient” amount of power when it comes 
to how that sufficient amount is comparatively exercised does not matter that much. 
Only how the power of state and that of Mafia fare in relation to one-another 
determines the absolute value of each. In the case of a positional good such as power, 
“enough” is not enough without it being equal. 
 
6. Power as a global positional good 
  
Why is “power” a global positional good? Let me press further the analogy with 
individual positional goods. In competitive environments between individuals, 
positional goods represent means the possession of which enables an agent to access 
other desired things. What determines the absolute value of positional goods is how 
much one has compared to others. So for example, in the case of a typical positional 
good such as education, the value of, say, a master degree in the job market depends on 
whether other people have PhDs. In the case of resources for legal representation in 
court, the value of one’s defence depends on the merits of the counter-part.55 In the 
cases of positional goods, equalizing the position of parties (even by leveling down) 
appears unobjectionable if it is designed to ensure a fair competition. Equality of 
positional goods is necessary to ensure that the rich and privileged do not accumulate 
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benefits at the expense of the poor, and that trade-offs do not occur at the expense of 
vulnerable agents. In the case of positional goods the only way to have enough and 
fairly interact with others, is to have as much as them. Absolute deprivation can only be 
avoided if agents are not made relatively worse-off. 
Notice that power in the international sphere represents a kind of positional 
goods that all states have reason to want equalized. Power represents a mean through 
which certain outcomes are obtained. It gives states the ability to interact with each in 
the international society of states. Power is the kind of positional good that all states – 
regardless of their political culture – need in equal amounts to establish fair 
international regimes from which their position partly depends. In global circumstances 
of justice, where political decision-making is essentially based on states bargaining 
with each other, equal distribution of power is a necessary feature in order to obtain 
agreements fairly arrived at. The establishment of just terms of trade benefiting not just 
safely rich countries but also more poor and vulnerable ones, the ability to coordinate in 
the exercise of state’s coercive capacity, the capacity to sign international conventions 
on non-proliferation, crucially depend on there not being power inequalities which 
would otherwise bias the solutions emerging from international rounds of negotiation.
   
One should be careful not to understand the claim for equalizing state power in 
a merely formal guise. Clearly formal guarantees – principles such as “pacta sunt 
servanda” as well as other founding principles of international law – matter 
enormously. But consider again the analogy with domestic litigation and the positional 
goods (i.e. legal representation) involved in that case. In the domestic case it is 
important that individuals do not merely enjoy certain formal legal opportunities but 
have access to an equal share of resources (i.e. equally good lawyers) in order to be 
able to take advantage of such opportunities and interact in fair terms with each other. 
So too in the international case, the formal guarantees of international law (non-
intervention, respect of state-sovereignty, recognition of international treaties, 
conventions and agreements) would be meaningless unless they were backed up by a 
substantive equal empowerment of states, allowing them to make effective use of such 
guarantees.  
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Consider, for example, the impact of power inequalities in the establishment of 
agricultural trade agreements and tariff barriers for poor countries. Agriculture in 
developing countries counts for the 40 per cent of the GDP, 35 per cent of exports and 
70 per cent of employment and, as we have seen, is one of the most sectors that renders 
them most vulnerable to trade liberalization.56 However, evidence from all the recent 
GATT/WTO negotiation rounds shows that powerful states have been able to shape the 
agricultural trade agenda in ways that increased subsidies and protective barriers when 
this served the interests of domestic farmers and agricultural industries, while ignoring 
persistent requests from developing countries to reduce tariffs for products in which 
they had comparative advantages. Even when the need for “Special and Differential 
Treatment” for developing countries was formally recognized (as in the Doha 
Declaration) this led to no concrete practical measure (other than longer 
implementation periods) and the only changes were rhetorical.57 
Powerful countries deploy various strategies to shape the WTO trade agenda at 
their own advantage. They play developing states against each other by promising to 
some bilateral or regional negotiations and benefits that they deny to others. They 
combine material resources and informational advantage in negotiation and litigation 
meetings that only few representatives from developing countries can afford to attend. 
They bribe or threaten vulnerable states to obtain their support when challenged on 
specific issue-areas. They take advantage of diplomatic networks or expensive legal 
resources to bring poor states in legal court. They form partnerships with large 
multinational corporations to prevail in settlement negotiations over trade disputes. 
They use financial coercion and liberalization discourses to elide development-related 
issues; or they deploy extra-legal tools that developing countries do not dispose in order 
to find convenient ways of interpreting WTO rules and exemptions.58  
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Without a substantive effort to equalize the position of all states, power 
asymmetries generated by relative inequalities will always condemn poor and 
vulnerable states to a position of subordination. They will always be subtly constrained 
to endorse whatever more powerful actors determine on their behalf, even if they 
receive “enough” generous assistance from them, as sufficientarian justice would 
require, or rather precisely because of that. Instead of empowering in equal measure all 
affected parties, instead of requiring that every agent in the democratic society of states 
have access to as much of the means required to equally perform their role vis-à-vis 
their citizens and vis-à-vis each other, sufficientarian justice creates dependence and 
cultivates deference. It preserves a hierarchy of donors and recipients; it does nothing to 
narrow the gap between powerful states and powerless ones. The first progress in 
relative terms, dictate the rules of the game and make decisions on how much ought to 
be given to everyone else; the latter keep at a respectful distance and should gratefully 
look forward to whatever goods they will be supplied with, if they have been compliant.  
Earlier we saw that a pure sufficientarian approach to global justice displays a 
lack of theoretical sophistication when it undertakes to eradicate absolute dispossession 
yet refuses to consider its relationship with relative inequalities. Whilst avoiding to 
look beyond non-comparative principles, that lack of sophistication - we emphasized - 
could easily lead to moral hypocrisy. But as we can now see, that lack of theoretical 
sophistication also threatens to legitimize an international order in which the relatively 
weak are taken advantage of from the safely rich, it runs the risk of having nothing 
distinctive to say against an international regime made of coercive offers, egoistic 
promises and implicit threats. Ultimately, that lack of theoretical sophistication 
threatens to absolve the subtlest forms of international oppression. 
 
7. Objections 
  
Relative deprivation can only be countered by means of egalitarian principles.  In the 
global sphere, egalitarian principles demand that all states be equally empowered. 
Power, we stressed, constitutes the currency of egalitarian justice at the global level. 
But what does equal empowerment of states amount to? I shall limit myself to 
mentioning two different ways through which we can further articulate the notion of 
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equality between states, two dimensions along which all states have reasons to want to 
be “empowered”, independently of their respective political and social cultures. These 
hardly constitute an exhaustive list of potential articulations of the concept of state 
power. I point them out merely by way of countering the weight of arguments from 
political and cultural diversity, which seek to undermine the case for global 
egalitarianism by stressing the complexity of equality and its apparent irreducibility to a 
single set of goods considered valuable across communities. 
All states, as I have mentioned above, have equal reason to want to be 
empowered, notwithstanding their diversity in life style, historical development, 
political traditions, and so on. Just like individuals, states are concerned with freedom 
as non-domination. Just like individuals, they can be secure from domination if they 
enjoy equal power. And just like in the individual case equal access to positional goods 
is necessary not to be dominated, in the case of states equal power plays an analogous 
role. Military power is what enables states to do just that, offer territorial protection to 
all their members and guarantee that they do not become an easy target of unjustified 
foreign intervention. Needles to say, inequalities in the distribution of military power 
constitute the greatest obstacle to the establishment of a just peace in times of war, and 
to the preservation of peace when this has finally been achieved. But the presence of 
great military potentials may also implicitly threaten countries who might be tempted to 
resist the will of powerful states or refuse to be manipulated in international bargaining 
situations. As the ambassador of a small, developing country chairing a WTO 
negotiating group, declared to the press, after having passionately defended US 
interests against challengers: “they have options that smaller countries do not 
have…my god look at what the US did in Iraq”.59 
There seems to be plausible prima facie reasons in favour of the equalization of 
military capacity, perhaps proportional to territorial extension and population size and 
ideally accomplished by levelling down.60 But being secure from external threat is 
usually not all there is for individuals. It is also not all there is for states. We think that 
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individuals are unable to take advantage from the formal rights available to them if they 
cannot access the positional goods allowing them to exercise those rights effectively. 
Notice that the same occurs with states. The formal recognition of international legal 
standing for states means little in the absence of the material conditions allowing them 
to exercise sovereignty effectively. Hence, we come to the second dimension along 
which the notion of state power can be articulated in the international arena: economic 
power. The case for the economic empowerment of vulnerable, underdeveloped states 
is all too clear if one considers the recent history of international economic and 
financial agreements. As I already pointed out, significant evidence from the last round 
of WTO negotiations suggests that in all relevant areas, from agricultural subsidies to 
industrial tariffs, from the regulation of migratory fluxes to the distribution of property 
rights, powerful states have been able to shape the agenda, dictate economic priorities 
and secure themselves a number of trade privileges at the expense of the worse-off.61 
Here again, the case for equalizing economic power, by setting up institutional schemes 
for an equal distribution of wealth between powerful and powerless states would seem 
straightforward. 
There may be objections to this proposal. The first is almost certainly bound to 
remind us that states might abuse their power. By asking to distribute an equal amount 
of wealth or military capacity to each of them, we might end up strengthening all sorts 
of dictatorial regimes, contribute to human right violations and so on. Remember 
however that at the beginning of this paper I endorsed a weak equalisandum claim. I 
argued that equality is one value among many and that it should be promoted 
compatibly with those others. I also argued that equalizing the power of weak states is 
necessary in order to integrate rather than replace other important principles of 
international law (non-proliferation, respect for international treaties and conventions, 
compliance with human right conventions). Egalitarian justice does not conflict with 
these principles, if anything it guarantees that they are applied fairly and not just when 
it serves the interests of powerful states as it now happens all too often. To reject 
egalitarian principles in the global sphere because there is a chance that some states 
misbehave, is analogous to arguing against domestic distribution on grounds that some 
citizens might end up being criminals. Surely, the answer to that threat in the domestic 
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sphere is not to dismantle distributive regimes, the answer is that those are different 
issues and should be addressed following different kinds of principles. Statist 
cosmopolitanism does not object to that, neither does it require equality to be the only 
principle to promote while discussing relations between states.62  
Another objection might be to say that the position of weak states in the 
international arena is not constrained by the relative power of others. One could 
plausibly argue that domestic features such as population growth, social employment 
policies, cultural and religious values, affect seriously the way in which different 
countries develop and the relative wealth they accumulate. However, critics of global 
egalitarianism who defend global sufficientarian principles tend to overemphasize those 
domestic features at the expense of theoretical sophistication. Examples of isolated 
societies living in autarchy and reaching specific societal standards thanks to their 
autonomously developed political culture, are elegantly deployed either to undermine 
claims for an egalitarian distribution of relative shares across borders. Alternatively, 
they recur to emphasize how all countries deserve their respective relative wealth and 
remind us that there is no obligation to share it equally with others beyond 
sufficientarian levels.63 
I do not mean to dismiss the illustrative value of those examples. Yet, one must 
be wary of the dangers of over-simplification, because autarchic-society-examples lead 
to an unwarranted partition of the moral world which says that one ought to recognize 
the global scope of sufficientarian principles but is unwilling to grant how egalitarian 
ones might follow from that acknowledgment. I do not mean to deny the relevance of 
domestic factors or arguments on national responsibility and collective desert. The 
point I am making is a different one and one could raise it independently. Where groups 
of people are related to one another through patterns of exchange and trade, where the 
advancement of some societies modifies the relative ability to access certain goods of 
others, there seem to be plausible, independent, reasons for wanting to establish a fair 
system of political cooperation placing distributive constrains on the economic 
development of powerful countries, even when it is well deserved. To return to 
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simplifying examples: if Rich prevents Poor from being able to access bread at prices 
Poor could previously afford, it seems that Poor can press a claim for an equal share of 
the means through which bread is accessed without further need to enquire about 
whether Rich deserves to be Rich and whether he acquired his wealth through 
inheritance, theft, winning the lottery or honest work. Likewise, it seems that Rich is 
under an obligation to equally share such means with Poor without need for Poor to 
explain him which gods he worships, what he does in his leisure time and whether he is 
thinking of having another child rather than put his savings in an investment bank . (Of 
course Poor has all the more reason to demand equal means of accessing bread if Rich 
has promised that under no circumstance would he let Poor starve but I will not press 
that point again).64 The important issue to bear in mind is that when the equality of 
certain positional goods (or power, in the case of states) is required to ensure fair terms 
of interaction between agents who would otherwise exploit relative inequalities to take 
unfair advantage of each other, a number of additional discussions on desert, 
responsibility, choice and luck could be safely reserved for another time. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I investigated the link between absolute and relative deprivation with 
regard to the issue of global justice. I argued that global responsibilities to avoid 
absolute deprivation trigger global responsibilities to remedy relative deprivation. I 
emphasized that taking seriously sufficientarian justice at the level of individuals 
requires the application of egalitarian principles at the level of states (at least). I further 
articulated this claim by defending the idea of power as the currency of global 
egalitarian justice and by demanding that state power be globally equalized.  
The principles of statist cosmopolitanism I have outlined do not exhaust the 
range of topics one should consider when assessing global justice. This chapter did not 
attempt to settle questions related to the legitimacy of external interference in the case 
of domestic political injustice. It did not address issues related to compensation for past 
violations of human rights, decolonization or some such. It also did not ask how the 
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world would look like if there were no states at all, or where individuals would like to 
live if they could speak from behind the veil of ignorance. Statist cosmopolitanism 
reflects on the impact of relative power inequalities on the protection that weak states 
are able to offer their own citizens and considers the issue one that can be raised in its 
own right. A society where agents interact on the basis of exploitative offers, implicit 
threats and false promises, and which endorses an overarching conception of justice 
likely to cultivate moral hypocrisy and political servility is not a just society. This 
chapter has shown that the validity of that judgment does not depend on where the 
boundaries of such society lie.  
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Chapter V 
Statist Cosmopolitanism: Agency 
 
 
1.  Cosmopolitanism: political not just moral 
 
We seem to have established the moral desirability of cosmopolitan principles at the 
ideal level. Whether such principles are also feasible in non-ideal circumstances 
remains to be seen. The moral claims of cosmopolitanism are such that they require the 
transformation of political institutions. The present chapter defends the normative 
relevance of the state for a cosmopolitan transformation of political institutions.65 It 
tries to show how states provide the unique associative sphere in which cosmopolitan 
principles obtain political agency, may be legitimately enforced and cohesively 
maintained.  
Broadly speaking, political agency obtains when it is both feasible, i.e. relevant 
political, legal and social mechanisms are in place to operate the necessary changes in 
the system, and when the outcome of political action is stable, i.e. it has a good chance 
to survive without disrupting existing social ties and it generates a sense of the 
collective that is likely to endure throughout time. Politics is an essential element for 
both requirements. In the first case politics should be understood in a more institutional 
sense, as the sum of processes and agents through which specific goals affecting 
citizens’ public interactions are achieved. In the second case, politics should be 
understood in a more civic sense:  stability may be secured only if the relationship 
between citizens on matters of common concern is one of constant participation rather 
than mutual exclusion and if the development of collective institutions accomplishes 
individual emancipation. 
                                                
65
 Throughout the chapter I will use the terms of state and political community interchangeably. An exact 
definition of “political community” is provided in section IV. 
 140 
The following pages explore the background circumstances under which 
political agency with a cosmopolitan scope could be considered successful. By 
background circumstances, I understand those societal (both cultural and political/legal) 
conditions under which political agency is feasible, and the outcome of political action 
is stable.66 There are three ways of conceptualizing the background associative 
circumstances in which political obligations could be allocated. The first account, what 
I shall call the “civil society model of the political community,” is characterized by 
both ethical and political universalism. It claims that there are universal moral 
constraints bearing equally on individuals worldwide (ethical universalism) and that all 
sets of institutions are equivalent in their desirability (political universalism).67 No 
special normative importance is attached to particular associative schemes either from 
an ethical perspective, regarding what individuals rightly owe to each other, or from a 
political one, determining what kinds of agents are most suited to uphold the universal 
claims of justice. The civil society model understands the polity as a set of collective 
institutions and practices instrumentally relevant for regulating conflicting interests in 
accordance with certain principles of justice considered valid for everyone. If those 
institutions failed to perform their designated social role, they could easily be replaced 
by alternative sets, enabling new ways of cooperating in view of reciprocal advantage. 
By contrast, the second account, what I will call “the political community as a 
large family,” is characterized by both ethical and political particularism. It emphasizes 
that a shared language, history and public political culture confer unique values upon 
particular associative relations and ground special obligations among members that do 
not exist between them and outsiders.68 Its ethical particularism resides in the claim that 
the fundamental principles of ethics do not derive from abstract considerations about 
human nature or individual dignity, but are limited by particular relational facts 
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characterizing social life.69 Different types of human relations trigger different types of 
obligations so that what we owe to, say, members of our family, colleagues or fellow-
citizens, is different, at the basic level, from what we owe to people with whom we do 
not stand in any particular relation. Similarly, the political particularism of the family 
model resides in the claim that the value of institutions embodying particular relations 
cannot be reduced to what instrumentally serves the aggregative interests of individual 
members. Rather, by taking part in the establishment and historical development of 
specific social institutions members create collective goods rendering those institutions 
unique and worthy of preservation.70 
Both models of the polity are familiarly flawed. The civil society model is 
generally derided for its political universalism, ignoring the peculiarity of different 
forms of political association, failing to engage its members’ disinterested concern for 
the collective and giving rise to social instability and “political disaffection”.71 The 
family model is derided for its ethical particularism, blind to whatever claims of 
outsiders demand political transformation, neglecting the distinctiveness of individuals 
with its emphasis on social identification and leading to potentially exclusionary 
practices. Building on the strengths of the two models whilst avoiding those familiar 
weaknesses in them, I shall here argue for a third, alternative, conceptualization of the 
polity. 
My model will be characterized by ethical universalism and political 
particularism. Emphasizing the relevance of specific historical circumstances for the 
allocation of cosmopolitan obligations, I shall firstly distinguish between universal 
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normative reasons and particular motivational sets.  Then I shall try to justify the role of 
particular political communities in making cosmopolitanism both feasible and stable. 
Two features of political cooperation appear very relevant in this respect: mechanisms 
that allow the imposition of  mutual political constraints upon members; and a basis for 
mutual agreement which progressively leads citizens to sympathize with cosmopolitan 
goals. By focusing on the relevance of the political for the associative conditions in 
which cosmopolitan obligations obtain agency, I shall illustrate how each of the 
previous accounts overemphasises an element entirely absent in the other – the 
possibility of a shared collective end in the civil society model and dynamics of 
political agonism and social transformation in the family one. Thus, the conditions in 
which political agency may be feasible and stable are lacking in both of them. Instead 
they are substituted by two kinds of orthodoxy: the orthodoxy of law in the civil society 
model, and the orthodoxy of cultural identity in the family one.  
The third way of conceptualizing public associative interactions combines 
features of the civil society and family models and clarifies conditions under which 
political agency would be feasible, and the outcome of political actions would be stable. 
These features emphasize key requirements of the democratic tradition in political 
theory: popular sovereignty and civic education. As I try to show, in the absence of the 
first one – legitimate decision-making mechanisms – any political initiative would be 
unfeasible. Yet, in the absence of the second – a historically developed willingness to 
comply – any achieved outcome would be unstable. Popular sovereignty, on the one 
hand, allows cosmopolitan obligations to enter a collective deliberative process 
enabling the transformation of political institutions in accordance with cosmopolitan 
goals. Civic education, on the other hand, complements this process by progressively 
familiarizing citizens with cosmopolitan virtues embodied in cultural and historical 
practices that are, for the most part, understood and shared. Both, I suggest, are 
indispensable conditions if we want social justice to be more than a cosmopolitan 
manifesto: popular sovereignty for cosmopolitanism to become feasible in the first 
place and civic education for it to be maintained. These ideas are explored in the 
following sections. 
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2.  Civil society or large family?  
 
The civil society and family models of political community seem to rest normatively on 
mutually exclusive premises. The civil society model is often understood as an 
atomistic one. Its subjects are mutually indifferent and self-contained units, each with a 
multiplicity of needs and wants and an independent plan on the best way to promote 
their satisfaction. Interactions are based on enlightened self-interest, the mode of 
cooperation relies on calculations of mutual benefit and membership in the association 
is partly, or entirely, voluntary. The worth of the association can be instrumentally 
reduced to the sum of the advantages derived by its members. Collective institutions are 
supposed to exercise their functions within the limits of the technical purpose they 
serve, letting citizens promote their own good in their own way. 
The large family model adopts a holistic approach in order to clarify the 
background associative circumstances in which an altruistic concern for the common 
good – missing in the civil-society model – is thought to be present. A family is a self-
contained unit, whose members identify with it not for instrumental reasons, such as 
taking advantages from the benefits it provides, but because participating in its organic 
life is constitutive of their own identity. Where membership in the civil society model 
is a quasi-arbitrary feature, sharing a set of collective cultural and historical practices is 
in the family account a source of internal gratification, something through which 
individuals are fully realized. Members in the family model recognize each other as 
both the authoritative source and the subjects of collective institutions, consider the 
unique mode of their interactions to constitute a common good and are jointly engaged 
in cooperative practices aiming to promote, not only the welfare of existing members, 
but also that of future generations.  
Traditionally the civil society model has been criticised for its atomistic 
features, failing to engage its members’ disinterested concern for the collective and 
leaving the public sphere open to potential risks of corruption, accumulation of power 
and the degeneration of political institutions in specific historical circumstances. 
Benjamin Constant was among the first to voice such a critique. The danger, he 
emphasized, is that “absorbed in the enjoyment of our private independence and in the 
pursuit of our particular interests we shall surrender too easily our right of participation 
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in political power”. For this reason he claimed, “the work of the legislator is not 
complete when he has simply brought peace to people. Even when people are content, 
there is still much to do. Institutions must achieve their moral education”. 72   
Many cosmopolitans implicitly adopt the civil society model of political 
association while insisting for a radical reform of existing political institutions to make 
them compatible with principles of global justice. Typically, they argue for the need to 
create supra-state or trans-national bodies able to mediate between the conflicting 
requirements of sovereign states and realize the principles of cosmopolitan justice.73 
However, the issue of how such institutions could, once established by legislative 
means, be historically maintained – i.e., the question of what motivates people to 
comply with duties assigned to them – is seldom raised. But as Rousseau once 
reminded, “no constitution will ever be good and solid unless the law rules the citizens’ 
hearts. So long as the legislative force does not reach that deep, the laws will invariably 
be evaded”. 74  
But “how can men’s hearts be reached?”75 The civil society model of political 
association is able to engage their interests, their reciprocal respect - at best their moral 
imperatives. Institutions maintain strength and stability as long as they promote justice, 
and justice is promoted as long as everyone does his fair share in the cooperative 
scheme. However, justice, “even of the utmost integrity,” is not enough to motivate 
everyone’s disinterested concern for the collective, because “justice, like health, is a 
good which one enjoys without feeling it, which inspires no enthusiasm, and the value 
of which one feels only once it has been lost.”76 The real difficulty, Rousseau thought, 
is not so much creating institutional responsibilities, but rather to fix them in a way that 
limits the possibility of defection and preserves whatever achievements emerge as a 
result of cultural and political practices with which members progressively identify. 
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Hence the importance attributed to civic education and to social participation, as well as 
the emphasis placed on the members’ mutual recognition in their collective enterprise.  
The family-model of political association takes these objections to the civil 
society model seriously by combining them in an alternative account of the nature of 
political association. It starts with assuming a set of specific associative circumstances 
in which members develop social habits that make them more willingly comply with 
communal obligations. By emphasizing the collective source of mutual obligations, the 
family model minimizes the possibility of defection not by threatening to punish, but by 
appealing to deeper feelings of associative loyalty, historical ties to a particular sphere 
and reciprocal solidarity. Loyalty is here understood as a widespread sense of 
commitment to the well-being of the community.  It is a commitment independent of 
the respective benefits to individual members in specific historical situations and does 
not merely arise out of concern for possible sanctions. The collective goods produced 
by community life, its traditions, culture and distinctive institutions provide a source for 
mutual recognition, significantly shape the identity of members and constitute a stable 
basis for social cooperation that citizens would want to defend even in the presence of 
an external threat. 
Consider the case of Poland which, as Rousseau reminds, would have been 
overwhelmed by its Russian neighbours at various historical moments if feelings of 
associative loyalty and the prevalence of collective attachments over individual 
interests had not led its citizens to rise, even to the point of sacrificing their lives, in 
defence of the distinctiveness of their communal form of life. As Rousseau puts it: “it is 
national institutions which form the genius, the character, and the morals of a people, 
which make it be itself and not another, which inspire in it the ardent love of fatherland 
founded in habits impossible to uproot, which cause it to die of boredom among other 
people in the midst of delights of which it is deprived of its own.”77  
One might of course object that the family model of political association 
overstates the extent to which people are, as a matter of fact, motivated by communal 
attachments of a Rousseauean kind. Yet, just from a causal inspection of newspapers, it 
seems that the number of people willing to make significant sacrifices for preserving 
their community’s self-determination is large enough to justify the claim that patriotism 
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is not simply the product of an old-fashioned, nostalgic mind. But this attitude does not 
seem to prevail towards trans-national institutions, however well designed or deeply 
integrated. As one author puts it: despite being subject to similar globalizing forces, 
"citizens of Western democracies are able to respond to these forces in their own 
distinctive ways, reflective of their ‘domestic politics and cultures’. And most citizens 
continue to cherish this ability to deliberate and act as a national collectivity, on the 
basis of their own national solidarities and priorities." 78  
 
3.  Normative reason and motivation 
 
The family model of political association seems then to provide a thicker account of 
moral motivation than the civil society one. It speaks to the majority of people’s hearts, 
as Rousseau would have put it, and appeals to the principles of moral psychology in 
explaining how specific associative circumstances develop important ties of fellow 
feeling and reciprocal solidarity that institutions need in order to obtain stability. 
However, even the family model is not without problems. Its shortcomings emerge 
more clearly if we consider the moral theory that it derives from a set of empirical 
observations on the circumstances of motivation - ethical particularism.  
Ethical particularists insist that universalism relies on an inadequate account of 
moral motivation. By grounding obligations on a universal view that requires people to 
abstract from particular sentimental ties or special inclinations, a cosmopolitan, 
universalistic view of morality makes particularly demanding claims with which 
fallible individuals may not be able to cope. More specifically, particularists emphasize 
that most people find it difficult to abstract from their social relationships and comply 
with universal principles only because it is their duty to do so. As one author puts it: “it 
seems unlikely that rational conviction can carry the weight required of it, except 
perhaps in the case of a small number of heroic individuals…For the mass of mankind, 
ethical life must be a social institution whose principles must accommodate natural 
sentiments towards relatives, colleagues, and so forth, and which must rely on a 
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complex set of motives to get people to comply with its requirements – motives such as 
love, pride, and shame as well as purely rational conviction.”79  
Ethical particularism thus emerges as an alternative view of morality which 
considers obligations embedded in particular social institutions, customs and a given 
political culture. It claims to offer a more appropriate account of moral motivation and 
attempts to reconcile ethical principles with community habits that members develop by 
taking part in specific associative practices. But one needs here to distinguish carefully 
between two systematically separate questions. The first is related to the source of 
ethical obligations. The second goes back to the circumstances of their performance. 
The fact that in certain circumstances I am happier to comply with a particular duty 
than in others does not make those circumstances or my happiness a guiding principle 
for justifying my obligations, as an ethical particularist would claim. This is because 
the reasons for which I ought to perform a certain way are a wholly separate question 
from the way in which I happen to perform today. Put in a different way: how you do 
something is not the same as what you ought to do. One can easily agree with 
particularists that, apart from a few moral heroes, it matters to a great number of people 
whether duties can be combined with natural and social inclinations, and whether 
discharging obligations can be done in a way that also brings satisfaction. This does not 
mean, however, that satisfaction is the source of moral agency, just as it does not mean 
that feelings of love, mutual sympathy or consideration for some particular agents are 
the only reasons for which we act in an ethically justified way. If we only focus on 
existing social inclinations that motivate imperfect moral agents to ground all our 
obligations, we might end up marginalizing those with whom we do not share any 
strong associative bond and run the risk of basing the state on deeply exclusionary 
practices. 
Having traced a distinction between the source of obligations and the way of 
executing them, it seems perfectly possible i) to accept that particular associative ties 
are essential for developing compliant attitudes in people, and at the same time ii) to 
reject the need for an alternative theory to the universalist cosmopolitan one. One can 
share with cosmopolitanism the concern for universal obligations and still insist that we 
need particular communities to get a motivational grip on people by activating their 
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shared understandings. Similarly, one can concede to particularists that many people 
are more easily motivated by feelings of love, sympathy or mutual trust than by respect 
for universal laws without also conceding that this is the only, or indeed the most 
appropriate, foundation of moral duties. 
The fact that empirically, in given circumstances, people undertake their 
obligations more willingly is very important. But the fact that it is important does not 
mean that it is always right. Of course, it also does not mean that those circumstances 
are arbitrary and one can change them at will, as some cosmopolitans might emphasize. 
Instead, empirical observation tells us that, if we are interested in the efficient 
allocation of certain duties, we should realize that imperfect moral agents will discharge 
their obligations differently, in different associative circumstances. Hence, we end up 
with a view that justifies a universalistic ethics with regard to the source of our 
obligations but makes concessions to particularism as far as one’s circumstances of 
moral motivation are concerned. This is also the view I advance in the next section 
while arguing for the conditions in which political agency succeeds. For now, let me 
consider some objections to the idea that I have just expressed, i.e. that one can 
distinguish between normative reason and motivational sets to overcome the flaws of 
the civil society and family models of political association and still make sense of some 
relevant intuitions underpinning each of them. 
One possible objection to this idea is that distinguishing between normative 
reason and motivation leads to a sort of “moral schizophrenia” introducing incoherence, 
fragmentation and disharmony in the structure of our ethical judgments.80 Consider the 
following case. The ethical universalist knows that the worth of his actions is due to his 
adherence to universalistic moral laws. Yet, he realizes that pure moral virtue might not 
be common or reliable enough in ordinary people and that feelings of love, friendship 
and mutual solidarity are more likely to motivate imperfect moral agents than the mere 
obligation to comply. Critics have pointed out that the ethical universalist is here likely 
to face the following dilemma. Either he should recognize that his own moral view is 
distorted or incomplete because it does not make space for social inclinations, which 
might contribute to increasing the value of moral actions, or allow such social 
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inclinations to enter the process of moral deliberation thus corrupting the universalist’s 
pure initial motives. 
Is there a way out of such dilemma? Interestingly, Kant once emphasized the 
distinction between normative reason and motivation in response to Schiller’s similar 
objection that his account of moral obligation involved a “monastic frame of mind” 
which left out people’s dispositions and natural tempers entirely. Writing during the 
Terror of the French Revolution, Schiller had argued in several papers that abstract 
moral imperatives needed to be reconciled with natural inclinations and social habits if 
morality were to realize itself in the empirical world. This would help man avoid being 
either a “savage”, with his feelings ruling over the principles, or a “barbarian”, with his 
principles destroying his feelings.81 With these ideas, he intended to criticize Kant’s 
account of morality, which seemed to exclude the possibility of morally cultivating 
inclinations because of the risk of corrupting the purity of categorical imperatives. 
Kant’s surprising answer was that there was no principled disagreement between him 
and Schiller on this point. Indeed, he denied the possibility of an irremediable conflict 
between duty and motivation by tracing an implicit distinction between the source of 
obligations and the manner of their execution. As Kant put it, “I am unable to associate 
gracefulness with the concept of duty, by reason of its very dignity.” However, when it 
comes to the duty’s “temperament” and the way in which a moral subject develops his 
resolve, “a slavish frame of mind can never occur without a hidden hatred for the law” 
whereas only in the presence of a “joyous frame of mind” one can also gain a love for 
virtue and definitely acquire it.82  
Thus, it seems perfectly possible to defend ethical universalism without 
conceding that a rightful action, if complemented by a positive motivation other than 
that of acting from duty, would lead to a moral failure. After all, insisting that an action 
has moral worth when it is performed from the motive of duty alone is not the same as 
saying that such an action suddenly becomes worthless if it is also supported by other 
positive motives. Therefore, an ethical universalist can still maintain that an action 
holds moral worth when determined by the motive of duty. This does not necessarily 
                                                
81
 Friedrich Von Schiller, Letters Upon the Aesthetic Education of Man (Montana: Kessinger Publishers, 
[1795] 2004) 7-10. 
82
 Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, [1793] 1998) 39-40.  
 150 
commit him to the claim that a similar state of affairs is preferable to another where 
cooperative inclinations are present as well.83 But if, as particularists suggest, we 
ground all our obligations on feelings of love, friendship and solidarity, how could we 
cope with states of affairs marked by the absence of cooperative inclinations yet in need 
of moral rectification? The burden of proof in this case is with the ethical particularist. 
While the presence of an additional positive motive to that of acting from duty does not 
badly affect a given state of affairs, the same could not be said about the absence of the 
motive of duty in the presence of contrary inclinations. The ethical universalist may 
thus agree that particular affective ties and social inclinations positively complement 
our duties and increase an agent’s pleasure in fulfilling them, but reject the 
particularist’s claim that these inclinations could by themselves determine the worth of 
a moral action. 
This leads to a second objection which questions the legitimacy of institutions 
and practices brought about to encourage moral virtue and promote acting from duty 
and in conformity with cosmopolitan principles of justice. On the one hand, educating 
fellow citizens to adopt similar attitudes, inculcating them with a cosmopolitan sense of 
the collective and helping them surpass particularist limitations seems necessary in 
order to overcome the shortcomings of the civil society model of political association. 
Indeed, a society in which individuals fail to spontaneously do their share and simply 
comply with the laws out of fear for being punished is likely to face the stability 
problems discussed above. On the other hand, one might argue that encouraging a 
universalistic morality and promoting cosmopolitan virtues among imperfect moral 
agents runs the risk of corrupting their own capacity for good-will. Is it really possible 
to continue emphasizing the value of autonomy and yet advocate the necessity of moral 
education to cultivate people’s capacities for certain types of decision-making?  
The alternative account of political association introduced in the following 
sections attempts to tackle this objection by emphasizing the political features that keep 
together the collective body. It articulates a political notion of autonomy which, far 
from constituting a limit to individuals’ capacities to set moral ends acts, as a condition 
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for morality’s further development. It focuses on two central features of democratic 
theory: popular sovereignty and civic education.  The former guarantees the legitimate 
allocation of political obligations and thus makes cosmopolitan agency feasible; the 
latter motivates citizens to a voluntary concern for cosmopolitan goals and 
consequently makes the political association stable. 
 
4.  An alternative account of the political community 
 
The two accounts of the background associative circumstances characterizing the 
spheres of allocation of cosmopolitan obligations that I have sketched in the previous 
sections seem to rest normatively on mutually exclusive premises. Each model lacks 
some essential features found in the other and fails to satisfy the requirements of 
feasibility and stability that are necessary in order for cosmopolitan obligations to be 
allocated successfully. So, for example, the civil society model accounts for how to 
create political institutions but not how to maintain them stable, while the extended 
family model accounts for how to maintain them but not how to include within their 
scope the claims of non-members. The former can thus provide feasibility but not 
stability in the political association; the latter provides stability but with no margins of 
transformation. In both cases, politics as a specific process in which the role and 
composition of the collective body is historically and progressively shaped and re-
shaped appears neglected.  
An alternative way of considering the background associative circumstances in 
which political agency with a cosmopolitan scope can succeed is by starting with a 
historical analysis of the political community. This account, rather than providing a 
fixed set of ontological attributes that inhere to the substance of a political community, 
aims to capture the relevant relational properties that qualify it as a unique social entity 
in dynamic development. What drives this evolution is politics, broadly understood in 
terms of a distinctive set of practices and institutions through which individuals 
recognize each other as joint authors of the same system of rules and are legitimately 
entitled to put constraints on each other’s actions. But it is also politics understood in a 
more civic sense, as a process in which citizens actively participate in public 
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deliberative processes and develop a historical sense of justice that supports the 
stability of political association. 
Being concerned with the historical conditions in which political agency is 
feasible and the outcome of political action stable, such an account of the political 
community is non-ideal in all relevant senses. This does not mean that it is also non-
normative. Even a non-ideal account of the political community is, after all, a type of 
entity, a theoretical approximation rather than a faithful reconstruction able to 
encompass in a comprehensive list the descriptive features of all existent political 
communities. So, although a critic may still object that there are existing political 
practices that do not entirely reflect the relational properties of this non-ideal type, the 
hope is that my own account is familiar enough to sound plausible and plausible 
enough to be persuasive.  
Forms of collective political organization exist everywhere in the world and 
their concrete historical development seems to have played a major role in the way 
abstract principles of social justice have given life to different political, legal and even 
cultural institutions. The history of modern ideologies with a universal inspiration such 
as liberalism and socialism cannot be traced without understanding the different, more 
or less peaceful, application of their principles to specific political and cultural 
practices, following different patterns of social change.84 So, the important point to bear 
in mind while assessing this alternative account is that I analyse the political 
community as it is and its practices as they have historically developed through long-
term collective processes of economic, social and cultural transformation that help 
maintain stability in the political association.  
Some might consider this development a great fortune, others a regrettable 
obstacle.  I try not to start with an abstract definition of society or with an ideal of 
human interactions – either atomistic as in the civil society case or holistic as in the 
family one - but rather consider the way in which political communities and particular 
institutions have embodied the coexistence, conflict and often maturing of both 
paradigms throughout history. It is precisely this historical non-arbitrariness of the 
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political sphere, I suggest, that makes its background associative circumstances 
distinctive and the patterns of interaction among its members unique. And it is precisely 
because of this distinctiveness and uniqueness that it also emerges as the most relevant 
context for the allocation of cosmopolitan political obligations. 
But what is the “political community”? In one of its most widely accepted 
definitions, it is described as a collective, historically situated, non-voluntaristic 
association of people that occupy a defined territory and stand in particular economic, 
institutional and cultural relations with each other.85 As in the civil society model, such 
relations exemplify a complex system of interdependent needs and interests, which 
require - in order to be satisfied - collective interactions, including the division of 
labour among community members and the acknowledgment of certain collective 
institutions assigning specific duties and responsibilities. As in the large family model, 
its members recognize each other as both the authoritative source and the subjects of 
these institutions, consider associative ties to constitute a common source of 
emancipation and are collectively engaged in developing their human capacities to 
promote not only the welfare of existing members but also that of future generations.  
The fact that members are engaged in mutual practices of constructing 
collective institutions with a long-term perspective does not always qualify their 
interactions as “cooperative”. The interdependence of needs and interests does not 
imply that they also constitute a homogeneous whole where each member, by 
furthering his own good, promotes that of his fellow citizens. Neither does the mutual 
recognition of a shared public good mean that this is a substantive good shared by 
everyone at the same time. Specific mechanisms of production or the popular impact of 
certain ideologies could be such that, in particular historical circumstances, the political 
community appears profoundly divided and new institutional and legislative measures 
have to be enacted in order to preserve its unity. But one could assume that the shared 
history and the distinctiveness of a public political culture are able to support even 
radical social changes without the interactions of members resulting in irremediable 
hatred and civil conflict. 
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So, on the one hand, we do not have to agree on the possibility of harmonizing 
different needs and interests by simply engaging in cooperative activities; neither do we 
have to rely too much on the organic unity among members of the same community and 
no one else. We only have to acknowledge that interdependent needs and interests 
require reciprocity in various social activities, and that all parties, for various reasons, 
converge on some principles of coordination and methods of enforcement. Without 
such convergence, society would be in a condition of perpetual anarchy and violence, 
and even minimal societal arrangements would be impossible to establish. We also 
have to acknowledge that, by participating in the political life of the community and 
being constantly involved in matters of public concern, the members of a community 
develop a genuine interest for the collective good and a sincere attachment to the 
collective institutions that they have shaped through their common history. Hence, over 
time, a political community comes to embody both instrumental mechanisms for 
accommodating conflicting interests and institutions that members appreciate in their 
own right, as unique communal bases of emancipation. 
The fact that interactions among members are not voluntary does not mean that 
citizens have no individual identity and no possibility of exit and of being accepted in a 
new political community, should they wish to migrate. What it means is that exit and 
entry are not arbitrary; they are neither a priori denied or a priori accepted but rather 
organized in a way that is compatible with and accountable to the collective political 
body. This requires that issues regarding the administration of emigration and/or the 
treatment of newcomers be considered political ones, subject to public deliberative (and 
potentially agonistic) processes in which members are ready to acknowledge the 
existence of a plurality of intuitions on the institutional interpretation of certain moral 
claims. Thus, membership being a non-arbitrary feature does not exclude the possibility 
of its constant re-negotiation, provided that the reasons for such re-negotiation can be 
rationally justified to all citizens in light of a specific political culture or a 
reinterpretation thereof. 
So unlike the civil society model, specific political principles may not be 
adopted simply because they constitute the outcome of a rational agreement of all 
relevant subjects. This is because although members may agree on the moral 
desirability of a certain goal, they may disagree on the role specific institutions should 
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be assigned in order to realize it; or they may have differing motivations to comply with 
what those institutional arrangements prescribe. This division does not arise for trivial 
reasons, it may reflect profound convictions rooted in various comprehensive doctrines 
that should necessarily emerge and be confronted. Unlike the civil-society model, my 
own account of the political community does not assume a clear distinction between the 
public and the private sphere. It is only in the political processes of public deliberation, 
negotiation, bargaining and eventually protest that this confrontation takes place and 
the different members of the political community create alliances, make coalitions and 
try to influence each others’ actions.  
I emphasize “eventually” because these conflicts of interpretation can be more 
or less severe and more or less latent according to the different historical stage in which 
a political community finds itself. There is no need to suppose that cooperation always 
prevails on insurrection and one can only reasonably assume that an established system 
of legal rules, a consolidated political tradition and the existence of a public culture will 
play an important role overtime in facilitating the transformation of power-relations. 
But it is only in light of the political development of collective social practices that 
members may publicly confront their comprehensive views on the role that institutions 
should play to realize specific ends. 
This is where my alternative account of the political community is closer to the 
family model. It relies on the general principles of moral psychology to explain how 
people prefer complex to more simple forms of goal fulfilment and develop associative 
loyalties which need not always be based on the satisfaction of personal preferences but 
rather on a development of particularist attachments.86 It emphasizes how, over time, 
individuals internalize social norms and cooperate on a more stable basis. In this way, 
relations of friendship, mutual trust or solidarity are created and feelings of guilt or 
shame tend to emerge when members of a joined associative scheme fail to do their 
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part. As generations replace one another, a shared system of meanings and consolidated 
ways of knowing and behaving constitute sources of collective flourishing and taking 
part in those particular activities becomes a form of reciprocal fulfilment. Members 
come to realize that only partaking in a political associative scheme educates their 
defective inclinations, moderates their passions, tempers their interests, and fully 
develops their moral powers. Members tend to protect their common language or 
languages, consider unique their shared cultural practices, take pride in past scientific 
and artistic achievements, criticize moral and political failures and perceive collective 
institutions as a symbol of joint historical progress in social emancipation. These 
elements contribute to the maintenance of a stable social system of cooperation and 
ground what is often referred to as the public sense of justice. But clearly, however 
strong the existence of a public sense of justice, as well as its foundation on shared 
cultural understandings, does not guarantee that interactions among members will 
always be peaceful or easy to maintain stable. What this peculiar form of social 
cooperation does provide is a basis for mutual agreement and the reference to a 
common good that, although political and not moral, members consider worthy of 
preservation. 
 
5.  Popular sovereignty and civic education 
 
In conceptualizing how political and institutional development occurs in similar 
associative circumstances, democratic theorists have traditionally drawn attention to 
two important features of modern societies: popular sovereignty and civic education. 
Popular sovereignty provides an account of the criteria that a political decision must 
meet in order to be considered legitimate. It explains under what conditions citizens are 
entitled to place coercive constraints on each other’s actions and distribute political 
obligations. According to this view, the only political decisions that citizens may be 
coerced to comply with are those that they have freely and collectively consented to. 
“Freely consented to” may be subject to two interpretations. First, one may 
understand that what a collective “freely consents to” is the content of specific 
decisions. A decision is then freely consented to by members of the collective when it 
is unanimously endorsed, i.e. every single member of the collective agrees with the 
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content of every single decision. But there might be difficulties in securing this type of 
agreement: the size of the collective, the number of options on the table and the 
disparity of views are likely to render it a remote prospect. A second-best interpretation 
of “freely consented to” might therefore be developed in response. In the context of a 
plurality of reasonable but possibly incompatible options what a collective “freely 
consents to” is a procedure for selecting decisions. Here “freely consents to” implies 
that if you freely agree with the procedure of selection of a certain decision, then you 
also commit yourself to endorse its outcome whatever this might turn out to be. In this 
case unanimity is only required once, namely in establishing the procedure of decision-
selection; it is not required for any subsequent, specific decisions.87  
Following this second interpretation, popular sovereignty lays out the external 
conditions for a meaningful exercise of one’s moral capacities within a plurality of 
modes of cooperation.88 In the absence of freely agreed upon procedures of decision-
selection and the collective recognition of what Rousseau and Kant called “the general 
will”, there would be no possible mechanism of coordinating a multiplicity of ends and 
means. Popular sovereignty expresses politically the notion of moral autonomy. To be 
morally autonomous means to obey the moral laws that you have given to yourself. To 
be politically autonomous means to obey the political laws that you have contributed to 
establishing as a member of the collective. Political autonomy constitutes the external 
condition of possibility under which moral autonomy can develop. Popular sovereignty 
grounds political autonomy by establishing that the authors of laws ought also to be 
subject to them and contains the criterion by which political obligations can be 
legitimately endorsed. Yet, whilst contributing to making those political obligations 
feasible, popular sovereignty does not guarantee, by itself, that people will also 
maintain stable terms of cooperation. Once a decision is adopted following a method to 
which people have freely consented, what is to stop them furthering their own interests 
by some other means?  
This is where the second feature of democratic theory – civic education – 
acquires a primary role. Civic education is the process by which citizens are taught the 
virtues of political participation, the centrality of engaging in public discussion, the 
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need to show mutual understanding, and the relevance of community life. If citizens’ 
comprehensive doctrines must be confronted every time a political decision comes to 
the fore, then their critical capacities need to be cultivated, their sensitivity to the 
nuances of different political positions ought to be sharpened and the discursive 
resources ensuring their meaningful participation in deliberative processes must be 
provided.89  
Civic education consists in the collective activity of distributing the abilities 
required for an effective exercise of popular sovereignty. Typically, it takes place in 
public schools, but schools need not be the only public spaces in which civic education 
occurs. Civil associations, the media and the workplace, for instance, might be just as 
plausible candidates for civic education. Schools, however, seem to have a primary 
role. This is not simply because of the compulsory nature of the service they offer or 
because of the educative function they are institutionally designed to perform. Schools, 
together with families, are arguably the most important associative environments for 
the development of one’s character. Schools familiarize children with the notion of 
authority, help them improve social skills, cultivate specific civic virtues and introduce 
children to past and present aspects of communal life, strengthening social bonds and 
creating an ethos of solidarity.90 
 This process is particularist at the start. It would be absurd to try and implant 
on children a universal sense of justice by lecturing them on individual dignity or the 
concept of freedom and the categorical imperative, or by training them to calculate 
moral harms and benefits. One usually starts with concrete examples, familiar episodes 
and stories of emotional identification with those who speak the same language or share 
similar traditions. Then progressively one builds towards more abstract narratives, 
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refining children’s critical capacities. Educational curricula fulfil precisely this role: 
they expose future citizens to a pool of knowledge on their communal history, 
literature, cultural practices and political institutions, and thus establish a basis for 
meaningful social communication. It is often said that this process is likely to be 
effective only if it espouses a type of patriotism that emphasizes glorious achievements 
in the interactions among community members and marginalizes episodes of 
oppression, exclusion or intolerance towards others.91  But this need not be the case. 
Indeed, if civic education promoted patriotic dogmas rather than self-critical historical 
reflection it would only encourage social hypocrisy and create citizens unwilling to 
engage with the reasons of others. This would hardly contribute to a stable allocation of 
political obligations.92 
 
6. Cosmopolitan agency 
 
Having examined the extent to which conflict and a basis for mutual agreement are 
present in most political communities, we may characterize the practices of interaction 
in them as synagonist.93 Synagonism emphasizes the conflicting-cooperative character 
of the relationships existing among members of a political community. Citizens 
struggle (agon) together (syn) to realize political projects benefiting the entire collective 
body - being divided in the specific, historical understandings of how collective 
institutions ought to assign responsibilities, but united in the recognition of their non-
instrumental value and in the necessity of preserving their autonomy. In the absence of 
a shared understanding of the collective end of historical institutions that citizens have 
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progressively created, political alternatives cannot be evaluated and no shifts in courses 
of action ever occur. However, this very collective end is also subject to continuous 
revision and expansion in light of emerging political projects and ideals of social 
transformation. 
Cosmopolitanism is itself an emerging political project, questioning the moral 
standing of states when they fail to cope with the fact that millions of people live in 
conditions of severe material deprivation and with the realities of global inequalities. 
However, whether states are more or less able to cope with the negative externalities of, 
say, a global free-market economy or with the existence of huge power inequalities 
among them, is not a natural fact, it is a question of political will. Political will requires 
allocating political obligations. And for political obligations to be allocated, political 
agency has to be both feasible and stable. 
Political communities then play an important, perhaps the most important, role 
in allocating cosmopolitan obligations. This is not because each exhibits an exclusive 
understanding of a substantive collective good, impossible as such to be shared with 
strangers, much less negotiated. Instead, political communities constitute spheres of 
interaction and dependence in which the problems of living in common can be 
institutionally addressed, in which members recognize each other as mutually 
responsible for the outcomes of their collective enterprises, and in which conflicting 
claims may enter the public arena with a clear reference to what values are called into 
question. Background historical institutions and a public sense of justice are in this case 
important not for some kind of intrinsic capacity to accommodate all possible 
controversies, but for offering the associative frame within which citizens recognize 
each other’s well-being as a condition of their own development, thus influencing their 
motivation to comply and strengthening their concern for the wealth of the collective 
body. Far from excluding the possibility that states evolve, enlarge or even 
fundamentally transform their character (including in a cosmopolitan sense), it is 
important to emphasize that such changes would still have to occur from within a set of 
common practices referring to historical institutions, legal texts and a public political 
culture that members regard as meaningful and worthy of preservation.94 
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We are now in a position to link more straightforwardly the requirements of 
feasibility and stability for cosmopolitan political agency, to the features of political 
communities emphasized above, namely, popular sovereignty and civic education. 
Popular sovereignty is a condition of possibility for the institutional realization of 
cosmopolitan obligations.  It allows enforcing a specific interpretation of the role of 
political institutions that has gained the consent of the collective body. Civic education 
guarantees, in the long run, the possibility that everyone, even those particular agents 
that initially oppose or find it difficult to comply with cosmopolitan-oriented laws as a 
matter of external coercion, progressively learn to live with them because they reflect 
the transformation of collective institutions that members consider valuable.  
Let us examine both features more in depth. If we agree, as cosmopolitans do, 
that pluralism with respect to substantive conceptions of the good is an irreducible 
feature of modern societies, we would have a hard time trying to have all citizens 
endorse the same view on the role of political institutions roughly in the same time. 
Take cosmopolitan political obligations to reduce power inequalities. Typically, they 
will require a transformation of domestic institutions and systems of production and 
distribution that are coercively imposed on all members of the political association in a 
way that also benefits non-members. Although agreeing with the broader moral 
concern, a libertarian will perhaps object that the distribution of material resources to 
needy populations should be a private matter, a nationalist will argue that levelling 
down on military power will undermine collective security and so on.  
The point of the institution of popular sovereignty is, however, that the 
authority of political communities is due to legal and political arrangements reflecting 
the consent – although perhaps not unanimous agreement - of all subjects to political 
decisions that may not correspond to everyone’s interpretation in a particular historical 
stage. Political membership is not an arbitrary feature. Recognition of the basic 
principles that regulate common life authorizes fellow-citizens to put constraints on 
each other’s actions following decisions collectively consented to. Thus, reluctant 
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citizens may object to certain principles or refuse to participate in their making (for 
example by not voting), but they cannot avoid complying with them once they have 
been collectively enforced.  
One might of course object here that, even if members value non-instrumentally 
their membership to a political community, they will not necessarily also endorse 
whatever decision happens to emerge from its internal political processes. On the 
contrary, precisely because, say, libertarians or nationalists might care for the well 
being of fellow-citizens, they are more likely to engage in actions of civil disobedience 
trying to resist what they consider as objectionable policies. But notice that acts of civil 
disobedience are usually justified when the state ceases to be representative of all its 
citizens, when there are no further grounds for believing that it reflects norms of 
fairness in its distribution of social roles and when popular sovereignty is thought to 
have failed at guaranteeing legitimate conditions for public deliberation. The kind of 
injustices that justify civil disobedience are usually deep-going, severe and determined 
by the exclusion of particular political or ethnic groups from the public sphere or by 
profound violations of human rights within or outside the state’s borders.95 This would 
not seem to be the case with cosmopolitan oriented goals. Reasonable people would not 
consider the principle of equal distribution following from the global scope of 
sufficientarian justice as an insult to human dignity. The problem, as pointed out by 
critics, is one of motivating people to discharge cosmopolitan obligations, or indeed 
even to recognize them as obligations that domestic institutions ought impose. Such 
motivational weakness might have different sources: people might think that it is not 
their job to take initiatives to support other states, they might prefer to devote their 
energies to family and friends, or they might judge it a useless activity unless everyone 
did the same everywhere in the world. These are precisely the concerns to which the 
emphasis on the legitimate exercise of popular sovereignty attempts to address.  
Popular sovereignty allows the legitimate enforcement of certain principles, 
thus making cosmopolitan political obligations feasible. But popular sovereignty only 
explains how it is possible to reach and exercise power legitimately, not how power is 
maintained and equalized. If citizens do not progressively identify with the laws, if 
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cosmopolitanism as a political project fails to foster cross-border solidarity and get a 
motivational grip on people, besides requiring them to comply, it is not likely to have a 
very long life. Political agency needs civic education in order to be effective, but civic 
education does not develop in a vacuum. Neither can it be implemented purely 
legislatively. This would mean recreating the problem it is trying to resolve. Political 
obligations are likely to be effective only if they are preceded, and followed, by an 
attempt to establish cultural as well as a political hegemony. However, this attempt to 
hegemonize the public sphere is necessarily linked to a historical sense of the 
collective, to the self-understanding of citizens as members of a community of fate, to 
justified ways of reasoning and debating, to a national literature, to dominant religious 
books, legal traditions and historical institutions. Far from ignoring comprehensive 
doctrines as a private issue that should be kept separate from the public sphere, civic 
education requires appealing to them every time a political project needs to be assessed, 
if this very project also hopes to be continuously endorsed. 
Various authors have explored ways of realizing a cosmopolitan civic education 
within particular political communities. We need not go into the details of their 
proposals here.96 It is enough to mention some of the institutions through which 
cosmopolitan civic education processes could take place: the role of schools in offering 
educational curricula where a plurality of cultural and political perspectives emerge and 
are confronted, the role of the media in documenting pressing economic and social 
questions even outside one country’s borders, and the role of local civil and political 
movements in directing their efforts to issues of global social justice. One might object 
that a similar cosmopolitan civic education distracts attention from community life and 
would “rob” people from their “concreteness” and “immediacy”.97 This need not be the 
case, especially if we consider that even within particular political communities 
national culture, traditions and patriotic allegiances are not the symbol of an eternally 
harmonious life in common, but of the politically mediated effort to create unity out of 
a variety of different, often incompatible, perspectives. The exposure of modern 
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societies to the possibility of cross-cultural tensions, especially with regards to the 
integration of migrants, might motivate initiatives for a more cosmopolitan civic 
education, preparing citizens to reflect upon relations between countries and cultures 
from a critical global perspective. But if this is so, why not try “any” political route to 
cosmopolitanism? Why insist on statist agency?  
Machiavelli wrote “he who desires or wants to reform the State of a City, and 
wishes that it may be accepted and capable of maintaining itself to everyone's 
satisfaction should at least retain the shadow of ancient forms”. For he added, often 
“the general mass of men are satisfied with appearances, as if it exists, and many times 
are moved by the things which appear to be rather than by the things that are. This 
ought to be observed by all those who want to abolish an ancient (system of) living in a 
City and bring it to a new and more liberal one.” And, “as new things disturb the minds 
of men, you ought to endeavour that these changes retain as much as possible of the 
ancient (forms) … only he who wants to establish an absolute power, which by authors 
is called a Tyranny, ought to change everything.”98 
Cosmopolitan political agency can succeed only by taking into account the 
background associative circumstances of particular political communities. 
Cosmopolitanism becomes a feasible option by taking advantage of the legislative and 
political mechanisms that allow citizens to transform collective institutions through 
constraining each other’s actions. It may hope to be stably maintained only by 
appealing to familiar institutions, deeper social ties, cultural resources and mutual 
understandings that motivate imperfect moral agents. Moral imperatives would in this 
case not appear over-demanding and citizens would not comply simply out of fear from 
coercive mechanisms but out of a sincere attachment with political institutions that they 
have contributed to develop.  
Now, this analysis of political obligations from the internal perspective of 
particular political communities leaves entirely out of its scope the further question of 
how the principles regulating interactions among political communities in the 
international sphere should be conceived. Cosmopolitanism is ultimately a theory 
concerning the transcendence of particular political boundaries. Even though it should 
rely on existing background associative circumstances to realize political obligations, it 
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cannot be content until social justice has been globally realized. But how can 
cosmopolitan political obligations be enforced in the first place? If it is right to say that 
ordinary people are more likely to take seriously particularistic commitments than 
duties to fellow human beings, why hope that there will be enough of them interested in 
issues of global justice and equal empowerment to lead cosmopolitan political 
campaigns? If certain political processes are successful in one particular sphere, what 
guarantees that the same will occur in another one? 
The following chapter explores some of these issues in further detail. However, 
it might be worth spending a few words on one general objection looming above all of 
them. The objection runs as follows. Either it is reasonable to assume that ordinary 
moral agents can be motivated by cosmopolitan obligations or it is not. If the answer is 
yes, the particularist route to cosmopolitanism seems unnecessary since the standard 
cosmopolitan accounts (i.e. political universalism) suffice for the stable allocation of 
cosmopolitan political obligations. If the answer is no, then the particularist route 
appears irrelevant since it ends up being as utopian on the feasibility of cosmopolitan 
obligations as the alternatives it tries to challenge. 
This objection would be a plausible one if politics were a matter of “either – 
or.”  In most cases, historically at least, the allocation of political obligations seems to 
have been a question of how much, when, where and how. Several political projects 
may have ringed utopian in a certain place at a particular time, and yet prove perfectly 
feasible in different associative circumstances at a later point; that is, they may have 
been received with hostility in an initial phase only to become a collective identity 
marker in a successive one. Two hundred years after a progressive philosopher’s 
invective against human rights even the most repressive government would be 
embarrassed to publicly declare those rights “nonsense upon stilts.”99 So we might 
think about cosmopolitan principles now. They motivate some agents, some they leave 
indifferent and others might object to them. The important issue to focus on is: in what 
associative circumstances cosmopolitan political agency is most likely to prove 
successful? 
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The previous pages have tried to answer this question by emphasizing two 
important features of particular political communities or states as we know them: 
popular sovereignty and civic education. Popular sovereignty clarified how 
cosmopolitan agency might become a feasible option. Civic education clarified how 
cosmopolitan projects within the polity could be stably promoted. In many countries 
there seem to be enough egalitarian political actors motivated to transform their own 
states, but there are probably not enough capable of doing it on a global scale. Within 
particular political communities, once certain cosmopolitan goals are brought into 
particular public spheres, they can be made reciprocally acceptable to members by 
employing legitimate mechanisms of institutional transformation. And once the 
enforcement of political duties is achieved, newly shaped institutions operating within a 
shared public culture may develop practices of voluntary constraint among members. 
Here the statist route to cosmopolitanism seems far from superfluous. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter tried to develop an account of the associative conditions under which 
cosmopolitan agency would obtain feasibility and stability. It tried to suggest that the 
kind of obligations flowing from cosmopolitan principles, should be allocated 
politically and not just morally. When enforcing political obligations, citizens can 
legitimately constrain the activities of fellow-members and act collectively to reform 
particular political institutions so as to align them with cosmopolitan goals. Where this 
kind of political action has been successful, a polity can continuously support 
cosmopolitanism and maintain stable a political association by relying on historical and 
cultural practices developed among community members. There is no guarantee that 
political agents will succeed in enforcing demanding cosmopolitan principles of the 
kind discussed in the previous chapter. But it is possible to think of a model according 
to which a similar transformation might occur. Illustrating this model is the task of the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter VI 
Statist Cosmopolitanism: 
From Principles to Agency 
 
1. Politics as art: the idea of a cosmopolitan avant-garde 
 
The previous chapter defended a non-ideal account of the background associative 
conditions under which the political realization of cosmopolitan goals could be 
considered a feasible and a stable option. It tried to show, on the one hand, how 
political obligations with a cosmopolitan scope may be realistically allocated where the 
members of a specific associative scheme are able to use legitimate decision-making 
mechanisms to constrain reciprocal public interactions. On the other hand, it 
emphasized that where political institutions have historically acquired the collective 
support of the citizen body, institutional schemes leading to the fulfilment of 
cosmopolitan obligations are more likely to be stably maintained throughout time. 
The present chapter builds on the centrality of political communities for the 
scope of global justice. It enquires into the question of what specific agents could most 
efficiently undertake cosmopolitan political transformations. As we have seen in the 
previous chapters, one of the most common criticisms against existent cosmopolitan 
proposals in favour of global equality emphasizes their weak motivational force and the 
over-demanding nature of their claims in the absence of a global ethos of solidarity. 
The strength of conceiving the allocation of cosmopolitan obligations as a political and 
not just moral issue is that such analysis does not need to make heroic assumptions 
about what ordinary citizens will or will not be motivated to do when it comes to 
specific initiatives promoting cosmopolitan justice. It is enough to rely on those 
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individuals, civil movements and political forces which are already morally or socially 
sensitive to issues of poverty and oppression and argue that these may be assigned 
responsibility for leading political actions transforming the state in a cosmopolitan 
direction.  
This chapter attempts to clarify this issue by introducing the notion of a 
“cosmopolitan avant-garde” in order to refer to those individuals, civil associations and 
political agents responsible for promoting global justice initiatives within particular 
states. It starts by exploring how one should understand the concept of “avant-garde” 
movement, its relevance in art and the analogies between avant-garde movements in art 
and politics in using available resources in tradition in order to promote emancipatory 
visions of society. It then discusses who might constitute an avant-garde 
“cosmopolitan” movement and how its civic and political action might affect the rest of 
the citizen body thus gaining support for cosmopolitan transformations. I try to 
emphasize the role of grass-root organizations and trans-national advocacy networks in 
educating local publics to cross-border solidarity and from there proceed to show their 
potential influence on the rules of interaction in the international sphere. The implicit 
assumption is that political transformations, including those cosmopolitically inspired, 
do not occur in a vacuum but are influenced by specific economic, social and political 
factors and develop within the background of a public culture and historical events 
shaping the way in which citizens mobilize. Below I argue that the attempt to realize 
global justice should be considered in continuity with the democratic struggle for the 
progressive expansion of political accountability in the public sphere. A cosmopolitan 
avant-garde would transform society in ways similar to those of artistic and political 
innovators in critical historical stages - taking the lead in developing an emancipatory 
social project, which contrasts the unequal distribution of power in the global sphere. 
 
2. The concept and its development: artistic avant-gardes 
 
The notion of an “avant-garde” movement is of course not new. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, the term originally appeared in the 15th century to denote 
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“the foremost part of an army advancing into battle (also called the vanguard)”.1 Later 
on it has been used both in art and in politics to emphasize the leading role of particular 
individuals and social forces in transforming existing cultural and political practices in 
light of new projects for the emancipation of society. Apparently the first use of the 
term in this second sense is owed to Claude Henri de Saint Simon’s Literary, 
Philosophical and Industrial Opinions, published for the first time in 1825. In this last 
work Saint Simon emphasizes the power of art in using imagination to appeal to 
people’s feelings in order to facilitate society’s transition toward a more progressive 
and civilized age. In the course of a dialogue between the scientist and the artist on the 
role of each for the project of human emancipation, he has the latter declare in a 
somewhat superior tone:  
 
Let us unite. We, the artists, will serve as the avant-garde: for amongst all the arms at our disposal, the 
power of the Arts is the swiftest and most expeditious. When we wish to spread new ideas amongst men, 
we use in turn the lyre, ode or song, story or novel; we inscribe those ideas on marble or canvas[…] We 
aim for the heart and imagination, and hence our effect is the most vivid and the most decisive.2 
 
And further: 
 
What a most beautiful destiny for the arts, that of exercising over society a positive power, a true priestly 
function, and of marching forcefully in the van of all the intellectual faculties, in the epoch of their 
greatest development! 3 
 
By reserving to the artists a crucial role in promoting human emancipation, 
Saint Simon intended to confer a more straightforward political meaning to the 
Enlightenment ideal of art as a means for conveying socially useful projects. Already in 
the French Encyclopédie (1751) of Diderot and D’Alembert the entry on “Beaux Arts” 
(believed to have been written by Diderot himself) exhorted the men of Academia to 
visit the ateliers (qu’il descende dans les ateliers), and produce works that determined 
                                                
1
 "avant-garde"  A Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Art. Ian Chilvers. Oxford University Press, 1998. 
Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  European University Institute Library.  16 May 
2007  http://0www.oxfordreference.com.bibliosun.iue.it:80/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t
5.e187. Accessed 17th May 2007.  
2
 Henri de Saint Simon, Selected Writings on Science, Industry and Social Organization, trans. Keith 
Taylor (London: Croom Helm, [1825] 1975) 281. 
3
 Ibid.  
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“the artists to read, the philosophers to think usefully and the powerful to make a useful 
(utile) exercise of their authority and recompenses” - a call that would have been 
literally taken up later by the avant-garde movement of the Bauhaus.4 Saint Simon’s 
idea of artist-leaders placed the latter at the centre of a trial administrative elite 
composed of scientists and industrialists/artisans and assigned them a crucial role in 
communicating to the masses through didactic means whatever science achieved 
through solid demonstrations.  
It comes at no surprise then that in the earliest stages of their development, 
artistic avant-gardes were characterized by their political commitment to social justice 
and by the attempt to use aesthetic means to influence a particular mass culture.5 
Inspired by the ideas of Saint Simon, Proudhon, Fourier and later Marx – as well as 
deeply influenced by the events leading to the Paris Commune – avant-garde painters, 
writers and musicians perceived their role in society as a break with conventional 
aesthetic canons and made revolutionary use of artistic techniques to raise public 
awareness on burning social issues. The most interesting feature that the movement 
exhibited was that in most cases, theory and artistic product coincided. The aim was 
appealing to familiar expressive means but in a way that conveyed a radically different 
message on the role of art and its relation to mass culture. As one critic has put it, the 
avant-garde could only make sense “if it remained dialectically related to that for which 
it serves as the vanguard – speaking narrowly to the older modes of artistic expression, 
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 “Qu'il sorte du sein des Académies quelqu'Homme qui descende dans les ateliers, qui y recueille les 
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Philosophes à penser utilement, & les Grands à faire enfin un usage utile de leur autorité & de leurs 
récompenses”, see Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond D'Alembert, Encyclopédie, Ou Dictionnaire 
Raisonné Des Sciences, Des Arts Et Des Métiers, 28 vols. (Geneve; Paris; Neufchatel: Briasson and 
others, [1754-1772]) 713. 
5
 My analysis of artistic avant-gardes is quite selective and has a merely illustrative function. I focus only 
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changes in society (starting from the events of the 1848 Paris commune), neo-avant-gardes merely 
repeated the strategies of their predecessors but abandoned social struggle. For one pioneering analysis of 
this issue see Peter Buerger, Theory of the Avant-Garde (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984). For an interesting discussion of the death of avant-gardes in the 20th century and the relationship 
between art and politics see Eric Hobsbawm, Behind the Times : The Decline and Fall of the Twentieth-
Century Avant-Gardes (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1999).  
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speaking broadly to the life of the masses which Saint Simon’s avant-garde scientists, 
engineers and artists were to lead”.6 
Gustave Courbet, arguably one of the pioneers of the historical avant-garde 
movement and a committed social activist, explicitly adopted this point of view in 
works judged by critics as “a pursuit of ugliness” because of their rebellious realism 
and poignant representation of the workers’ conditions in industrial societies. When his 
now famous painting “Burial at Ornans” (1849) was rejected by an official international 
jury in Paris because of its “brutal” realism in representing manual labourers as heroic 
characters, Courbet reacted by opening his own exhibition space called “Le Réalisme”. 
The event was relevant not simply because it created a precedent for the representation 
of works refused by official exhibitions, a habit that was to become later one of the 
identifying features of historical avant-gardes.7 Courbet conceived his work above all 
as a means to increase the public’s awareness about social conditions in industrial 
societies, as well as a protest toward the allegedly “idealistic” and “elitist” canons of 
official aesthetics. “An object abstract, invisible, nonexistent”, he claimed, “is not in the 
domain of painting”.8 
It would be difficult to explain the origin and development of historical avant-
gardes in art without considering how their aesthetic innovations were shaped by, and 
aimed to account for, the profound political transformations in which their protagonists 
took active part. The originality and interest of early avant-garde works lies precisely in 
their attempt to combine art criticism and social engagement in a way that both speaks 
to tradition and progressively abandons it by pointing at new routes of development. In 
the second generation of the movement, for example, this issue was explicitly theorized 
by impressionists with socialist and anarchist sympathies such as Camille Pissarro, Paul 
Signac and later Pablo Picasso and affected not just the content of their works but also 
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their painting techniques. So for example Paul Signac thought that the pointillist style 
of painting represented the artists testimonial of “the great social process which pits the 
workers against Capital” and that revolution “will be found much stronger and more 
eloquent in pure aesthetics…applied to subjects like working-class housing”9.  
The call for taking the lead in promoting human emancipation through artistic 
innovation became most inspiring for several avant-gardes in the decades going roughly 
from the October Revolution to the affirmation of Nazism in Germany and Stalinism in 
the Soviet Union. In literature, for example, the Surrealist movement supported by 
important intellectuals and activists such as André Breton, Louis Aragon, Paul Eluard 
and Jacques Prévert theorized the “mechanic style of writing” as a means of liberating 
thought from the commodified conventions of bourgeois society and establishing a new 
cultural hegemony. Spontaneously recording the dreams, visions and utopias of the 
artist intended to overcome the illusionary coherence of bourgeois every day life with 
its rooted habits, stylized expressive means and concealed mechanisms of repression in 
order to release new ways of exploring experience and sharing future visions of society. 
“We make no claim to change the mores of mankind”, declared the Surrealist manifesto 
of 1925, “but we intend to show the fragility of thought, and on what shifting 
foundations […] we have built our trembling houses”.10 If this was still too abstract, the 
movement made its intentions more clear in the early 1930s by changing the name of its 
official journal from “Révolution surréaliste” to “Le surréalisme au service de la 
révolution”.11 The time had come for poets, Eluard declared, “to affirm their right and 
duty to be deeply immersed in the life of other human beings, in ordinary life […] Real 
poetry is included in anything that does not conform to ordinary morality, a morality 
                                                
9
 Cited in Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, eds., Art in Theory 1815-1900: An Anthology of Changing 
Ideas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998) 797. 
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 Cited in Maurice Nadeau, The History of Surrealism (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 1989) 240-41. 
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that can only preserve the constituted order by building banks, garrisons,  prisons and 
churches”.12 
Participating with enthusiasm in the affirmation of the October revolution, 
Russian avant-gardes went even further in advocating the relevance of artists as “social 
engineers” involved in the production of work which had to be both functional and 
accessible even to the uncultivated public. Ranging from a variety of styles and themes, 
from Malevich’s and Lissitzky’s suprematism to Rodchenko’s constructivism, the goal 
of avant-garde movements was hermeneutical, critical and didactic in the same time. It 
aimed, on the one hand, to put an end to the commonsense understanding of art as an 
activity that could only interest cultural elites. On the other had, and more didactically, 
it tried to familiarize the masses with abstract thinking and the use of creative 
associations. It is for this reason that for example, Lissitzky's experimental art 
developed into work in typography, exhibition design, and architecture and that 
Malevich defended his abstract paintings as showing the progressive liberation of 
people from the domination of work and constituting the true expression of their newly 
acquired freedom.13 
The most persuasive avant-garde attempts to introduce innovations in art and 
society were those who tried to subvert specific traditions from within, while 
continuing to act as their critical voice. This point becomes particularly clear if we 
contrast the scarce success among the broader public of Futurist and Dadaist attempts, 
aiming to destroy centuries of historical accumulation, with the popularity of emergent 
forms of art such as cinema and later Jazz, which combined traditional ways of 
enjoying aesthetic products with their extrapolation from the realm of high culture.14 
More generally, the most interesting and promising avant-garde productions seemed to 
be those who were perceived by their authors in continuity with the classic works that 
inspired them. Picasso for example, spent several years analysing and absorbing the 
style of authors such as El Greco, Rubens, Velasquez and Titian before advancing into 
new territory. Even then, some of the most brilliant paintings represented variations on 
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classical work, as testified by the many reinterpretations of Velazquez’s “Las Meninas” 
or of Courbet’s “Demoiselles de la Seine”. In a similar way, Brecht’s “epic theatre”, far 
from mounting a radical attack to art as an institution, tried to appropriate tradition in 
order to change its function and cultivate critical distancing in the public. Aristotle’s 
Poetics and its focus on feelings remained a constant reference point for Brecht’s 
articulation of the concept of “estrangement” (Verfremdung), a concept denoting the 
attitude of a public which did not emotionally identify with the characters of a drama 
(as in the Aristotelian tradition) but rationally adopted a politically fruitful critical 
perspective. 
The effort to act as “the creative conscience of a usable tradition” constituted 
the main concern of several avant-garde movements and represented a much more 
arduous and subtle task than that of rejecting all existing institutions and tastes.15 
Indeed, as one critic puts it, “tradition already had its official guardians, who, armed 
with an elaborate system of sanctions, were determined to resist any change that 
required them to reconsider the precious inheritance in their charge”. Instead, “a 
constant reconsideration and revaluation of the past is precisely what the master artists 
of the avant-garde were forcing upon the official guardians of taste, and doing so not 
out of any conscious determination to ‘subvert’ tradition but, on the contrary, to rescue 
it from moribund conventions and redefine it in the most vital terms - terms that spoke 
directly to the sensibility of the age”.16 
Avant-garde art did not initially constitute simply one aesthetic fashion among 
others – as it occurs all too often in our days - but represented the first major attempt to 
radically reinterpret the role of artists in society. By challenging the traditional division 
of labour between history, art, philosophy and politics it tried to construct a more 
transparent relation between socially engaged artists and the broader public to which 
their call for a different, more just society was addressed. Whether it was in music, 
literature, architecture or visual arts, the link that avant-garde movements established 
between existing cultural practices, innovations in aesthetic canons and political 
initiative acted both as a critique of present cultural and social institutions and as a 
concrete instance of their social emancipation. The means through which historical 
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avant-gardes pursued their goals might have been different, and more or less successful, 
but the attempt to appropriate centuries of artistic legacy, reinterpret it and put it at the 
service of a larger social project was shared by many.  
It was when such fruitful relationship with tradition waned, or was deliberately 
rejected by its protagonists, that the historical avant-garde became most vulnerable to 
attack.17 It was when references to tradition disappeared from the project altogether 
(both consciously and unconsciously) that historical avant-gardes died.18 As we shall 
shortly see, similar risks threaten political avant-gardes and similar opportunities 
present themselves. As Brecht put it “a vanguard can lead the way along a retreat or 
into an abyss. It can march so far ahead that the main army cannot follow it, because it 
is lost from sight and so on”.19 Political avant-gardes, just like artistic avant-gardes, can 
avoid either leading backwards or losing their way, only if they are able to adequately 
combine a global vision of society with local commitments, only if they are able to 
innovate in a way that also communicates with tradition. Cosmopolitanism, by its very 
nature, is all the more subject to similar risks. It can either be rooted in the state, to start 
with, or fly so high that one easily loses sight of it. 
 
3. The analogy between art and politics (I): the public  
 
Interesting similarities between the spheres of art and politics emerge very clearly if we 
focus on the analogy of aesthetic and political judgment from both the point of view of 
the actors involved as well as that of the public. Drawing on Kant’s Critique of the 
power of judgment, we may start to clarify the latter by illustrating how the maxims 
orienting claims of taste are analogous to those evaluating the importance of political 
events.20 In discussing the status of aesthetic judgment, Kant underlines how even 
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though the claims of taste are always rooted in a particular experience of the subject 
and do not rely upon an ideal concept of what counts as beautiful in art, they 
nevertheless aim to be generally valid. Unlike private sensations and feelings, aesthetic 
judgments are not merely assertions of subjective preferences but require to be shared 
by a broader public. And rightly so: for Kant claims of taste are grounded on the 
presupposition of a kind of communal sense (sensus communis) which brings all 
discursive participants to abstract from contingent circumstances and private interests 
and hypothetically take into account the representations of everybody else. Because 
aesthetic judgments are autonomous, impartial and public, the kind of relation that they 
aim to establish between the perception of a beautiful product of art or nature and its 
assessment in a particular claim of taste is thought to be universally extensible.21 
According to Kant it is possible to illustrate the status of aesthetic judgments 
and the reasons for which those who perform them expect a general agreement by 
enlisting three maxims upon which the presupposition of a communal sense is 
grounded. These are: 1) to think for oneself; 2) to think in the position of everyone else; 
3) always to think in accord with oneself.22 In the first case, every time a product of 
nature or art is described as beautiful we make use of “unprejudiced” thought since we 
do not assess the object considering its utility for us or a private interest involved but 
only its pure aesthetic value. In the second case we recur to “broad-minded” thought 
because we assume the product of art would produce the same disinterested feeling of 
pleasure on any other impartial observer. In the third case we deploy “consistent” 
thought because we coherently combine the first two and formulate a judgment that we 
believe to be exemplarily valid. 
Now it is interesting to notice how the first two maxims that Kant thought could 
illustrate some of the fundamental features of his critique of taste are reminiscent of the 
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principles that ought to guide enlightened citizens in their assessment of political 
institutions. The first idea, that of autonomous and unprejudiced thought, promotes 
emancipation from the errors of superstition and the dogmatic acceptance of any given 
authority, preparing citizens to be active members of a self-legislating collective. This 
enlightened disposition, which Kant defines as “the emergence of men from their self-
incurred minority”23, together with the imperative of only obeying the laws that one has 
autonomously prescribed to himself are necessary preconditions for that critical 
exercise of public reason upon which the idea of political legitimacy rests.24 Here Kant 
insists that although acting within a particular political sphere, citizens should always 
be able to look beyond it and assess political institutions from a cosmopolitan 
perspective. As he puts it, the unprejudiced use of public reason constitutes an essential 
demand for an agent who is both required to obey the laws in his capacity of citizen, 
but who also “regards himself as a member of a whole commonwealth, even of the 
society of citizens of the world”.25 
The ability to make use of “enlarged thought” while reflecting on a beautiful 
product of art, is also the same displayed by the members of an enlightened public in 
their evaluation of transformative political events. Indeed, the capacity of external 
observers to participate in a disinterested, yet passionate, manner in the affirmation of 
the French revolution was perceived by Kant as a sign of moral progress in history. 
Judging political issues from an enlarged perspective, which requires the spectator to 
put himself in the place of everybody else, even sacrificing one’s own self-interest, 
reveals an important disposition. As Kant puts it, this disposition constitutes a 
revolution in the “mode of thinking” whereby the public manifests “universal yet 
disinterested sympathy” to the deeds of those who are brought to sacrifice their own life 
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for the realization of justice.26 Just as a person feels elevated and moved by the lyrics of 
a poem, the music of an opera or the characters of a painting because the “beautiful” is 
perceived as a “symbol” of the morally good, the general admiration and unselfish 
enthusiasm with which the public assists at the unfolding of progressive political events 
constitutes a “sign” of the possibility of moral emancipation. 27 
The analogy between aesthetic and political judgment illustrates the capacity of 
individuals to act following “enlightened”, “enlarged” and “consecutive” maxims. 
Ordinary citizens are perfectly able to participate in the transformation of their polity 
even against their selfish individual interests, provided background conditions for 
political mobilization are available. What is the role of avant-gardes in the making of 
such conditions? To understand this issue we need to consider another type of 
similarity between art and politics. 
  
4. The analogy between art and politics (II): actors 
 
The first explicit shift in the use of the term “avant-garde” from the sphere of art to that 
of politics occurred when Lenin in his famous 1902 essay “What is to be done?” 
referred to the communist party as the “vanguard of the revolutionary forces in our 
time”.28 The transformative activity of particular political agents was here perceived in 
analogy with that of innovative artistic movements, creatively invoking a new vision of 
the good polity and progressively removing obstacles to the realization of social justice. 
The image of politics as a special kind of creative activity; the art of governing 
the polity goes back at least to Aristotle. Rousseau, in the social contract also 
emphasizes how “the constitution of a man is the work of nature, that of the State is the 
work of art”.29 The interesting addition coming from the notion of “avant-garde” 
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political agency is its focus on critical circumstances in which existing institutional and 
discursive resources appear exhausted or insufficient to resolve society’s political 
impasse. The products of avant-garde movements are there to symbolize that the ends 
of reason do not belong to an abstract realm of the hypothetically possible but may be 
promoted (and in fact are) in real world circumstances.  
In a way similar to artists, avant-garde political agents must use imagination 
and invest creative energies in giving concrete shape to an abstract vision of the good 
polity. Both kind of movements aim at transforming society by introducing new 
discourses which solicit a particular public sphere to become aware of its own limits 
and opportunities. Both constitute teleological activities whose strategies of 
mobilization rely on the ability to link the past – what has already been achieved – with 
a vision of the future – what remains to be done - and of persuading the public that their 
project is a meaningful one. And in both cases subjective participation plays a crucial 
role: the whole project may succeed or fail according to the ability of leaders and 
activists to subordinate tradition to the goals of a superior intellectual and political 
reform: a reform desperately needed, if not yet fully conceptualized. 
This complex relationship between tradition and innovation with regard to 
avant-garde political agency is illuminatingly introduced by Antonio Gramsci’s with a 
metaphor emphasizing the analogies between art and politics. As Gramsci puts it:  
 
The active politician is a creator, an initiator; but he neither creates from nothing nor does he move in the 
turbid void of his own desires and dreams. He bases himself on effective reality, but what is this effective 
reality? Is it something static and immobile, or is it not rather a relation of forces in continuous motion 
and shift of equilibrium? If one applies one's will to the creation of a new equilibrium among the forces 
which really exist and are operative — basing oneself on the particular force which one believes to be 
progressive and strengthening it to help it to victory — one still moves on the terrain of effective reality, 
but does so in order to dominate and transcend it (or to contribute to this). What "ought to be" is therefore 
concrete; indeed it is the only realistic and historicist interpretation of reality, it alone is history in the 
making and philosophy in the making, it alone is politics.30 
 
As modern substitutes for the role played in history by talented and perceptive 
leaders, avant-garde political agents are assigned the duty to awaken and develop a 
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“national collective will” by introducing and adapting progressive universal ideas of 
justice to particular cultural and political circumstances.31 In his Philosophy of history 
Hegel had already emphasized the importance of particularly “clear-sighted” characters  
- what he called “world-historical individuals” - in understanding the needs of their 
time and taking initiatives to enact the political transformations they required.32 Those 
“thinking men” – Hegel stressed – had a special insight into what was “ripe for 
development”; they reflected it through their actions and words and contributed to 
dissolve the dilemmas of theoretical analysis in the practical immediacy of concrete 
political action. Gramsci – and Marx before him – considered however reductive 
analyzing the motion of leading social forces in history through a record of the actions 
of single individuals. Thus they proceeded to substitute it with an account of avant-
garde agents which were abstract, collective and institutionally mediated (the working-
class, the party, organic intellectuals, civic associations) and which attempted to 
exercise political as well as cultural hegemony.  
This conception of the avant-garde agent as a “modern prince” able to 
understand the motion of progressive social forces, organize them and invent strategies 
of political mobilization could be better understood in light of the analogy between 
artistic production and political activity and the emphasis placed on the “creative” 
moment of the process. The role of “avant-garde” agents is not exhausted in the 
application of a political program that promises to fulfil the needs of particular strata of 
society in a given historical situation. What is at stake is not merely providing a 
political platform that is supported by the greatest number of people and can claim to 
operate the necessary political changes. “Numbers”, as Gramsci underlined, are “simply 
an instrumental value, giving a measure and a relation and nothing more”. The difficult 
task is intervening at the level of that which is measured: “the effectiveness, and the 
expansive and persuasive capacity, of the opinions of a few individuals, the active 
minorities, the elites, the avant-gardes – i.e. their rationality, historicity or concrete 
functionality”.33 
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The work of avant-garde political agents begins with the process of discovering 
the ideational centre of production of specific discourses on political agency, subjecting 
it to critical scrutiny and providing alternative visions on how interactions in the polity 
should be conceived. Avant-garde movements challenge the common-sense view that 
“all individual opinions have "exactly" equal weight” and argue that ideas and opinions 
do not spontaneously arise out of isolated cognitive processes but are rooted in specific 
social practices, which determine their political shape and must also be subjected to 
critical investigation. The institutional operationalization of ideas, “the counting of 
votes” is only “the final ceremony of a long process, in which it is precisely those who 
devote their best energies to the State and the nation (when such they are) who carry the 
greatest weight”.34  
Considered from a broadly historical perspective the relevance of avant-garde 
political movements has consisted precisely in their ability to occupy the empty space 
between the critique of existing institutional practices and universal ideals on social 
justice with a concrete project for the emancipation of society. In a way similar to 
artistic avant-gardes, political ones have both acted as the critical conscience of a 
particular political tradition and made use of the cultural resources that it provided in 
order to bring into the public arena issues previously excluded from the agenda of 
institutional actors. Their political initiatives and discursive emphasis on the contrast 
between the formal recognition of universal principles of freedom and justice and the 
practical oppression of particular groups could be considered among the main artifices 
of expansion of the democratic public sphere. Due to the activity of political avant-
gardes what initially appeared odd or unacceptable to consolidated elites or was 
considered over-demanding by existent institutional standards progressively matured 
into a persistent popular request for modifying the scope and franchise of democratic 
citizenship.  
Consider, for example, the way in which the formal recognition of the universal 
dignity of all human beings in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man could go hand 
in hand with the exclusion of women or workers from participating in political 
decision-making. Or how one of the most fundamental assumptions of natural rights 
theory, the idea that “every man is born free”, coexisted for almost three centuries with 
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the institution and practice of slavery. Few people today would question the right of 
women to vote or defend the legitimacy of holding slaves; few would have doubts 
condemning apartheid or racial discrimination. There tends to be universal agreement 
on the validity of certain moral standards. Yet not so long ago several of these issues 
were subject to heated debate even on the side of an educated public. Several universal 
principles of justice, now standard reference in international human rights circles, were 
introduced through difficult processes of domestic change. They only reached the 
global sphere in a second stage, once there were enough states to have recognized and 
implemented them. The merit of political avant-gardes consisted in their taking the lead 
to initiate a process of confrontation which made possible the introduction such 
principles within the domestic public. Only in a successive moment did international 
institutionalization start taking place. 
Domestic structures have an essential role to play in the initial stages of protest 
campaigns, when people are familiarized with new repertoires of collective action and 
ideological innovation is introduced. Ordinary citizens must be able to understand the 
issues on the table, connect to them through local experiences, feel the need for 
political transformation. They ought to have a clear awareness of the limits of existent 
political practices in order to be eventually persuaded that alternative strategies are 
available and that things could go otherwise. 
 Consider for example the way in which women’s movements initiated with 
claims for domestic changes within a small number of countries before such claims 
entered the international domain. Despite the existence of several suffrage 
organizations in the nineteenth century in several countries, a real international 
campaign was initiated only in 1904, when the International Women's Suffrage 
Association (IWSA) was founded. Between 1890 and 1930, the struggle had been 
only domestic, with several groups fighting within various states and national 
governments making concessions only on the face of strong pressure. Neither did 
such pressure emerge by itself. Political avant-garde movements led by characters 
such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony in the United States or 
Millicent Garrett Fawcett and Emmeline Pankhurst in England constantly engaged 
in domestic campaigns of “moral proselytism” trying to persuade other women 
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about the importance of participating in public life and shift opinion in favour of 
their own cause.35  
To make their voice heard, suffragettes engaged in several acts of civil 
disobedience: they chained themselves to fences, resorted to hunger strike, broke 
public buildings and refused to contribute their taxes. Only after such political avant-
gardes succeeded having key states modify their electoral laws, did norm 
modification reach a threshold point. Then a “cascade” effect would occur and allow 
for easier subsequent transformations in a greater number of states. In the case of 
women’s suffrage, that threshold was reached in 1930 when twenty states (roughly 
one third of the total states system) had endorsed the claims of the movement. Once 
a number of key actors accepted such normative modifications, it was easier for 
domestic actors in other places to exercise pressure on their respective governments 
and introduce similar changes. Thus, while it took eighty years to the first twenty 
states to adopt women’s suffrage, in the twenty years that followed forty-eight 
countries had adopted the norm.36 
 A similar dynamic has been observed with regard to some of the greatest 
movements for social reform during both the 19th century (anti-slavery movement, 
workers’ movement) and the 20th century (anti-apartheid or anti-colonization 
movement).37 In all those cases the leading role for both raising consciousness on 
the exclusionary nature of specific political practices and creating political occasions 
for protesting and modifying them was played by domestic “avant-garde” 
movements: groups of committed intellectuals, social activists and enlightened 
political reformers without whom the democratic transformations we are all familiar 
with would have never occurred. The means through which these groups tried to 
exercise influence in the public, ranging from publishing political newspapers, to 
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spreading pamphlets, to public protest or strike, to institutional pressures, might 
have differed as much as in the case of artistic avant-gardes, but the goal pursued by 
all was a similar one: progressively improving on the quality of the democratic 
sphere by increasing the accountability of political institutions.  
Analogous processes may still be observed with regard to the internalization 
of human right norms in several authoritarian states, for example in Africa and 
Asia.38 The most effective campaigns here have been those able to address domestic 
publics in a way that persuaded them about the moral relevance of civil and social 
rights. The process has witnessed various phases: in a first stage both domestic and 
non-governmental actors, linked through transnational advocacy networks, tried to 
exercise pressures on governments without the legitimacy of their claims being yet 
recognized. This is also the stage in which the ability of avant-gardes to connect to a 
domestic public seems to have been most crucial. It was necessary to mobilize as 
many resources as possible in order to signal governments internal dissatisfaction 
and denounce their lack of moral standards, however traditional channels of 
representation were missing. In the absence of conventional institutional resources, 
avant-garde actors could only recur to rational argumentation, persuasion and 
symbolic campaigns linking their narratives to familiar historical episodes of social 
protest in order to convince fellow-citizens about the importance of certain moral 
principles.  
Where these campaigns were successful and obtained enough local support, 
governments started making rhetorical concessions. This opened the discursive 
space for further challenge on the side of critics thereby increasing the means 
available for putting more pressure. Questioned about their responsibility in rights’ 
violations, governments responded by either denying its occurrence or by rejecting 
the charge that they represented a systematic phenomenon. At this point, however, 
the confrontation  had become more detailed and parties recognized each other as 
valid interlocutors. This paved the way towards the definite internalization of human 
rights norms. Finally, once that process was over, specific states not only acted 
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following principles they would have initially rejected but even perceived 
themselves as pioneers in the region, trying to persuade other states to follow their 
route and listen to the claims of domestic activists. In all those cases the behavior of 
states could not have been easily predicted at the outset without taking into account 
the way in which local avant-gardes intervened to modify their goals and self-
perception. 
 
5. The meaning of a “cosmopolitan avant-garde” 
 
The struggle for inclusion in the polity of cosmopolitan imperatives should be 
considered in continuity with such historical efforts. Cosmopolitan discourses on global 
distributive equality could in fact be interpreted as one more political cause of 
expansion of the aims and scope of the polity, rendering it more sensitive to the 
concerns of subjects affected by deliberative processes from which they are territorially 
excluded and more responsive to ideals of global solidarity (rather than narrow self-
interest) within the international sphere.39 Applied to the cosmopolitan discourse, the 
concept of an “avant-garde movement” could be used to denote those political agents 
for whom the role of the state should not be limited to the protection of those who 
happen to share particular political boundaries, but ought to include in its franchise the 
interests of all those affected by its own policies or by the global policies that it 
contributes enforcing. 
Local cosmopolitan avant-gardes could be involved in the processes of 
influencing decision-formation and jointly transforming the collective institutions to 
which the citizens of particular states owe the possibility of a fair coordination of their 
public activities. They would campaign for substantive equality between states in the 
international sphere and activate themselves to reform their respective legislative and 
judiciary systems. They would also try to change the various international institutions 
in charge of regulating global processes of production and distribution of goods (eg. the 
market), the modalities of knowledge sharing and transfer (eg. educational schemes, the 
protection of sciences, arts and culture), military cooperation, and so on.  
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A local cosmopolitan avant-garde could comprise both institutional political 
actors as well as those individuals, social movements or civil associations constituting 
what one we might call the sphere of “civil society”.40 Among the former it is possible 
to list public officials, government representatives, various state agencies, political 
parties, and so on. To illustrate the latter one could to refer to the various associations 
and networks committed to particular civil or political causes such as the protection of 
the environment, migrants’ organizations and workers’ movements, the rights of 
minority-groups, anti-poverty campaigns or campaigns in favour of military 
disarmament. Through this broad characterization, we would capture both formal 
procedures of decision-making and decision enforcing and the more spontaneous forms 
of action in the public sphere that try to influence or reshape state-agenda in a way that 
reflects new democratic political imperatives. 
The cosmopolitan avant-garde would be committed to a universal view of 
social justice, to promoting inclusion and solidarity with foreigners in the domestic 
sphere and to establishing non-aggressive and non-exploitative international political 
institutions based on ideas of cooperative sovereignty. It would perceive domestic and 
international issues as interdependent on both moral and pragmatic grounds. As far as 
the former is concerned, it would argue that no state could claim to be just and 
democratic if it discriminates among citizens and strangers in the distribution of 
protection and social benefits, if it promotes egoistic foreign policies or if it unilaterally 
abuses its bargaining power in the international sphere. From the perspective of the 
latter, it would maintain that the policies a particular government promotes or endorses 
at the international level, the way it responds to various global political and economic 
challenges have important consequences for the well-being of its own citizens, just as 
the kind of decisions authorized by the latter by means of elections or other 
mechanisms of accountability matter enormously to those who are territorially excluded 
by a particular deliberative sphere.  
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Who might constitute the “cosmopolitan avant-garde”? A growing number of 
authors in recent years have documented the emergence and consolidation of various 
political groups and social movements aiming to raise public awareness and build trans-
national networks of protest against the negative externalities of neo-liberal 
globalization processes and in favour of more just and accountable international 
political institutions.41 Typically such networks include formal organizations (for 
example socialist, social-democratic and green political parties as well as trade unions) 
informal associations (groups campaigning on gender issues, religious or indigenous 
movements, land-workers and peasants’ organizations) as well as various branches of 
international non-governmental associations (such as Oxfam, Amnesty International, 
Emergency and so on).42 Some of these organizations are not new, they have emerged 
during previous mobilization campaigns (for example during the 1968 students’ and 
workers’ protests or in support of decolonization movements in the Third world) and 
survived their temporary decline only to re-emerge and readapt their agenda to new 
political circumstances.43 Others constitute recently created groups targeting neo-liberal 
global economic institutions and advocating trans-national control over markets and a 
fair global distribution of resources. It is, for one example, the case of the French 
association ATTAC, now present in several European countries as well as North 
Africa, Latin America and Canada, founded in 1997 with the aim of promoting control 
over global economic transactions (ATTAC stands for Action for a Tobin Tax to Aid 
Citizens).44  
Within the model of political association outlined in the previous chapter the 
role of the cosmopolitan avant-garde in transforming the polity in a way that reflects 
principles of international solidarity and global inclusion would appear to be crucial. 
On the one hand emphasizing its very existence already responds to the critique that 
cosmopolitan imperatives are unable to mobilize the citizens of a particular society on 
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issues that elude their direct interests and immediate spheres of concern. It allows to 
show, for one, that the citizens of Italy, Germany or the US may, and in fact do, 
participate in mass mobilizations against, for example, neo-liberal and exploitative 
policies promoted by international financial institutions in Africa and Asia or against, 
say, forced intervention in the Middle East. 
On the other hand, by focusing on the role of the cosmopolitan avant-garde in 
taking the lead to challenge the establishment of unfair rules of international interaction 
it is possible to respond to a second critique usually made to cosmopolitanism. This 
critique underlines its inadequate reliance on limited individual actions to bring about 
large-scale global political transformations and points out at the weaknesses of this 
perspective in resolving consequent collective action problems.45 Our emphasis on the 
cosmopolitan avant-garde shifts attention away from the charitable initiatives of 
individual citizens and focuses on the activity of collective political agents – both civil 
society and institutional ones – which act as intermediaries between ordinary citizens 
on the one hand and domestic and international structures on the other. Similarly to 
historical avant-gardes mobilizing for inclusion in the democratic sphere, their purpose 
is twofold: on the one hand to make the former (citizens) progressively more sensitive 
to public campaigns raising awareness on pressing global issues, and on the other to 
make the latter (institutions) more responsive to political claims that require a shift in 
the international policies of the state. 
Consider, for example, the recent call from activists in Europe and the United 
States to boycott the products of multinational companies which make profits by 
employing cheap labour force - in some cases child labour - in particular areas of the 
Third World. Several campaigns of mobilization including the organization of public 
debates and sit-ins, propaganda and information campaigns, activist demonstrations at 
the outlets of Nike, Levis, Gap etc., have tried to raise public awareness on the labour 
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policies of such multinational corporations abroad. In many US universities, student 
associations have organized rallies and educative events, occupied campus buildings, 
and threatened hunger strikes, in trying to put pressure on their university 
administrations to end contracts with sportswear companies responsible for paying 
manufactured workers abroad salaries which did not cover even minimal subsistence 
needs.46 These activities urged fellow-citizens to think about the ethical consequences 
of their preferences as consumers and to take their share of political responsibility in 
opposing exploitative practices promoted by multinational corporations.47   
Consider, for another example, the pro-migrant campaigns of international 
networks of associations active in countries with restrictive immigration and asylum 
policies such as the members of the European Union, the United States or Australia. 
Building alliances between unionized workers, immigrants, refugees and simple 
militants these associations have organized international border blockades, planned 
actions of civil disobedience in check-points and coordinated information seminars on 
non-violent resistance to protest against the deportation of migrants, denounce the 
miserable conditions of detention camps and promote the extension of citizenship 
rights. The goal of such activist campaigns is not simply to target the institutions 
responsible for the unjust treatment of migrants at the border but also raise public 
awareness among fellow-citizens about the limits of a globalization, which only applies 
to the free movement of capital and goods but increases barriers among people.  
These initiatives may of course attract criticism for being merely facade 
activities, unable to modify the structural conditions from which unjust globalization 
processes depend. It is certainly true that without the kind of structural institutional 
adjustments that only states can provide civil society actors would have limited options 
of change and perhaps obtain merely symbolic rewards. The activity of civic 
cosmopolitan agents relies on institutional guarantees for security, the provision of 
public goods and the creation of conditions under which oppositional groups may grow, 
develop and exercise pressures on institutions. In several South American countries, for 
example, global justice activists literally risk their life on a daily basis and alarming 
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reports continue to arrive on trade union members, peasants or members of civic groups 
being killed or falling victim of paramilitary violence.48 In all these situations, the 
political empowerment of oppositional groups and a share of institutional 
representation in state decision-making would appear to be crucial. Connecting local 
struggles to trans-national networks of advocacy on global issues has proved to be one 
of the most successful strategies of mobilisation with this regard. 
The environmental movement, whose agenda in the 1950s was entirely 
unknown, offers one example of effective avant-garde work linking global issues to 
local activism. By the end of the 1990s the movement had managed to establish itself as 
one of the most important trans-national networks and environmental issues are now 
firmly part of any electoral agenda in democratic states. One of the main factors 
contributing to its growth was the capacity to connect successfully an issue with 
potentially global impact such as the environment to the local struggles of several 
indigenous communities and peasant unions in South America and Asia. The high point 
in its mobilization campaigns was reached when Washington activists made contact 
with rubber tapper organizers and indigenous communities from Acre (Brazil) who had 
been fighting since 1975 to ensure land use rights and improve living conditions in the 
Amazonian rainforest. The former helped indigenous communities gain visibility for 
their struggles in the international domain by supplying them important information 
and access to international decision-making arenas, whereas the latter helped to show 
the Western public that tropical deforestation was more than a set of technical or 
biological issues and affected the living conditions of depredated peasants. Despite the 
subsequent assassination of Chico Mendes, the movement’s leader, indigenous 
communities and international activists succeeded in exercising joint pressure on the 
Brazilian government and on World Bank representatives and obtained important 
results, later institutionalized through the newly created environmentalist Worker’s 
Party Government of Acre.49 
It is undeniable that in many countries, especially Western democracies, 
cosmopolitan avant-garde movements need more political cohesion, more clarity of 
purpose, more transparent mechanisms of accountability and greater ideological 
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awareness in order to be politically effective. They also need to be able to mobilize the 
larger public, in particular the working class and petty-bourgeoisie, which are likely to 
suffer more from the negative externalities of globalization processes but seem to react 
by either manifesting symptoms of political “disaffection”50 or seeking refuge in 
reactionary, populist and xenophobic policies.51 Here the need to come up with 
innovative projects linking the older modes of political participation, a reinvented role 
for the state as the major promoter of global reform and new discourses of global 
inclusion and solidarity would appear most urgent. Important examples of joint-
initiatives from trade-union activists operating across borders, such as the long-standing 
cooperation between IG Metal in Germany and the Brazilian Metalworkers affiliated 
with CUT (Central Unica dos Trabalhadores), show that the use of global contacts to 
strengthen pressure on local governments and corporate organizations may be an 
effective strategy of combining the global and the local.   
Clarifying how local civic and institutional agents should interact with each 
other and within trans-national networks, what degree of inclusion in the state 
cosmopolitan social movements should seek in order to make their claims more 
effective, and to what extent political parties should try to influence civic actors or 
involve them in electoral processes is a complex issue. An adequate answer to this 
puzzle would require a more case-by-case analysis taking into account the specificities 
of each political community, its tradition of social mobilization, its institutional past 
and prospects of reform and the ways its public culture has historically developed.52 
The emergence of a ‘cosmopolitan avant-garde’ seeking to introduce global issues in 
the agenda of states and include global justice imperatives in the moral commitments of 
ordinary citizens is after all a recent phenomenon. The movement still needs to 
consolidate; the political and cultural features of its various components are to emerge 
more clearly, before avant-garde cosmopolitan principles are transformed into a fully 
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coherent political alternative. At this stage of the process it would seem that the real 
interest of cosmopolitan avant-garde initiatives all over the world lies not so much in 
what the movement achieves but in what kind of alternative discourses on political 
responsibility it manages to create; not in what problems it resolves but in what issues it 
problematises. Without a widespread  public awareness on the relevance of a more 
inclusive democratic sphere, without a massive assumption of political responsibility 
on the side of the citizens’ of both affluent and poor states even those structural and 
institutional processes required to fight unjust globalization processes would lack the 
popular support needed to be established in the first place. It is the long-term issue of 
mass-political motivation rather than that of making concrete proposals in favour of 
cosmopolitan political structures (a question which relies on political practice as much 
as on normative argument) that our analysis of the role of the cosmopolitan avant-garde 
has mainly tried to address.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have tried to explore the concept of an “avant-garde” movement in 
order to illustrate how the political community might be transformed in a way that 
reflects global justice imperatives. The idea of relying on existing civic and political 
agents who are already morally and politically sensitive to the cosmopolitan cause is 
meant to provide a response to critiques focusing on the absent motivational strength of 
cosmopolitanism and the possibility of constructing cosmopolitan initiatives in the 
absence of a global ethos of solidarity. Within the model of political association that I 
have outlined in the previous chapter the role of a cosmopolitan avant-garde in both 
educating the masses to alternative discourses of political agency in response to neo-
liberal globalization processes and in taking the lead to collectively enforce the political 
transformations required would appear to be crucial.  
Indeed, the cosmopolitan avant-garde is rooted in a particular public sphere but 
it is also outward looking. One of its major assets is thus the ability to address political 
concerns in a way that makes sense to every participant of a shared political culture and 
use existing political structures and coercive mechanisms in a way that progressively 
seeks to expand the mechanisms of democratic accountability beyond those nationally 
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available. It concentrates political efforts in both trying to increase citizens’ awareness 
on pressing global issues and gather their consent in order to modify the imperatives 
guiding state-behaviour in the international sphere. 
Of course the modes of action, the degree and type of involvement of the  
representatives of the “cosmopolitan avant-garde” might vary across places and 
according to the specific development of political campaigns for the promotion of 
cosmopolitan justice. They might also vary according to the specific features of the 
polity in which such attempts are taking place. One could expect the nature of protest 
campaigns in the United States to be quite different from that of India or Brazil, 
precisely because of the different historical development of public political interactions 
in each of these countries, and of the different degree of involvement and influence of 
these states in the international sphere. As a matter of political organization the 
cosmopolitan avant-garde has still a long way to go in homogenizing its objectives, 
building transparent international networks of coordination, sorting out the degree of 
inclusion and developing coherent proposals on which set of political structures would 
best accommodate the claims of global justice. However, the existence of groups of 
people committed to the cosmopolitan cause and putting pressures on their own states 
all over the world in order to modify their rules of cooperation proves that the 
realization of global justice is not just a pious wish; it is a reality in motion. 
Justifying global cosmopolitanism from an ideal perspective is not enough to 
guarantee the feasibility of that project in non-ideal circumstances. Without a collective 
subject animating the general will in each particular community, without historically 
reflected goals, “cosmopolitan” ideals appear unhelpfully detached from local reality. 
At worse they end up nurturing political elitism, at best they construct moral utopias. 
Even a broadly shared moral consent on the necessity of global justice might not be 
able to substitute the political and cultural mechanisms of adaptation grounded on a 
particular collective self-understanding. It is as important to start a theory of global 
justice with ideal principles, as it is to conclude it with at least some idea on how to 
cope with the non-ideal dimension of politics. Worrying about the normative 
justification of global equality matters as much as thinking about concrete political 
processes of hegemony-construction, popular participation and power exercise which 
serve to realize abstract principles of distributive justice. Without cosmopolitanism at 
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the level of principle, statist agency is morally indefensible. Without statism at the level 
of agency, cosmopolitan principles are politically unsustainable. The aim of this work 
has been to defend a statist cosmopolitan approach to global justice able to account for 
both principles and agency. 
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